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Ainsi les histoires particulières représentent la suite des choses qui sont arrivés à un 
people dans tout leur détail. Mais afin de tout entendre, il faut savoir le rapport que 
chaque histoire peut avoir avec les autres, ce qui se fait par un abrégé où l’on voie 
comme d’un coup d’œil tout l’ordre des temps. 
Particular histories show the sequence of events that have occurred in a nation in all 
their detail. But in order to understand everything, we must know what connection 
that history might have with others; and that can be done by a condensation in which 
we can perceive, as in one glance, the entire sequence of time. 
- Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Discours sur l’Histoire Universelle, 1681 
 
 
Mais, lui dis-je, si parmi tant de matériaux bruts et informes, vous choisissiez de quoi 
vous faire un édifice à votre usage; si en retranchant tous les détails des guerres aussi 
ennuyeux qu’infidèles, toutes les petites négociations qui n’ont été que des fourberies 
inutiles, toutes les aventures particulières que étouffent les grands événements; si en 
conservant celles qui peignent les mœurs, vous faisiez de ce chaos un tableau général et 
bien arrêté; si vous cherchiez à démêler dans les événements l’histoire de l’esprit 
humain, croiriez-vous avoir perdu votre temps?  
But, I said to her, if, in this vast amount of raw material, you selected what will allow 
you to build something for your own use; if you omitted all the details of each war, 
which are as boring as they are uncertain; if you omitted all the small negotiations, 
which turned out to be useless treachery; all the particular incidents, which obliterate 
the great events; if, keeping what pertains to manners, you turned this chaos into a 
general and definite picture; if you tried to tease out the story of the human mind from 
these events; do you think it would be a waste of your time? 
 
- Voltaire, Essai sur les Mœurs, 1754 
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of Copenhagen, which through its generous grant of an open stipend for 
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cial support; to Nicolai Bagger, whose thorough readings of my work pro-
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search stay at the University of Chicago; to Stuart Ward, Head of Depart-
ment of the SAXO institute, for his attempts to reform this arcane insti-
tution; and finally to Mette and Lea, my wife and daughter, for reminding 
me of the essential unimportance of academic work in the great scheme 
of things. 
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Introduction 
Le détail méthodique de la doctrine chinoise … mérite de servir de modèle à tous les 
États. 
The methodical detail of the Chinese doctrine … should serve as a model for all states. 
- François Quesnay, Le Despotisme de la Chine, 1767 
 
These years, it seems, China is everywhere. Four decades into the reform 
movement begun by Deng Xiaoping, China has finally entered the global 
community and reclaimed its prominence as one of the leading powers on 
the international scene. An uncountable number of books with titles such 
as “When China Rules the World”, “China goes Global”, and “China Ris-
ing” seems to come forward every year, trumpeting its arrival.1 And busi-
ness leaders, politicians, and commentators constantly remind us of the 
opportunities and dangers emanating from the East. For many a leader 
and pundit “The China Model” seems to offer an interesting alternative to 
the ideals of Western Liberal Democracy.2 
Three centuries ago, a similar fascination with China engulfed Europe. 
Jesuit missionaries returned from China with wondrous tales of an enor-
mous, glorious, and well-ordered empire. Merchant ships arrived in Euro-
pean ports carrying hugely popular Chinese luxuries, such as silk, tea and 
porcelain. And leading intellectuals of the age, among them Voltaire, 
J.H.G. Justi and François Quesnay, wrote books praising China, and argu-
ing for the strategic emulation of the Chinese social order.3 In China, as 
we see in the quote above, was found an inspiring model for the construc-
tion of ideal societies. 
In the 19th and 20th centuries, however, between these two instances of 
European Sino-mania, China was largely forgotten. As Europeans were 
busy constructing a modern, industrial world, China did not seem to offer 
anything other than a textbook example of a stagnant society, trapped in 
the obscurity of tradition. If any “China Model” was ever mentioned, it 
                                              
1 Jacques, When China Rules the World; Shambaugh, China Goes Global; Liu, China Rising. 
2 Bell, The China Model. 
3 Lee, China and Europe. 
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was only to provide a contrast to European society, a stagnant, poor, irra-
tional, and oppressive other to the dynamic, rich, rational and free Western 
civilization. 
The 19th and 20th centuries were also the time when the modern historical 
and sociological sciences were established, and so the overwhelmingly 
negative view of China was carried into these fields. In the construction 
of a modern World History, China was placed at the sidelines, outside of 
the main narrative of historical progression. The view of China was that 
of a static, self-sufficient culture, withdrawn and isolated by its own willing 
from the rest of the world. 
With the coming of the recent wave of Sino-mania to the historical sci-
ences, this picture seems to finally be changing. The Chinese historical 
experience is again recognized to form an indispensable part of World 
History, and scholars are now turning their efforts toward the daunting 
task of incorporating East and West into a unified, world historical frame-
work. 
This thesis forms my attempt at contributing modestly to this task. It fol-
lows in the footsteps of those great thinkers of the 18th century who saw 
in China a society worth studying for understanding the European socie-
ties of their time. As they did, I will here use Chinese society as a model 
of social organization that can provide insight into the nature of contem-
poraneous European societies, and in the nature of world historical devel-
opment more generally. However, we differ in that my use of a China 
Model is not intended as a normative prescription for social development, 
but as a merely descriptive one. The triumphalist Sino-centrism evident in 
many modern works of Global History, echoing the moralizing voices of 
the 18th-century thinkers, does no good to the field. It is in the sober, dis-
interested (as far as that can be practiced) introduction of the Chinese ex-
perience to world historical problematics, that we can find value. 
Even though 18th-century thinkers like Voltaire presented a quite idealized 
picture of Chinese society, they were not merely inventing a utopia like 
that of Thomas More. From the writings of the Jesuits they recognized 
that China provided an example of an advanced society comparable to 
their own, and governed by similar social dynamics. In their pre-modern 
frameworks of mind, China did not constitute an inescapable other, but a 
society dealing with similar problems, subject to the same limitations that 
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European societies were struggling with.4 Only the specific solutions were 
different (and by their account, superior). 
This deep truth of pre-modern comparability was temporarily lost with 
the onset of modernity. But it is precisely the fact of comparability that 
makes the study of Chinese history useful for understanding European 
history of the age of Voltaire. Beneath all the superficial differences, Eu-
rope and China remained essentially agrarian, organic societies, and the 
same pre-modern dynamics of change shaped both worlds.5 These funda-
mental, pre-modern dynamics are the true objects of this thesis. 
The study of large-scale phenomena 
How can we study such general and abstract things as pre-modern dynam-
ics of change? Seen one way, it seems the height of arrogance to assume 
to contribute to such a large problem in such a limited format as that of a 
PhD thesis. To this, I must plead partially guilty. However, I would argue 
that there is something to be said for the reasonableness of such an en-
deavor. 
Like in any other field of scholarship, progress in history has generally 
involved continuous specialization of scholars into ever more narrow 
fields of inquiry. Overall, this is both a necessary and good development, 
as it results in the deepening of historical knowledge and the continued 
refinement and nuancing of earlier scholarship. But the continuous spe-
cialization also produces a dilemma for the contextualization and integra-
tion of the produced knowledge. As historians delve into the study of nar-
rowly defined times and places, they achieve increasingly idiosyncratic un-
derstandings of their historical subject. Historical reality is irreducibly 
complex, so any deeper exploration of a historical process will inevitably 
discover exceptions, irregularities and counterpoints to any theorization. 
The closer you come to total knowledge of a concrete historical phenom-
enon, the harder it becomes to contextualize and situate in a broader 
framework.6 
                                              
4 Wrigley, Continuity, Chance and Change argued the same point with reference to the clas-
sical economists. 
5 See also Wrigley for the essentiality of the distinction between “organic” and “mineral-
based” economies. 
6 Cf. Hall, Powers and Liberties, chap. 1. 
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But context and broad frameworks are just as necessary for historical 
scholarship as ideographic knowledge. 7  In order to resolve what the 
broader meanings of specific historical phenomena are, you have to look 
outside of the local setting, and place it in a broader framework. Compar-
ison and contextualization also provide a crucial corrective for idiosyn-
cratic explanations of local historical developments, as it enables us to look 
closer into cause and effect, and to weigh the relative importance of dif-
ferent factors of change.8 
All too often, historians trained in the tradition of detailed archival studies 
refrain from engaging directly with these larger frameworks, as they feel 
they have no educational basis from which to engage them.9 When histo-
rians do venture into the realm of broader synthesis, it is often only after 
a long career engaged in local historical studies, which then tends to serve 
as the place from which they form their broader thoughts. Alternatively, 
the task is left for the sociologists, who share no such compunctions. It is 
thus historical sociologists, from Marx and Weber to Charles Tilly and 
Michael Mann, who has provided most of the great works of historical 
synthesis. 
In this thesis, I therefore take a somewhat unusual approach. Moving in a 
different direction than that of increased specialization, I aim to tackle a 
number of large-scale problematics head on. In this brief space, I deal with 
broad geographical areas, long timeframes, and multiple subjects. Inevita-
bly, much detail and sophistication is lost along the way, but I hope to 
show that something is to be gained as well. By starting out relatively ‘un-
burdened’ by idiographic knowledge, to use a well-placed euphemism, I 
hope there is more room for generalities. And though this thesis remains 
heavily indebted to historical sociology, as will be clear along the way, it 
aims to keep its grounding as a historical study, retaining a place for the 
historically specific and unique. 
Ultimately though, any practicable study must involve some narrowing of 
its field and scope. However widely one may wish to spread one’s arms, 
every inquiry must remain limited, and this thesis is no exception, though 
                                              
7 For a discussion of the importance of world historical contextualization, see Bang, 
Irregulare Aliquod Corpus? 
8 Cf. Bloch, “Pour Une Historie Comparée Des Sociétés Européennes.” 
9 Kocka and Haupt, “Comparison and Beyond,” 13–5. 
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it is placed at the wide end of the spectrum. My way of entry into the study 
of large-scale, pre-modern dynamics is dealt with in the following sections. 
Defining the problem 
On a general level, this thesis deals with dynamics of change in pre-mod-
ern society. Specifically, it deals with the problem of how to interpret de-
velopments in the realms of economy, state formation and the formation 
of social elites in the century and a half preceding the industrial revolution, 
from the middle of the 17th century to the end of the 18th century. This is 
done through a comparative study of the relevant developments in three 
historical polities – Qing China, Bourbon France, and the Austrian Habs-
burg Empire.10 In broad terms, I argue that developments observed in all 
three fields of study can be largely accounted for in terms of the continu-
ous workings of essentially pre-modern dynamics shared by all three soci-
eties. Consequently, I argue that we should abandon the framework of 
modernization that has traditionally provided the structure for historical 
scholarship of the period. 
The Great Divergence and beyond 
The problems dealt with in this thesis are in important ways connected to 
what has become known as The Great Divergence-debate. This debate, 
with its name derived from a book published in 2000 by Kenneth Pomer-
anz, constitutes the most recent iteration of the recurrent investigation of 
the question of why and how modernity emerged, and why it did so spe-
cifically in Europe.11 In the past two decades, the problem of “why Eu-
rope?” has been enlivened by the challenge to traditional interpretations 
coming from a group of scholars customarily referred to as the ‘California 
School’, as many of them worked out of Californian institutions. Ground-
ing their work in structured comparisons between China on the one side 
and either Britain or Europe as a whole on the other, the ‘Californians’ 
argued that the Eurasian world up to as late as 1750 or 1800 remained a 
“world of surprising resemblances”. 12  The Great Divergence between 
                                              
10 From here on, the Austrian branch of the Habsburg domains will be referred to 
simply as the ‘Habsburg Empire’. 
11 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. 
12 Pomeranz, 29; Important works of the California School include Wong, China Trans-
formed, 1997; Frank, ReOrient; Li, Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, 1620-1850; Marks, 
The Origins of the Modern World; Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization; Goody, 
The Theft of History; Goldstone, Why Europe?; Flynn and Giráldez, China and the Birth of 
Globalization in the 16th Century. 
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East and West, they generally argued, occurred late, as a result of limited 
and specific contingencies and thus not as the result of a general develop-
mental trend. 
The claims of the California School naturally invited a great amount of 
critical response.13 Most forceful among the critics was perhaps Peer Vries, 
who responded by issuing two large volumes consisting of detailed com-
parisons of state and economy between Britain and China in the ‘long 18th 
century’, and concluded that the world remained a “world of striking dif-
ferences”.14 By the late 2010’s the debate seems to have lost much of its 
earlier vigor, with a synthesis beginning to emerge out of the rubble.15 
The Great Divergence-debate has pushed comparative studies of the East 
and West far ahead, and much of this thesis relies on the insights produced 
by the participating scholars. However, the overall structure of the debate 
was also characterized by a number of methodological problems specifi-
cally relating to the objects of comparison. As a rule, the debate has fo-
cused on comparing China with either Britain or Europe as a whole, which 
presents us with a problem regarding the representativeness of the studies.  
In fact, one conclusion to come out of the debate was that Britain was 
clearly quite exceptional in many aspects of its economic and political de-
velopment. Often, other European examples, especially France, are drawn 
into the debate to highlight the unique developmental path of Britain. This 
is of course in itself unproblematic, but it becomes questionable when 
British developments are subsequently used as a stand-in for European 
development more generally. A particularly clear example of this is to be 
found in Linda Weiss and John Hobson’s 1995 States and Economic Develop-
ment. In a section titled “The emergence of the strong state”, Weiss and 
Hobson compare French and British central governments to show how 
the British state developed extraordinary capacities to appropriate societal 
resources. A couple of pages later, the ‘European’ state is compared to the 
Chinese, which they argue “contrasted clearly” with the former. However, 
                                              
13 E.g. Huang, “Development or Involution”; Brenner and Isett, “England’s Divergence 
from China’s Yangzi Delta”; Bryant, “The West and the Rest Revisited”; Elvin, “De-
fining the Explicanda”; Vries, “The California School.” 
14 Vries, Escaping Poverty, quotation from p. 410; Vries, State, Economy and the Great Diver-
gence. 
15 Some early examples of the emerging synthesis can be found in Rosenthal and Wong, 
Before and Beyond Divergence; Goldstone, “Divergence in Cultural Trajectories”; Li and 
Zanden, “Before the Great Divergence?” See also the articles in Tijdschrift voor Sociale en 
Economische Geschiedenis 12, no. 2 (2015). 
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the numbers for relative tax efficiency they use as a basis for this contrast 
is actually the same for the French and Chinese examples.16 Inadvertently, 
Weiss and Hobson thus come to use Britain as a stand-in for Europe, 
despite their previous use of France as a contrasting case for British 
achievements. 
This example in Weiss and Hobson admittedly is quite extreme, but it il-
lustrates a general point. However much these Britain-China comparisons 
help us understand the emergence of modernity in Britain, they tell us very 
little about social development in the rest of Europe. Until well into the 
processes of industrialization, there was simply no single ‘European’ de-
velopmental path. As Vries puts it “There is no such thing as a ‘rising 
Europe’.”17 
In this thesis, I have responded to this insight by moving my focus away 
from Britain to a different set of comparanda. While keeping China as the 
basis for comparison, I have moved the European side of the comparison 
to polities seldom used as European models in their own right, France and 
the Habsburg Empire. Although not commonly used, there are good rea-
sons for choosing these in particular. 
Continental empires 
The choice of Britain, the birthplace of the industrial revolution, makes 
eminent sense if what we want to study are the reasons for the emergence 
of modernity. But for the very same reasons, if we want to study the dy-
namics of the pre-modern world, we need to look elsewhere. If we want 
to focus our study on the centers of importance for the pre-modern Euro-
pean world, France and the Habsburg Empire seem the ideal candidates.  
In the centuries leading up to the industrial revolution, these two empires 
were the dominant players on the European continent. In terms of size 
and population, with both states approaching 30 million subjects by the 
end of the 18th century, they outranked every other European power by 
several factors. Politically, until the ‘diplomatic revolution’ of 1756, it was 
the struggles between these two great powers that shaped the fate of the 
continent. And in terms of prestige, it was to Versailles and (to a lesser 
degree) Vienna that European rulers and elites looked for inspiration, pat-
ronage, and cultural sophistication. 
                                              
16 Weiss and Hobson, States and Economic Development, 42–50. 
17 Vries, “Replies to My Commentators.” 
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France and the Habsburg Empire also make sense to use in a comparison 
with China because of the similar status of all three as continental, agrarian 
empires.18 Although France, unlike China or the Habsburg Empire, did 
engage in overseas colonial ventures, their overseas colonies never attained 
anything near the importance of its European possessions, in the way that 
it would for Britain or the Dutch Republic. France remained primarily a 
continental empire, dominated by its agricultural sector. And so, less con-
troversially, did China and the Habsburg Empire. 
The common structure of these three societies facilitates comparison be-
tween them. It also makes any conclusions reached on the basis of this 
comparison less valid for other types of societies, such as city-states or 
truly sea-borne empires, but that is an acceptable price to pay, given that 
continental, agrarian empires seem to have been the dominant form of 
social organization throughout pre-modern history.19 
Choice of time-frame and the early modern 
The time-frame of this study, as previously mentioned, I have defined as 
c. 1650-1800, though sometimes with a slightly ‘long tail’ at the beginning. 
There are several reasons for that choice. Firstly, as I will discuss more 
thoroughly in the following chapter, being the period leading up to the 
industrial revolution makes it central for the study of precisely where the 
limits of the modern lie. Interpretations of development in this period are 
to a great extent colored by the expectations of a budding modernity. By 
focusing on this contested space, there is more to gain from showing the 
continued predominance of pre-modern dynamics of change. 
Secondly, as luck would have it, the period between the mid-17th and the 
late 18th centuries is a period of remarkable similarities across our three 
cases. All three experienced substantial social and state breakdowns in the 
period leading up to 1650, which resulted in a considerable social reorgan-
ization. The following century and a half was a period of state consolida-
tion, elite reorganization, and from the 18th century also economic and 
demographic expansion. By the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 
19th centuries, all three societies again came to experience major social and 
political problems, and their economic and political trajectories diverged 
sharply. The stable and relatively similar experiences of the period c. 1650-
                                              
18 See chapter 4 for a discussion of my use of the term ‘empire’ to describe European 
polities.   
19 Haldon and Goldstone, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation,” 17–9. 
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1800 make the task of comparison between our cases much easier, and 
help focus the study on large-scale trends rather than specific events. 
Breaking off the study at the momentous events around the end of the 
18th century may seem problematic in that it is precisely there we see a 
substantial divergence between our three cases. Indeed, it can be argued, 
it is only there that we can observe the natural end-points of the dynamics 
I seek to explore, and so by refraining from dealing with it, I artificially 
create the conditions of similarity that I wish to argue for. This objection 
has some merit, and can only be incompletely addressed. However, I 
would argue that we cannot assume that later developments grow naturally 
out of earlier ones, and they therefore should give form to our understand-
ing of the preceding period. The point of this study is precisely to show 
how far up in time we can follow the workings of pre-modern dynamics 
of change, and that implies a radical discontinuity between the premodern 
18th century and the modern developments that followed it. Here, I ask 
only to save the objection for later, and follow my argument through. 
Themes of comparison 
The central themes of comparison of this thesis are as mentioned eco-
nomic development, state formation and elite formation. Each of these is 
dealt with in a separate chapter. Each chapter includes the discussion of 
important previous research on the field, which due to the breadth of the 
study would be too diffuse and unwieldy to treat together, as well as the 
presentation of important theoretical models. The separation of these 
three themes is a purely practical matter. In reality, all three are so closely 
intertwined as to make any separation very difficult. This is recognized 
here by the fact that each chapter regularly refers to developments de-
scribed in other chapters. As a practical matter, the distinctions neverthe-
less remain analytically meaningful. 
The themes of economy, state, and elites are chosen because of the tradi-
tionally supposed importance of each to the emergence of the modern 
world. As such, they have been the central objects of inquiry for studies 
on the Great Divergence during the past two decades and essentially all 
the way back to Marx and Weber. As the central battlegrounds for discus-
sions of emergent modernity, they are likewise the natural objects of study 
for the present attempt to show the continued importance of pre-modern 
dynamics. By dealing with the themes most influenced by the expectations 
of modernity, as discussed in the following chapter, any conclusion 
15 
 
reached regarding the explanatory power of pre-modern frameworks will 
stand out so much the stronger. 
A subject conspicuously absent in this thesis, due to its equally strong 
claim to be central for the emergence of modernity, is the areas of tech-
nology, science, and cultural and intellectual history. However, there are 
reasons for their absence as well. It is far from the case that I disregard 
their importance for modernity. As the debate on the Great Divergence 
has proceeded, older economistic and materialist explanations for the on-
set of modernity have gradually come to give way to more cultural and 
intellectual explanations. This insight has come from a variety of scholars 
on all sides of the debate, and I fully support their conclusions.20 But what 
I believe to be equally clear is that developments in these areas did not 
matter greatly for either economy, state or elites on the Eurasian continent 
until at a very late time in history. The world of the 17th and 18th centuries 
was not made in the minds of Grotius, Bodin, Montesquieu, Hobbes, 
Smith, Newton, or anyone else of the thinkers usually connected with in-
tellectual modernity. What I hope to show is that state, economy, and so-
cial structure instead evolved gradually in a still pre-modern world, follow-
ing pre-modern dynamics. And they evolved to be stable in that world, 
not to create another. 
Comparative methodology 
Given the comparative nature of this project, a short discussion of the 
methodological issues related to this form of study is necessary. Due to 
the inherent tendencies toward specialization of historical scholarship, as 
discussed above, the comparative method has remained somewhat periph-
eral to the field. But as Marc Bloch already remarked in the late 1920’s, 
comparison is an essential tool for dealing with explanation of historical 
phenomena.21 It is, in fact, the only method of testing explanatory hypoth-
eses in historical scholarship, as historians cannot make use of the experi-
mental method common to other sciences. So, since this thesis aims to 
                                              
20 E.g. Vries, Escaping Poverty; Goldstone, “Divergence in Cultural Trajectories”; Pomer-
anz, “Ten Years After”; McCloskey, Bourgeois Dignity; Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy; 
Elvin, “Defining the Explicanda”; Jacob, Scientific Culture. 
21 Bloch, “Pour Une Historie Comparée Des Sociétés Européennes”; For a succinct 
condensation of Bloch’s views, see Sewell, “Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative 
History.” 
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explain historical phenomena in terms of general, pre-modern dynamics, 
the comparative method is essential here. 
Comparative studies are generally used in two ways – what Jürgen Kocka 
and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt identify as the ‘contrasting type’ and the ‘uni-
versalizing type’.22 The contrasting comparison seeks to explain divergent 
development by focusing on elements of difference between the com-
pared cases, while the universalizing comparison seeks to establish general 
patterns and theories of development. Though in practice most studies 
involve some mixing of both strategies, often one can be identified as 
dominant in any given study. Most of the literature on the Great Diver-
gence, given its explicit goal of investigating the causes for the emergence 
of the modern world, employs mainly contrastive comparison. This thesis, 
with its goal of establishing a common framework for pre-modern devel-
opment, is an example of a universalizing comparison. 
The comparative method is connected with a number of methodological 
problems. First is the inherent danger of over-generalization. When look-
ing at historical development across several societies, especially in a uni-
versalizing framework, very different phenomena easily come to be flat-
tened into an overly generalized pattern, losing their individuality in the 
process. An example of this kind of over-generalization is the overzealous 
application of Marxist notions of ‘feudalism’ to widely different societies, 
squeezing every phenomenon to fit into the general model. As generaliza-
tion is a necessity for comparative research, this problem can only be tack-
led by continually weighing the benefits and problems of each explanatory 
model, and by a willingness to continually refine or discard these models 
where necessary. 
Second is the problem potentially arising from treating each object of 
comparison, or ‘society’, as a black box, independent of external and inter-
case influences.23 In the context of this study, how do we distinguish be-
tween whether a similar development is caused by common underlying 
dynamics, or the result of interaction between societies? However, the 
scale of the phenomena studied here makes this problem less pressing. In 
a longer time-frame, the concrete way in which a model of organization is 
introduced is less relevant than the question of how or why it could remain 
effective or stable, which points back to deeper structural dynamics. For 
                                              
22 Kocka and Haupt, “Comparison and Beyond,” 2–3. 
23 See Werner and Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison.” 
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example, the question of whether European observations of Chinese so-
ciety influenced social organization in Europe is of course interesting in 
its own right, but what really matters for this study is the structural simi-
larities between China and Europe that made imitation of China seem fea-
sible to these observers. Here, I distance myself from the growing trend 
of ‘connected-’ ‘transnational-’, ‘transfer-’ or ‘entangled histories’, which 
takes global interaction as the object of study.24 
A third problem lies in the choice of units of comparison. Even as I here 
follow the usual pattern of taking states as the primary units of comparison, 
there is no reason to expect state boundaries to coincide neatly with self-
contained economic units or arenas of elite interaction. Additionally, there 
are also obvious problems with comparing the continent-sized China with 
the much smaller European states, as the former will inevitably be far 
more diverse than the latter.25 For the sake of structure, I have neverthe-
less opted to keep the state territories as the boundaries of my study 
throughout the thesis, and this constitutes a limiting factor for my work. 
The fourth and last problem dealt with here concerns what should be re-
garded as the basis for comparison. The traditional procedure for East-
West comparison has been to lay out European developments as the basic 
pattern, to which Chinese developments then have been compared, assert-
ing similarities and differences. In his book China Transformed, R. Bin Wong 
forcefully criticized this strategy for privileging European developments 
as ‘normal’, while Chinese developments came to be seen as less successful 
deviations from European norms.26 For Wong, the solution was to be 
found in a ‘reciprocal comparison’, where each side of the comparison is 
respectively interpreted in light of the other.27 This enabled a kind of the-
oretical equalization, with both sides seen as deviations in relation to each 
other.  This thesis can be said to go a step further than Wong, and con-
sistently uses China as the basis to which France and the Habsburg Empire 
are compared. As the European experience is so ingrained in our historical 
understanding, I believe we can still learn much from focusing solely on 
                                              
24 See Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories”; Saunier, Transnational History; Espagne, 
Les Transferts Culturels Franco-Allemands; Werner and Zimmermann, “Beyond Compari-
son.” 
25 This was a central methodological point of Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. 
26 Wong, China Transformed, 1997. 
27 See also Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 8–10. 
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China as an instructive example, without necessarily having to rehash older 
perspectives as well. 
Sources 
A study of this breadth places severe limitations on the use of source ma-
terial. Departing from historical convention, I have confined myself to use 
secondary sources only, basing my study on the research of other scholars 
more specialized in the relevant fields. Due to the scope of the study, pri-
mary sources would, in any case, only have served as cherry-picked illus-
trations and not contributed critically to my conclusions. Another limita-
tion lies in the linguistic capabilities required for a study of this scope. I 
have opted to use primarily English-language scholarship for the basis of 
my comparison, though also a good deal of French and some German 
scholarship has been included. Inevitably, some distortions will result 
from this limitation. 
One problem concerns the unequal nature of this limitation on the three 
cases of this study. On the one hand, the history of 17th and 18th century 
France has been thoroughly worked through by French and Anglophone 
scholars, with countless general works producing a host of theorizations 
on the economic, political and social dynamics of this period. Contempo-
rary China, on the other hand, has attracted considerably less Western 
scholarship, and so I have at certain points had to rely on fairly dated ma-
terial in my research. However, this problem has been somewhat amelio-
rated by scholarship produced in the context of the Great Divergence-
debate, which has brought forth a great amount of new material.  
The Habsburg Empire presents an even more difficult case than China. 
Due to the dismemberment of the Habsburg lands following World War 
I, no contemporary state stands as the inheritor of the Habsburg tradition. 
Scholarship has unfortunately been similarly divided into separate German, 
Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Italian traditions, among many more, re-
quiring an extreme linguistic talent to overcome. Consequently, very few 
works of synthesis have been produced. In addition, syntheses have 
tended to focus on the periods either before the 17th century, the period 
of the Austro-Spanish Habsburg world empire, or after the 18th century, 
seen as a period of decline in the face of emerging nationalisms. Faced 
with these limitations, the Habsburg part of my comparison is at times not 
as detailed as I would have liked it to be. However, I believe the inclusion 
of the Habsburg experience has still proved very valuable to my arguments. 
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Even though it has of necessity assumed the part of a ‘lesser partner’ for 
comparison, it retains a vital importance as the corrective ‘third case’ nec-
essary to establish generalizable typologies.28 
Problems of this type are of course inherent to large-scale comparison. In 
this vein, Jeroen Duindam observes that “The problem of such generaliz-
ing studies is that they necessarily rely on secondary literature, sometimes 
using outdated views as the basis for generalized claims”, and argues in-
stead for the format of edited volumes, drawing on contributions by ex-
perts from specific fields.29 But such anthologies generally suffer from a 
lack of direct comparison, and often become just a collection of parallel 
narratives not contributing significantly to each other.30 Problems are in-
herent in any format of research, and the hope for this thesis is merely that 
these can be outweighed by the insights produced by engaging with large-
scale comparison directly. 
In fact, one could argue that since the complex nature of history makes 
the possible scope of ideographic detail infinite, this problem of compar-
ative research is simply a reflection of a general problem of historical 
scholarship. Any study, on any scale of time and place, makes use of gen-
eralizations, simplifications, and only a limited amount of sources. This 
problem only seems more aggravating on the larger scales because local 
specialists exist who can point out idiosyncrasies and exceptions to the 
generalized pattern. But few would argue that we should only study micro-
history and refrain from generalizations at all. It is a mistake to privilege 
more detailed, local levels of historical explanation as inherently more ‘true’ 
than macro-historical levels of explanation. Instead, we should recognize 
that there is an inherent value to every level of explanation, from the most 
narrow to the broadest. Sometimes, in the words of Joseph Fletcher, “to 
see the picture in the mosaic of microhistory, one must step back from 
it.”31 
But to be clear, I must repeat the usual apologies offered by practitioners 
of universalizing comparison: as this thesis deals with large-scale processes 
across widely different areas, it can treat each with only undeserved super-
                                              
28 See Kocka and Haupt, “Comparison and Beyond,” 7. 
29 Duindam, “Early Modern Europe,” 615. 
30 Cf. Bang, Irregulare Aliquod Corpus?, 1:37. 
31 Fletcher, “Integrative History: Parallels and Interconnections in the Early Modern 
Period, 1500-1800,” 37–8. 
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ficiality. Any reader with expertise in any of the relevant fields will un-
doubtedly discover many imprecisions, unjustified generalizations, and in-
numerable glaring omissions. For this, I sincerely apologize. However, I 
am also hopeful that nevertheless, even the most expert reader will find 
something of use in the perspectives offered here. 
A note on translation, concepts and style 
When engaging in comparative studies, one encounters the problem of 
how to render diverse historically defined concepts, titles, and names into 
a comparative framework. While it is usually deemed acceptable to trans-
late the Chinese title of Huángdì (皇帝) as ‘emperor’, other translations, 
such as the use of ‘gentry’ for the Chinese civil elites, arouse more suspi-
cion. As a rule, I have opted to translate as much as possible into compa-
rable Anglophone terms. This comes at the cost of a degree of precision, 
but helps readers unfamiliar with the specificities of Chinese, French, or 
‘Habsburg’ culture attain a greater understanding of the bigger picture. 
A similar problem pertains to the use of historically situated analytical con-
cepts to describe different historical phenomena, such as using ‘the state’ 
to describe a variety of pre-modern political systems. I do this unapolo-
getically, from the understanding that analytical concepts should be used 
as loose, heuristic tools, rather than as analytical straitjackets. In this, I may 
incur the wrath of the more philologically minded reader but this is a price 
I am happy to pay. 
I would like to include a final comment on style. At various places in this 
thesis, I have slipped into a somewhat polemical style. I do not want to 
apologize for that, since it is only a reflection of my passion for historical 
scholarship. What I will say is that the scholars subjected to this kind of 
criticism here tend to be the ones that have inspired me the most. In the 
world of academia, criticism is really a form of praise. So, if anyone should 
want to criticize this work, as I have done to others, I would feel tremen-
dously honored.  
Overview of the thesis 
The plan of this thesis is as follows. Having presented the broad outlines 
of my research here, chapter 2 delves into a theoretical discussion of the 
relation between world historical frameworks and the problem of moder-
nity. I broadly argue for the destructive effects of ‘modernocentric’ history 
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on our understanding of the workings of the pre-modern world, and pre-
sent my vision of a conceptual ‘late pre-modernity’. 
Three chapters follow, which constitute the core of my comparative anal-
ysis of economic, state and elite dynamics in the 17th and 18th centuries 
across China, France, and the Habsburg Empire. Chapter 3 deals with de-
velopments in the economic sphere. I here follow Pomeranz in arguing 
that the major developments of demographic expansion, commercializa-
tion and growth of manufacture observed in this period are broadly com-
parable across the studied cases. Furthermore, I argue that these develop-
ments can be usefully interpreted as a continuation of pre-modern trends 
through the application of a developmental framework largely taken from 
the work of Ester Boserup, but expanded to encompass change in the 
commercial and manufactural sectors.32 
In chapter 4, I turn to the processes of state formation. The 17th and 18th 
centuries saw both signs of convergence and divergence between state 
forms and dynamics in China on the one side, and France and the Habs-
burg Empire on the other. In the broad outlines of state formation, we see 
the French and Habsburg states increasingly converge on the Chinese pat-
tern of the ‘Bureaucratic-Imperial State’. Simultaneously, in terms of ex-
tractive and military capacities per inhabitant, the trajectories of France 
and the Habsburg Empire sharply diverged from that of the Chinese state. 
I argue, however, that both of these convergent and divergent patterns 
can be situated in a pre-modern framework of state formation, and that 
we thus should not see the observed divergences as evidence of the emer-
gence of the modern state in Europe. 
Chapter 5 builds on the conclusions of the previous two chapters and an-
alyzes patterns of elite formation in the context of changes in the eco-
nomic and political spheres. Due to the observed convergent development 
of the Bureaucratic-Imperial State, we see a similar convergence in the 
field of state-elite interaction, both in the civil and military spheres. Addi-
tionally, shared processes of commercialization in the economic domain 
induced similar changes in the economic role of social elites, who became 
increasingly oriented toward the market. Nevertheless, in no case do we 
observe anything like the rise of a bourgeoisie, as elite status continued to 
be based primarily on landed wealth and political privilege. 
                                              
32 Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth; See also Boserup, Population and Techno-
logical Change. 
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In a final chapter, I bring all these insights together to argue for the con-
tinued predominance of pre-modern dynamics of change across all three 
societies throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, and to discuss how these 
dynamics can be fitted into a world historical framework transcending the 
conceptual boundaries between East and West.  
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The problem of modernity 
La prévention où la plûpart des hommes sont pour leur temps et pour leur nation, est 
donc une source feconde en mauvaises remarques comme en mauvais jugements. 
The bias most humans have in favor of their own time and their own nation is there-
fore the source of many poor remarks and poor judgments. 
- Jean-Baptiste Dubos, Réflexions Critiques, 1719 
 
In recent decades, a great amount of work has been done to rid modern 
World History of the blinders of traditional Eurocentrism. However, years 
of deconstructive effort has left us in the unsatisfactory position of having 
no real framework for understanding world history. The arduous task be-
fore us of reconstructing a truly global history is still in its early phase, and 
all too often scholarship either slips back into the comfort of the tradi-
tional vision, or retreats into a postmodern rejection of metanarrative itself. 
But however condemned, grand narratives are simply an inescapable fact 
of historical scholarship, and continue to color contemporary research. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the global history of the so-called 
“early modern” era. The attempts of the last decades at globalizing early 
modern history, that is, at including non-European experiences into a co-
herent historical structure, continue to present problems of interpretation, 
at times appearing to exacerbate confusion rather than provide explana-
tion.  
The inclusion of the Chinese historical experience into World History has 
proved an especially serious conundrum to the traditional interpretation 
of history. Already from the time of the Song dynasty (960-1279), Chinese 
state and society evidenced a plethora of phenomena traditionally thought 
to be reserved for early modern Europe: absolutist government, profes-
sional bureaucracy, regular taxation, flourishing commerce, gunpowder 
warfare, technological innovation, book printing, and large iron and coal 
industries. Broadly speaking, two interpretations of the significance of 
these phenomena have been proposed: Traditionally minded scholars 
have tried to understate them, or at best conceded that they represented a 
short-lived exception of creativity in an otherwise largely stagnant society 
– whether because of political or ideological conservatism, or because it 
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was stuck in a “high-level equilibrium trap”.33  By contrast, revisionist 
scholars have interpreted the presence of these phenomena as proof that 
the development of modernity was a global, rather than European, phe-
nomenon, and championed the concept of an “early modern China”. As 
I will argue in this chapter, both of these avenues of interpretation are 
mistaken, or at least in need of serious qualification. 
However, as the problem of “where to put China” can be seen as an ex-
ample of the clash between traditional European analytical categories and 
World History taken seriously, this can ultimately prove extremely pro-
ductive in causing us to question and revise our basic historical frame-
works. The reason for the inadequacy of the interpretations mentioned, I 
will argue, comes from their failure to challenge at a deeper level the more 
general structure of World History itself: World History as the origin story 
of modernity. To construct a global history free from the biased teleology 
inherent in the current structure, it is an essential task to question its 
deeper assumptions, including the nature of modernity itself, and the role 
of modernity as the central protagonist of history. 
In this chapter, I begin by exploring the phenomenon of modernity and 
how it has been historically conceptualized. I then show how the emerging 
postcolonial critique has severely problematized these conceptualizations, 
but without producing credible alternatives. Subsequently I argue that 
these complications stem from problems in our greater historical frame-
work. I end with a discussion of alternative ways to conceptualize world 
historical change in the context of pre-modernity. 
Modernity as phenomenon and concept  
The concept of modernity appears to mean a great many things to a great 
many people. First, it is an epochal concept, referring to the current his-
torical period as distinct from earlier times, variously defined as beginning 
at almost any point from 1492 until roughly 1800. Second, it refers to a 
specific trait of a given society, institution, or phenomenon, the presence 
of which can be questioned and empirically analyzed – for example, a 
modern economy is one based on industrial production and, perhaps, cap-
italism.34 Modernity is thus both an epochal and an analytic concept. As I 
will show, these two conceptual meanings are closely interrelated, and this 
                                              
33 Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past. 
34 Wittrock, “Modernity: One, None or Many?,” 31. 
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leads to particular challenges in the scholarly attempt to construct a global 
history of the early modern world. 
The epochal concept of modernity has its roots in the tripartite model of 
history advocated by European renaissance scholars, organizing history 
into the three periods of antiquity, middle ages and modernity. As used 
originally, modernity was both backward- and forward-looking: it was 
used to separate the disparaged medieval period from both the present 
and the perceived glory of antiquity, which was seen as finally reborn after 
a long sleep. At the same time, modernity also implied the creation of 
something new; that history had entered a period radically different from 
what came before. In the querelle des Anciens et des Modernes which was played 
out the following centuries, these two understandings were furiously op-
posed, but slowly the second interpretation, of the modern world as an 
improvement upon earlier times, came to dominate. Modernity was thus 
from early in its inception a concept that emphasized its own rupture with 
the past - to claim that you lived in the modern age was to stress a radical 
difference between that and the world before it. 
As well as referring to a certain time, the epochal concept of modernity was 
also connected to a certain place. Just as the concept of a Tudor period only 
makes sense within Britain, the concept of modernity, like the rest of the 
tripartite model, was created to provide structure to the history of Europe, 
or more broadly the Christian community of its creators. Modernity was 
thus born as an ideographic, historical concept without explicit claims to 
universality. 
However, under the critical scrutiny of contemporary scholars, any peri-
odization becomes reliant on analytical arguments in order to retain valid-
ity. The assertion that any specific time, rather than another, constitutes 
the beginning of a modern period has to be grounded in empirical analysis 
of what can be said to be modern. And this makes the epochal concept of 
modernity completely dependent on more universal, analytical ideas. In 
the words of Wolfgang Reinhard, “A simple concept of a period in history is 
always a reduced kind of theory of history”.35 Thus, when working with the con-
cept of modernity, even if only as a question of periodization, one is de-
pendent upon abstract theorization, and in practice this entails turning to 
interpretations offered by sociology. 
                                              
35 Reinhard, “The Idea of Early Modern History,” 281. 
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The abstraction and universalization of the concept of modernity has been 
at the core of the social sciences since their inception in the 19th century. 
The realization that a great discontinuity had appeared in history was what 
inspired much of the work of the sociological field’s three Grand Old Men, 
Durkheim, Marx, and Weber, and the nature of this macrohistorical phe-
nomenon has been analyzed and described by thousands of scholars for 
more than a century and a half. It is, perhaps then, paradoxical that at the 
same time, it could be argued that modernity is still a quite poorly under-
stood phenomenon. It has even, famously, been defined out of existence 
by Bruno Latour, who in his 1991 book declared “We have never been mod-
ern”.36 
However, apart from Latour and a few other radical critics37, there is broad 
agreement that modernity constitutes a historical phenomenon sufficiently 
important to be worth dealing with in universal terms. Essentially, the 
emergence of modernity is perceived to have constituted a central discon-
tinuity of history. It is widely understood that pre-modern societies and 
modern societies are characterized by completely different historical-soci-
ological dynamics, concerning almost all aspects of society.38  
Yet, an attempt to identify the constitutive elements of modernity will 
quickly run into trouble. Basically, there is no general agreement over what 
constitutes modernity in analytical terms, but rather an overwhelming 
mess of different definitions, each suited to a specific field of inquiry 
where it provides a structural framework for historical differentiation: For 
Marxists, modernity is defined by the dominance of the capitalist mode of 
production, in contrast to earlier feudal societies. For Weberians, moder-
nity is characterized by continuing rationalization at both the formal, the-
oretical and practical level. A number of cultural historians define it as a 
set of promissory notes, as an expectation for the future.39 And the list 
could go on. 
Conceptualizations of the phenomenon of modernity are thus extremely 
differentiated across the social sciences. In the construction of moderni-
zation theory from the 1950’s and onwards, an attempt was made to rec-
oncile these widely varying definitions by seeing the variation as a function 
of the complexity of the phenomenon itself – shifting to the view that 
                                              
36 Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes. 
37 E.g. Symes, “When We Talk about Modernity.” 
38 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 3; Crone, Pre-Industrial Societies. 
39 Wittrock, “Modernity: One, None or Many?,” 55. 
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modernity should be understood as a totality of interacting phenomena, 
rather than characterized, or driven by, any individual component or de-
velopment. In essence, modernization theory posits that there is a broad 
set of processes that we label modernization, which leads from a univer-
salized “tradition” to a universalized “modernity”. According to this view, 
while traditional societies are differentiated from one another, they all 
share a certain set of characteristics which define them as traditional. Con-
trarily, due to the interconnected nature of modernity, modernized socie-
ties show a marked tendency to converge on a standard model, which, in 
general practice, is defined by contemporary Western Europe or the 
United States.40 A newer variant of modernization theory is exemplified in 
the writings of Anthony Giddens, which have had a great influence on 
contemporary studies of modernity: “Modernity, I propose, is multidimen-
sional on the level of institutions, and each of the elements specified by these 
various traditions plays some part”.41 The multidimensionality proposed 
by Giddens allows him to incorporate the different conceptualizations of 
modernity into a single phenomenon, without choosing between one sin-
gle dynamic or another as the primary driving force. 
However, the focus on modernity as an assemblage of diverse dynamics 
tends to produce a lack of analytical acuity as regards its historical emer-
gence. For Giddens, the driving force of modernity becomes either very 
abstract phenomena, such as “the separation of time and space … the 
disembedding of social systems … and the reflexive ordering and reorder-
ing of social relations”42 or simply the totality of history at the moments 
before the modern transition: “"Modernity" refers to modes of social life 
or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth 
century onwards, and which subsequently became more or less worldwide 
in their influence”.43 Giddens’ work is therefore much more useful as a 
diagnosis of the complex modern condition than as an analysis of the 
emergence of modernity. But the multidimensional view of modernity re-
mains very influential, as can be gauged by a glance at the Wikipedia page 
describing modernity: “Modernity is a term of art used in the humanities 
and social sciences to designate both a historical period (the modern era), 
as well as the ensemble of particular socio-cultural norms, attitudes and 
                                              
40 Wittrock, 32. 
41 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 12 (Italics in the original). 
42 Giddens, 16–7. 
43 Giddens, 1. 
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practices that arose in post-medieval Europe and have developed since, in 
various ways and at various times, around the world.”44 
In this mode of reasoning, then, the analytical conceptualization of mo-
dernity is highly dependent on the epochal conception of a European age 
of modernity, just as the epochal concept is dependent on analytic con-
ceptualizations. Modernity is defined as ‘what happened in Europe in the 
modern age’, while the justification for labeling the period modern is itself 
dependent on the analytical concept of modernity. This reasoning is thus 
somewhat circular, which makes the concept of modernity lose much of 
its analytical value as a universal concept – in contrast to merely being a 
concept of local periodization, which is always tautological in this way. If 
the emergence of modernity is to be studied in an analytically meaningful 
way, with pretense to universal qualities, it cannot then be understood as 
broadly as suggested by Giddens. 
Modernization theory and its discontents 
The problem with broader interpretations of modernity is not only a the-
oretical one, but a practical problem as well. As modernization theory has 
been used to predict developmental patterns for third world countries, 
many assumptions have proven misguided – though perhaps not as com-
pletely as it is currently fashionable to declare.45 The apparent failures of 
modernization theory have led to criticism from scholars in the postcolo-
nial tradition, most forcefully by Dipesh Chakrabarty in his Provincializing 
Europe.46 As Chakrabarty among others make clear, analytical conceptual-
izations of modernity are deeply tied to the specific historical experience 
of Western Europe, where it is normally thought to have originated. As a 
consequence, the purportedly universal concept of modernity reflects Eu-
ropean cultural idiosyncrasies - as modernity is a concept created to make 
sense of European history, it predictably fits non-European history quite 
crudely, and thus provides the basis for biased comparison, implicit or 
explicit. 
As a response to this challenge, in recent years two distinct alternative the-
oretical frameworks have proven especially popular in the field of world 
history; the frameworks of ‘multiple modernities’, and what I label ‘global 
modernity’. However, I will argue that, despite their popularity, none of 
                                              
44 Wikipedia article for “Modernity”; see also Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity, 2. 
45 Marsh, “Modernization Theory, Then and Now.” 
46 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. 
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these conceptualizations solve the problem of globalizing our historical 
framework in a satisfactory way, and remain severely problematic. 
Multiple modernities 
The concept of multiple modernities, originally developed by Shmuel Ei-
senstadt, is a rather recent attempt at freeing the concept of modernity 
from its Euro-American moorings and thus to challenge the convergence 
theory of modernization. Its central point is that modernity, rather than 
just being copied or imported by non-European societies, is constantly 
being reinterpreted and developed anew, giving rise to a wide spectrum of 
different ways to be modern.47 Even within Europe, it is claimed that dis-
tinct modernities have developed, with the communist states as a first ex-
ample of a crystallization of an alternative modernity.48 Similarly, Richard 
Wolin writes than in order to get away from our “extreme biases of Euro-
centric conceptions of development … we need to expand and pluralize 
our definition of modernity”.49  
Inspired by the idea of multiple modernities, it has become fashionable to 
speak of also early modernity in the plural. 50 According to the China 
scholar R. Bin Wong, for example, multiple modernities persist because 
they evolved from multiple early modernities, and China accordingly did 
have an early modern era – only it was different from the European one.51 
Looking at the Moghul Empire, Ayesha Ramachandran writes: “The mod-
ern invention of the world, I want to suggest, took place in quite different 
places and in quite different ways, but the epistemological impulse behind 
this process may have been surprisingly similar across early modern cul-
tures”.52  
While the multiple modernities paradigm may certainly be applauded for 
its critique of classical modernization theory, several weaknesses should 
be recognized. Firstly, as it does not develop an alternative view of “core” 
modernity, but instead enables very different phenomena also to be la-
                                              
47 Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities.” 
48 Eisenstadt, 10. 
49 Wolin, “‘Modernity,’” 744. 
50 See e.g. the two issues of Daedalus: “Early Modernities”; “Multiple Modernities”; See 
also Porter, Comparative Early Modernities. 
51 Wong, “Did China’s Late Empire Have an Early Modern Era?,” 213–4. 
52 Ramachandran, “A War of Worlds: Becoming ‘Early Modern’ and the Challenge of 
Comparison,” 20; See also Islamoglu and Perdue, Shared Histories of Modernity. 
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beled modern, it becomes difficult to demarcate the boundaries of moder-
nity. Positing a host of modernities begs the question of what makes all of 
them modern – to which question it provides no new insights. Following 
the conceptual scheme of multiple modernities thus makes us no wiser as 
to what constitutes modernity and how it transforms and operates in so-
ciety.53  It functions rather as a conceptual loosening of the one-size-fits-
all modernization theory, making it possible to include other experiences 
without really changing the parameters – and is thus scientifically a dead 
end. As noted recently by Sebastian Conrad, the multiple modernities par-
adigm could perhaps more reasonably be interpreted as varying cultural 
manifestations of a single modernity.54 The idea of multiple modernities 
has even been criticized from a postcolonial perspective for retaining the 
culturally specific European modernity as the yardstick by which to meas-
ure non-European deviations and alternatives, and thus perpetuating a cer-
tain conceptual eurocentrism.55 
Global Modernity 
The framework which I label ‘global modernity’, as of yet largely unde-
fined by its practitioners, has been steadily growing in popularity during 
the recent decades, and can be summarized as follows:  the emergence of 
modernity cannot be ascribed to any given spatial location (i.e. Europe) as 
it was a product of precisely the interconnections and networks that were 
extended over the globe during the last five centuries. This perspective 
mirrors the older, now partially discredited, critiques of modernization 
theory, namely World-systems analysis and Dependency theory, which 
also claimed that the core of modernity lay in the relations among groups 
and societies rather than in the societies themselves.56 But while these had 
a narrow economic focus, ‘global modernity’ is equally inspired by cultural 
history and therefore has a broader, although also more fuzzy and under-
defined, focus. The framework of ‘global modernity’ can be found in a 
variety of works, but has attained its clearest programmatic formulation in 
Gurminder Bhambra’s Rethinking Modernity.57 Inspired by Sanjay Subhrah-
manyam’s notion of connected histories58, Bhambra suggests that we should 
imagine “co-eval, that is, co-evolving and co-existing modernities”, and 
                                              
53 Cf. Brimnes and Andersen, “Modernitetsbegrebets Muligheder,” 154–5. 
54 Conrad, What Is Global History?, 60. 
55 Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity, 56–79. 
56 Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis. 
57 Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity. 
58 Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories.” 
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create “histories that would allow us to see that the theories and ideas we 
use were not created by a culture diffused from a centre which then im-
pacted on the world, but through the interconnections of processes and 
paradigms that are themselves continually in negotiation and develop-
ment”.59 In this perspective, as modernity is global, so is its early form – 
in the words of Laura Hostetler, “the term “early modern” can appropri-
ately be used to describe global, rather than uniquely Western, pro-
cesses”.60 
While connected histories and the concomitant focus on global interconnec-
tions have certainly inspired positive developments, I would argue that this 
theoretical complex also leads us in unsatisfactory directions for a variety 
of reasons. Firstly, I believe this view overestimates the importance of 
global connections in the early modern world. While the world indeed saw 
an immense increase of long-distance trade and travel from around 1500 
onwards, it must be remembered that it rose from a vanishingly small basis. 
Secondly, the stark denial of the European origins of modernity seems on 
its face implausible, and would certainly surprise many of the third world’s 
great modernizers, such as Sun Yat-Sen, Mustafa Kemal and Jawaharlal 
Nehru, who certainly saw modernity as something to be imported from 
the West. Thirdly, and most consequentially, to assert that modernity 
evolved as a global project, a “shared East/West undertaking”61, makes it 
a lot harder to explain historical divergence and difference. Hierarchy, 
power differences and cultural idiosyncrasies are continually underplayed 
by the advocates of a globally developed modernity, which makes Euro-
pean global dominance in the 19th century extremely hard to understand. 
I find myself strongly aligned with Chakrabarty in suspecting that these 
ideas of equal and shared histories have arisen primarily because of our 
egalitarian values – because we want history to be equal, rather than be-
cause it was.62 
Dismissals of modernity 
A third, but less prominent, group of scholars critical of modernization 
theory take a more radical approach – regarding the notion of modernity 
as merely a moral judgment, they opt to discard the term altogether.63 In 
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a similar vein, other scholars argue that we should only treat modernity as 
a discursive object of study, refraining from its use as an analytical con-
cept.64 It is of course true that the establishment of qualitative difference 
that is enabled by the oppositional pair of modernity and tradition has 
often been used as a claim of superiority of one society to another, and 
that it is quite difficult to disentangle oneself from the inherent feeling that 
modernity is somehow “better” than tradition. However, I would argue 
that we cannot let go of our structuring concepts of history without losing 
the structure itself – In order to be able to understand the changes enacted 
by modernization we must be able to define it, and a somewhat morally 
burdened concept might even be better than no concept at all.65 
The deeper problem 
The primary challenges to the old Eurocentric version of history thus suf-
fer from concrete problems that make them unable to supplant it, or qual-
ify it in a constructive fashion. However, I would claim that these issues 
are in fact only a product of a larger problematic – that none of these models 
significantly challenge our overall conception of historical structure. In fact, they seem 
only to be cosmetic modifications of a larger world historical framework 
which remains firmly in place – the pseudo-Hegelian teleology of moder-
nity. In the following sections, I will expand on what constitutes this larger 
framework, and how it creates these problems for globalizing our inter-
pretation of early modern history. 
The Hegelian banana 
World History, or history on the largest scales more generally, serves the 
function of constructing an overall framework for understanding the sig-
nificance of events on more local levels of time and space. As significance 
is a value often determined by its relation to the future, it carries with it 
inherent dangers of teleology – the fact encapsulated by the philosopher 
Kierkegaard as “Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be 
lived forwards”. In a fairly recent article, Kenneth Pomeranz noted that 
current world history is characterized by the “framing narrative for world 
history as the origins of modernity”.66 As we try to understand world his-
tory backwards, it takes the form of a genealogy of our modern condition. 
In order to be relevant enough to include, pre-modern developments must 
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somehow relate to the later emergence of modernity. Correctly seeing the 
modern transition as perhaps the most crucial moment in history for our 
present condition, world history has thus become ‘modernocentric’, to intro-
duce a neologism I would like to see spread. And modern eurocentrism, 
the much maligned bogeyman of the last decades, is in fact mostly a by-
product of this modernocentrism, rather than a product of ethnic or cul-
tural myopia. 
The modernocentric vision of history has traditionally resulted in what 
could be called a banana-shaped history.67 It begins to unfold with the 
dawn of civilization in Mesopotamia, and slowly edges westwards to 
Greece, then Rome, and continues north into Europe until it finally 
reaches Britain and the Industrial Revolution. In newer works, a chapter 
on China or India is inserted to counter the critique of eurocentrism, but 
the main story remains the same.68 Although often presented as moving 
forwards chronologically, it is really a backwards-looking genealogical 
structure. It is a pseudo-Hegelian story of the ‘spirit of modernity’ moving 
through the ages until it reaches perfection in our time. And while, as 
Pomeranz notes, this framework can certainly be justified in guaranteeing 
relevance to world history69, it carries with it a host of problems for un-
derstanding the dynamics of historical change. These problems become 
worse the closer you get to the modern transition – and so especially crit-
ical for the early modern period. 
The people without history 
The most obvious problem arising from the modernocentric view is the 
large parts of history consigned to secondary status. Much more work has 
been done on ancient Persia than on its Safavid period, as the latter falls 
outside the cone of vision. And much of the world has traditionally been 
absent in history until contact with modernizing Europeans was estab-
lished in quite late centuries. 
In the last decades, scholars influenced by the postcolonial tradition have 
been trying to remedy this problem, by placing their focus on the subaltern 
or the “People Without History”.70 Yet, remaining within the moder-
nocentric framework, this has usually taken the form of assigning some 
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relevance for the emergence of modernity to the said people, in a move 
Lynn Struve has described as “We-too-ism”.71 This has been done in a 
variety of ways, of which the above mentioned multiple modernities and 
global modernity paradigms are central examples. The epithet of (early) 
modernity thus acts as a way of including non-Europeans in the larger 
history of the world.72 In Chinese history, the traditional temporal indica-
tor “late imperial” is thus exchanged for “early modern” by an increasing 
number of scholars.73 Regarding India, Sanjay Subrahmanyam expresses 
the sentiment clearly: “Having taken away so much from the societies of 
South Asia, it seems to be high time that social science at least gave them 
back what they had by the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries – their ad-
mittedly very ambiguous ‘early modernity’”.74 
The same process is also at work in the spread of early modernity further 
back in time.75 The trouble arises in the attempt to construct a genealogy 
of modernity, to explain how, why and where it emerged. There is first the 
general problem of genealogy and periodization – that as you go back in 
time, there will always be an earlier directly related cause leading to your 
current position, so that the explanation extends indefinitely. Any discon-
tinuity you introduce will therefore be to some degree arbitrary, and will 
thus require a well-defined argument. But with modernity defined so dif-
ferently according to different scholars, almost any development, any 
point in time, could be argued to signify its beginnings. Therefore, the 
traditionally accepted starting point of early modernity, the year 1500, has 
come increasingly into doubt. Since modernity functions as a positive 
value judgment and criterion for relevance, almost every scholar wants his 
or her period defined as modern, which leads to (early) modernity being 
stretched far into the previously medieval period.76 And, by going further 
and further back in time, the phenomena that purportedly characterize 
modernity become increasingly watered down, especially when there is no 
clear qualitative distinction between tradition and modernity. For example, 
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as an extensive market economy or commercialization is normally re-
garded as a modern phenomenon, the growth of trade in 18th century Eu-
rope is a prototypical sign of early modernity. So too, perhaps, is the 
growth of the 16th century, but what about the commercial revolution of 
the 13th century? And should the Carolingian renaissance also be seen as 
showing signs of early modernity? 
This example is representative of a typical path of interpretation: it begins 
with an observation of a phenomenon preceding European modernity, 
which is then labeled modern, or as a driving force of modernity. Subse-
quently, medieval scholars protest that the phenomenon in question has 
antecedents far back in time, which therefore shows that Europe was on 
a modernizing path from very early on. Lastly, phenomena like it are ob-
served historically outside of Europe, leading to ideas like a globally 
emerging modernity. This path has been taken in quite a few areas, includ-
ing studies of proto-industry77, bureaucracy78, warfare79, and commercial-
ization. It is, on the contrary, very rare that the epithet of modernity is 
taken away from a phenomenon or a society, as this would seem to deny 
the area relevance. 
This kind of theorizing is of course quite problematic, and for several rea-
sons. When the concept of early modernity becomes stretched over the 
globe, two things happen: the concept loses much of its original meaning, 
and any analytical connection between early and ‘full’ modernity becomes 
muddled. In the original European case, we expect early modernity to be 
characterized by dynamics leading to modernity, but this is not so easy in 
the rest of the world. As noted by Harriet Zurndorfer, if we stipulate a 
Chinese early modernity beginning by the Song era (ca. 960), China would 
have had a full 900 years of early modernity, which can only lead to disap-
pointment over why it did not take the last step into modernity.80 The East 
would still seem to have been stuck in history, just now in early modernity 
instead of tradition, until Europeans arrived. A further problem arises in 
that this claim of a shared, global early modernity seems to make later 
divergence even harder to explain. If the world was on a common path of 
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“deep modernization”81, why do we see these immense differences in 
power and plenty developing by the end of the early modern period? 
Thirdly, the modernocentric vision is problematic in that it puts too large 
an emphasis, and value, on dynamics of change rather than stable systems, 
which causes us to miss important facets of history. For most of the 
world’s population, through most of its pre-modern history, change was 
not an especially prevalent factor of life, and so we should not expect so-
cieties, European or not, to show great signs of development everywhere 
we look. The stable nature of pre-modern societies can be fascinating 
enough on its own, and the history of these societies is important to tell 
even if no real influence on the modern world can be gauged. 
By expanding our notion of (early) modernity, and thereby extending it 
beyond Europe, we thus act to legitimize the greater framework of world 
history as the ‘master plan of modernity’. And since this macrohistorical 
framework is created in order to give sense to specifically European his-
tory, we inevitably bind ourselves to Eurocentric conceptual schemes, 
even in our attempt to break away from them. As long as the overarching 
theme of world history is centered on the emergence of modernity, Euro-
pean history will remain privileged, as the concept itself is structured by 
the specific historical experience of Western Europe. If we really wish to 
construct a truly universal history, we will need to look beyond this con-
straining vision. 
Occidentalism 
A second set of problems with the newer paradigms of modernity lies in 
their failure to challenge some essentialist categories formed by the moder-
nocentric version of history. The concept of modernity itself is, as we have 
already seen, one of these categories. But it is a great irony that, after 
spending decades deconstructing the essentialist conceptions of ‘Asia’ 
prevalent in earlier scholarship, the same essentialism often remains per-
vasive in world history regarding European development. It is an under-
valued point that the Europe which constitutes the standard reference 
point for modernity is itself a construction formed by the modernocentric 
framing narrative. In the words of Chakrabarty, Europe “is an imaginary 
figure that remains deeply embedded in clichéd and shorthand forms in some 
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everyday habits of thought that invariably subtend attempts in the social 
sciences to address questions of political modernity…”82  
The archetypical European experience of the early modern age is an ide-
alized vision, fraught with inconsistencies and overgeneralizations which 
cover the fact that there was simply no singular direction in which the 
societies on the continent moved. This becomes a problem as national 
histories are struggling to live up to the ideals of the imaginary Europe, 
and thus become framed as stories of failure, such as the history of early 
modern Spain, or somehow uniquely different, as in the assertion of a 
German Sonderweg.83 Failing to conform to the modernocentric teleology 
accordingly becomes something that needs special explanation. The same 
point has been made often regarding comparative studies of the East and 
West, where China scholars have for a long time implored us not to expect 
China to follow the ‘European’ developmental trajectory.84 But the Euro-
pean trajectory is in itself a product of an essentialist understanding of 
Europe, followed by no real societies. Engaging with non-European his-
torical experiences in a non-modernocentric fashion can thus also be used 
as a way of developing alternative conceptualizations of European history 
itself, as a way of overcoming the Occidentalism that is the inevitable 
counterpoint to Orientalism. 
Towards a new framework 
In this section, I aim to explore the contours of a viable conceptualization 
of the historical dynamics of pre-modern change outside the bounds of a 
modernocentric model. This is done in order to be able to reconceptualize 
early modern history into what I shall label ‘late pre-modernity’, and thus 
help freeing it from its teleological binds. 
Stability and change in traditional societies 
Compared to the modern world in which we live, pre-modern society 
seems exceptionally stagnant. In contrast to the rate of change experienced 
in modern society, where it can be justifiably expected that subsequent 
generations will lead a life quite different from our contemporaries, pre-
modern life seems largely devoid of change - a pre-modern peasant had 
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absolutely no reason to expect the life of his descendants to be anything 
other than the life he himself lived. Even so, when seen on a large time-
scale, it is undeniable that development did occur. With the passing of 
centuries, pre-modern societies changed considerably, as is of course a 
precondition for the concept of history itself. 
So, how do we integrate these notions of pre-modern historical change 
and stability? This has been a central goal of historical sociology, and for 
historical philosophy before that. The earliest theories depended on reli-
gious ideas of providence, the gently guiding hand of supernatural entities, 
which caused the world to change according to some divine principle. At 
least in the West, this idea depended on Christian conceptions of linear 
time, as opposed to earlier cyclical conceptions, which implied at least 
large-scale stability over time. Most influential of these providence-driven 
theories of change is that of Hegel, who founded the idea of the historical 
dialectic. For Hegel, historical change was clearly directional, and showed 
signs of order, and therefore, reason. The world was designed such that 
through the dialectic, the spirit came gradually to be conscious of its own 
freedom, and to realize it in the material world. Essentially, writing before 
Charles Darwin, Hegel made the creationist assumption that evidence of 
(semi-)orderly development must be the evidence of a reasoning agent or 
force, which he in a pan-theistic manner identified as “absolute spirit”.85 
With the continuing disenchantment of the world in the 19th century, 
providence became an unpopular explanation. A clear waypoint in the 
transition from providence-driven theories to theories of change based on 
blind processes is the Marxist conceptualization of historical change. In 
the traditional Marxist materialist conception of history, social develop-
ment is driven by changes in the social relations of production. For Marx, 
history moved through a number of stages characterized by specific sys-
tems of material production, from primitive communism through slave- 
and feudal society to capitalism, which itself would give way to socialism. 
The factor ensuring change was the supposed internal contradictions in-
herent in each mode of production, which would lead to its own downfall. 
This was envisioned as a universal process, meaning that every society 
would tend to move through the same successive stages as material devel-
opments proceeded. Recognizing that this framework of development did 
not fit the histories of non-European societies, Marx posited a unique 
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‘Asiatic mode of production’ to explain what he perceived to be the stag-
nant nature of oriental societies. Historical Materialism, as it became 
known as, thus remained a unidirectional and Eurocentric theory of de-
velopment, but recognized semi-stable waypoints along the way in the 
form of stages. 
After Darwin, more distinctly evolutionary theories of historical change 
proliferated. In the work of Herbert Spencer and other proponents of So-
cial Darwinism, historical change was the product of intense competition 
between societies which led to a general increase in their complexity. Later 
evolutionary theorists such as Talcott Parsons similarly saw societies de-
velop gradually by logics of competition and selection. Still, the evolution-
ary scheme of Parsons remained unidirectional. In Parsons’ historical 
framework, societies could either evolve in a single direction of “general-
ized adaptive capacity”, or would stagnate and fall apart.86 
In what is perhaps the most powerful theory of general historical change 
written in recent decades, The Sources of Social Power, Michael Mann takes 
issue with such gradualist, evolutionary theories in the development of 
stratified societies. In his treatment of the initial emergence of states, he 
argues that we cannot see a natural progression toward stratified societies, 
and that social organization in fact developed cyclically between ‘evolution’ 
and ‘devolution’, until very specific historical circumstances gave rise to a 
relatively rapid reorganization of social structure in specific localities.87 
The emergence of the state was, for Mann, “abnormal” and unwanted, a 
result of “unusual” social situations, and not an outgrowth of a general 
social trend.88 In the rest of his work, Mann similarly denies that historical 
development followed an evolutionary pattern, as “Development cannot 
be explained in terms of the immanent tendencies of society.”89 Instead, 
he insists that historical development has been accidental and uneven, only 
exhibiting directional patterns at the greatest level.90 
Two points of criticism need to be mentioned here. Firstly, when Mann 
turns his gaze toward the development of post-Roman society to study 
“the European dynamic” (and only that!), he seems to argue for exactly 
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such a “development in terms of the immanent tendencies of society”, and 
his earlier criticism seems to fall away. In a classic example of the destruc-
tive effects of modernocentrism, for Mann the whole story of the last 1500 
years becomes one of incipient modernity, and Europe, supposedly having 
“the leading edge of power”, becomes the only object of interest.91 
Secondly, Mann’s criticism of the evolutionary framework appears to be 
mainly directed against its vulgar, teleological versions popular in his time. 
The misappropriation of evolutionary dynamics was, in fact, a general 
problem among both proponents and opponents of social evolutionism, 
who seem to have taken the wrong lessons from biological evolutionism 
already from Spencer onwards. The three most problematic assumptions 
can be listed as 1) the unidirectionality of development, 2) the progressive 
nature of development, and 3) the internally driven nature of development. 
These three assumptions are at the base of many theories of social evolu-
tion, but fit very badly with the analogy to biological evolution. 
While generally seen as discredited, I believe that the analogy between bi-
ological and social evolution can really be useful in understanding histori-
cal change over larger time periods. But in order for it to be useful, we 
have to take a closer look at how the dynamics of biological evolution 
function. Here, we must take our inspiration from the Neo-Darwinian 
‘Modern Synthesis’, which from the 1970’s onwards has been particularly 
associated with the work of E. O. Wilson, W. D. Hamilton, Robert Trivers, 
and brilliantly synthesized by Richard Dawkins.92  
Before going deeper into the analogy, we have to delimit where it seems 
useful and not. A number of scholars have explicitly incorporated Neo-
Darwinism into theories of social change at a more fundamental, detailed 
level. A leading theorist here is W. G. Runciman, who in a number of 
articles and books has espoused his “Theory of Cultural and Social Selec-
tion”.93 Runciman proceeds from the fundamental mechanisms of cultural 
and social selection to create an encompassing theory of social evolution 
to serve as a basis for comparative studies of historical development. But 
in spite of the great sophistication and merit of his theory, its detailed and 
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structured nature makes it hard to apply to historical phenomena, and in 
the end fails to produce any substantial new insights into the processes of 
historical change.94 A different approach is put forward by Walter Scheidel, 
who in a chapter titled Sex and Empire uses Neo-Darwinian theory to argue 
for the importance of sexual competition and reproduction in the devel-
opment of human societies.95 This perspective, however, also falls some-
where between reductionism and banality as a framework for understand-
ing historical change, even if it may provide an interesting side story. 
The trouble with these approaches is that they become too concrete and 
mechanical, as they focus on fundamental mechanisms of selection and 
evolution. At the fundamental, short-term level, historical change is simply 
too complex, and too driven by reflective agents, to be usefully encapsu-
lated in reductive theories of evolution. Where the analogy of biological 
evolution is useful is instead precisely as an analogy for providing a different 
perspective on large-scale historical development. On the larger scales of 
time, individual reflection and action becomes less important, and there is 
a larger place for functionalist theory to provide insight. 
To begin with, biological evolution is a historical, and not a teleological pro-
cess. However much we as humans like to see ourselves as the pinnacle of 
the evolutionary process, evolution does not have a goal. Instead, it is 
characterized by the continual reshaping of patterns given by earlier de-
velopment. Secondly, it is radically multidirectional, with the continual 
forking of directional paths from any given point, dependent on the inter-
action of established patterns and changes in the environment, both nat-
ural, cultural and social, and with a large role played by historical accident. 
Thirdly, evolution displays no sense of progress, even in the sense of a 
general enhancement of ‘fitness’ of anyone. This is not to say that evolu-
tion does not produce any patterns at all. General trends can be observed, 
but only on larger timescales, and in the most general ways, such as a trend 
toward increased complexity. Furthermore, local trends often occur, as 
certain selective pressures remain stable over certain periods of time. 
Lastly, patterns occur in the form of ‘convergent evolution’. When evolu-
tionary pressures are similar across multiple cases, they often result in sim-
ilar developments, as practicable ways of responding to such pressures are 
limited. 
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One of the insights most important for the usefulness of the analogy is 
the central role of stability in evolution. As Dawkins writes, evolution is 
governed by the general law of “the survival of the stable”.96 Rather than 
enhancing ‘fitness’, evolution generally produces ‘Evolutionary Stable 
Strategies’, organizational patterns of self-reproduction from which devi-
ations are generally unstable in the given environment. The quasi-stable 
conditions developed by these strategies do not guarantee optimizations 
of fitness or any other characteristic, only the continuous reproduction of 
itself, until changes in the environment disturbs the pattern. Evolution 
therefore often proceeds in localized spurts between stable states, and is 
not smooth and continuous. 
Returning to Mann, we can now see that his critique of evolutionism is 
really a critique only of wrong applications of the evolutionary framework. 
Mann’s own theory of the emergence of states actually displays clear anal-
ogies with biological evolution, and can be read as a truly evolutionary 
theory. The ‘cyclical development between evolution and devolution’ of 
prehistory forms a large-scale stable state. A specific historical accident, 
due to certain features of local environments, broke this state, and in a 
short time span resulted in new patterns of semi-stable organization in the 
form of stratified societies. From there, environmental changes in the 
form of an expanding sphere of civilization provided the spur for further 
development. 
These insights by Mann are as mentioned not carried over to the study of 
post-Roman society, where his narrative becomes more teleological. How-
ever, I would argue that the evolutionary analogy is useful to understand 
development throughout pre-modernity. It is especially useful in provid-
ing a heuristic basis for understanding late pre-modernity, where the at-
tractions of teleology are at their strongest. In this way, the period just 
before the modern breakthrough mirrors the period just before that first 
great discontinuity, the emergence of civilization as studied by Mann. 
Late pre-modernity was, as the neologism suggests, governed by pre-mod-
ern dynamics. It is these dynamics that we in the subsequent chapters turn 
to investigate. By applying the evolutionary analogy, what should we ex-
pect of these dynamics? Firstly, we should embrace the inherent non-tel-
eological nature of change. There is no reason to expect pre-modern soci-
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eties to develop in a direction of modernity. Change is of course ubiqui-
tous, but we cannot measure this change with the yardstick of later devel-
opments. Modernity is not a natural endpoint for social, political or eco-
nomic development. Just as Mann argued for the emergence of states, mo-
dernity should also be seen as decidedly ‘abnormal’ and ‘unnatural’ - not 
an outgrowth of a general social trend, but a localized, fast-paced rupture 
of earlier dynamics. 
Secondly, we can expect some large-scale developmental directionality, 
but there are no reasons to expect them to constitute any kind of progress 
– we should not necessarily expect people to grow richer, or states to grow 
stronger on a general level. Instead, we should expect development to 
move in the direction of stable organizational patterns – not because of 
any inherent teleological importance of stability, but simply because these 
by definition tend to reproduce themselves, and non-stable patterns do 
not. Almost by circular logic, natural end-points for development are sta-
ble states. 
Thirdly, we can expect a great degree of convergent evolution of social 
formations. This is because the underlying problems of social organization 
seem to have been broadly similar across the human world. Furthermore, 
there seem to be relatively few ways of organizing stable societies in an 
agrarian world, so in practice very different societies tended to converge 
on a limited number of models. It is important to distinguish between this 
convergent evolution and stage theories of development. Unlike stage the-
ories, convergent evolution does not require social development to follow 
any specific path, and it is therefore always ‘open’. Different social systems 
can converge on a semi-stable pattern from a multitude of directions, and 
can diverge again in different ways, dependent on internal and external 
differences. It is just that sufficiently similar situations tend to produce 
similar results.   
Directionality and the late pre-modern world 
No matter how non-teleological your frame of reference is, pre-modern 
history clearly developed in certain directional patterns. On the basis of 
the previous, how can we think about this directionality in the world his-
torical processes of pre-modernity? 
One clear trend mirroring biological evolution is the continual expansion 
of the area and scope of human activity. This expansion was not linear, 
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but interspersed by repeated spouts of contraction due to disease and var-
ious social breakdowns. However, on the larger scale it clearly constitutes 
a trend. From the earliest emergence of civilized society at various times 
and places around the world, the boundaries of civilization have continu-
ally expanded across the globe, drawing more and more people into the 
‘human web’ of stratified society.97 Simultaneously, the population densi-
ties within the boundaries of civilization have continued to rise, although 
characterized by severe ups and downs on both the medium and smaller 
time-scales. In short, the world was gradually filled up with more and more 
people, with an increasing proportion of these living in stratified societies. 
The pre-modern world was thus a world dominated by extensive growth. 
Extensive growth, however, does not mean simply more of the same. 
Modes of organization that work to ensure relative stability in a sparsely 
populated territory, such as early medieval Europe, do not necessarily 
work in the same way in a heavily populated territory, such as Europe a 
millennium later. Social forms evolve with changes in the environment, 
and so they also can also be characterized by a degree of directionality. But 
this directionality cannot be thought of in terms of an increase in organi-
zational ‘power’, as Mann does, or an increase in wealth, or in any other 
‘progressive’ form. If centralization of power is what produces stability, 
this tends to happen. But if decentralization is what best preserves a sys-
tem, that tends to happen. And if a stable economic system increases the 
immiseration of all, that will be the direction it is headed in. What produces 
change in pre-modern society is the continual ‘search’ for stability in an 
extensively expanding world. 
The late pre-modern world did not constitute a natural climax or end-
point for this evolutionary path, but merely another step on the way. If 
undisturbed by the intrusion of the modern world emanating from the 
British Isles, it would be easy to imagine the continuation of this evolu-
tionary path, even if we cannot imagine precisely what such a world would 
look like. The modern world did, of course, intrude, closing forever the 
evolutionary paths of pre-modernity and replacing them with a different 
set of paths. This led to the misperception that, in fact, we were on the 
modern path all along. But if our pre-modern evolutionary paths ever led 
us ‘closer’ to something resembling modernity, it was purely by chance, 
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and nothing necessitated that subsequent development would lead in the 
same direction. 
So it is that while the late pre-modern world was indeed characterized by 
processes resembling those that characterize the modern, such as com-
mercialization and bureaucratization, these are not evidence of a world 
developing toward modernity. It could very well be that pre-modern com-
mercialization was in fact an obstacle to modern commercialization, as has 
been argued for China.98 The late pre-modern world had its own evolu-
tionary dynamics, counterintuitive and still substantially obscure to us. In 
the following chapters, I will try to elucidate these dynamics as far as I can. 
  
                                              
98 Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past. 
46 
 
Agrarian Economies 
Enfin toutes les inventions que peut chercher l’industrie, tous les avantages que la 
nécessité peut faire valoir, toutes les ressources qu’inspire l’intérêt sont ici employées et 
mises à profit.  
In conclusion, all the inventions that industry can discover, all the improvements that 
necessity brings to attention, all the resources that self-interest inspires, are here em-
ployed and used profitably. 
- François Quesnay, Le Despotisme de la Chine, 1767 
 
Perhaps the most important battleground in the interpretation of early 
modern history lies in the field of economic history. Whatever modernity 
is, it is characterized by, or perhaps even defined by, a certain economic 
system – either defined as capitalism, a market economy, or simply eco-
nomic growth. This central place held by the economy in the definition of 
modernity makes economic history suffer immensely under the view of 
modernocentric history.  
In the scholarship on the economic history of all our three cases—late 
pre-modern China, France, and the Habsburg Empire—we can observe 
the same type of reasoning leading down the same blind alleys of discus-
sion. With the development of a modern economy being expected as nor-
mal, considerable energy has been expended on locating the supposed 
blockages or obstructions responsible for their failures; and in all three 
cases, revisionist historians have argued that a more optimistic approach 
shows that the areas in question did in fact take part in the construction 
of economic modernity. It will by now come as no surprise that I find 
both these positions fairly misleading. Nothing ‘blocked’ the economy of 
all three societies from developing according to modern expectations, be-
cause modern development was never in the cards to begin with. By pre-
modern standards, the three economies developed along fairly normal 
lines, and indeed show many commonalities. 
What I hope to accomplish with this chapter is to show how many of the 
theoretical problems surrounding early modern economic history can be 
reduced by breaking with the modernocentric vision, and constructing a 
traditional framework capable of integrating the various experiences of 
47 
 
our three cases. I base this framework on the work of Ester Boserup, es-
pecially as presented in her seminal essay The Conditions of Agricultural 
Growth, with inspiration from the work of Anthony Wrigley.99 
The perspectives of Wrigley and Boserup, which will be further elaborated 
below, leads me to focus primarily on agriculture, the main sector of eco-
nomic activity during the pre-industrial era. This focus situates the chapter 
somewhat outside the contemporary tendency of global history, which 
tends to privilege long-distance networks and trade as their objects of 
study. However, it is my belief that the determining influence of long-dis-
tance interactions has been unduly overstated in global historical scholar-
ship. Seen in an overall perspective, the global streams of cultural and eco-
nomic exchange before the age of steam-driven transportation were really 
very narrow and sporadic, and thus not capable of driving development in 
any determining fashion. As Fernand Braudel remarked in what could be 
called the foundational document of Global History, his 1949 book Le 
Méditerranée, “The Mediterranean in the sixteenth century was overwhelm-
ingly a world of peasants and of the tenant farmers and landowners; crops 
and harvests were the vital matters of this world and anything else was 
superstructure, the result of accumulation and of unnatural diversion to-
ward the towns. Peasants and crops, in other words food supplies, and the 
size of the population silently determined the destiny of the age.”100 Such 
continued to be the case throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, and indeed 
perhaps to a greater degree than Braudel himself realized, as he in his later 
volumes Civilization and Capitalism, 15th to 18th century tended to lose this 
focus.101 
What this chapter will also illuminate is the degree to which developments 
in manufacture and trade can be seen as relatively dependent on this basis 
of agriculture and population growth. On this relationship, I am strongly 
influenced by research on Chinese economic development in late imperial 
times, especially by Philip Huang and Kenneth Pomeranz, on which also 
more below. 
The chapter begins by presenting the case of China’s economic develop-
ment in the 17th and 18th centuries through the perspective of Ester 
Boserup. Arguing that the Chinese example may serve as a heuristic model 
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for understanding the dynamics of Advanced Organic Economies, I pro-
ceed to show how the economic developments of the contemporary 
France can better be understood through this perspective. After a short 
discussion of the additional example of the Habsburg Empire, I conclude 
by drawing up the insights gained by adopting this perspective, as well as 
potential shortcomings. 
China: tales of blockages, tales of modernity 
The economy of China has traditionally been seen as the prototypical ex-
ample of stagnation and lack of development. As far back as the 18th cen-
tury, Adam Smith noted that “China has been long one of the richest, that 
is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most pop-
ulous countries in world”, but then added “It seems, however, to have 
been long stationary.”102 A century later, Karl Marx felt it necessary to cat-
egorize China as being based on an “Asiatic mode of production”, in order 
to explain the supposed non-development of the Chinese economy. To 
Marx, the non-existence of private property, the despotic rule of the em-
perors, and the communal structure of peasant villages blocked Asiatic 
societies from participating in the historical dialectic, which he considered 
the normal course of history. 
The trope of a blocked Chinese economy continued into the 20th century. 
In the 1950’s Karl Wittfogel’s ‘hydraulic thesis’ gained ground, in which 
the nature of irrigated agriculture forced China into an ‘Oriental Despot-
ism’, incapable of internal change.103 Later, Eric Jones blamed China’s 
economic stagnation on insecure property rights, as well as environmental 
catastrophes, which supposedly inhibited the buildup of capital in 
China.104 The more recent, best-selling books The Human Web and The 
Wealth and Poverty of Nations by, respectively William & John McNeill and 
David Landes, mostly places the blame on conservative Confucian bu-
reaucrats, who stifled innovation.105 
Medieval mania and Malthusian mechanisms 
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Alongside this story of stagnation, China specialists have since the 1950’s 
developed a more differentiated picture of Chinese economic history. A 
very important factor in shaping this development was Joseph Needham’s 
massive Science and Civilization in China, a multi-volume project with the 
first installment published in 1954 and still going.106 The broad goal of this 
project was to document the immense technological sophistication and 
innovative spirit of medieval China, especially the Song dynasty (960-1279). 
Though often prone to exaggeration, and not particularly critical, Need-
ham has had great success in igniting fascination for the economic and 
technological achievements of medieval China, which is now broadly rec-
ognized as the most illustrious period in Chinese history. Mark Elvin, in 
his 1973 classic The Pattern of the Chinese Past, described the period as char-
acterized by a ‘medieval economic revolution’, with ‘revolutionary’ devel-
opments in agriculture, water transport, money and credit, market struc-
ture and urbanization, and science and technology.107 Eric Jones, in an oft-
quoted passage, goes as far as declaring that “China came within a hair’s 
breadth of industrialising in the fourteenth century.”108 Even Peer Vries, 
who usually is very careful with these things, writes that “In all probability 
China reached its highest level of development and wealth – that is before 
the twentieth century – during the period of the Song dynasty”.109 
The flipside of the fascination of medieval China is encapsulated in what 
has become known as the ‘Needham puzzle’ – if China was so advanced 
early on, why did it fall so far behind later? Trying to answer this puzzle, a 
different kind of stagnationist literature has emerged, with much more fo-
cus on the fact of economic change in China, in contrast to the earlier 
stories of permanent statis. However, the goal has still been to show why 
China was economically stagnant – only now just from the 14th century 
onwards. Since Mark Elvin’s groundbreaking work, the main explanation 
has been a broadly Malthusian one. In Elvin’s words, China was caught in 
a “high-level equilibrium trap” – it had reached a level of economic devel-
opment where all the easy pickings in terms of improvement had been 
realized, and given the lack of technological development, the ever ex-
panding population made labor-saving innovation economically unattrac-
tive. China was thus caught in a trap of falling incomes and increasingly 
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expensive resources, only to be broken by “the historic contribution of 
the modern West”.110 
Another major work in this tradition is Philip Huang’s The Peasant Family 
and Rural Development in the Yangtze Delta, 1350-1988 published in 1990. 
Zooming in on the familial structure of agricultural production in China’s 
highly developed Yangtze delta, Huang strongly reinforced the pessimistic 
interpretation of Chinese economic development, which he characterizes 
as ‘involuted’. According to Huang, high population growth resulted in 
ever decreasing sizes of the typical family farm; smaller farm sizes forced 
household members, especially woman and children, to engage in under-
paid activities such as cotton spinning for the market in order to survive. 
This massive and growing reserve of cheap labor doomed any attempt at 
capital-intensive production, and led peasant families to work harder and 
harder for a diminishing output.111 
The Great Divergence 
Elvin and Huang’s works are landmark achievements. In addition to ab-
staining from tired clichés about Confucian conservatism, insecure prop-
erty or Oriental despotism, they reconciled the fact that late imperial China 
was a highly commercialized, technologically sophisticated society with its 
observed stagnation compared to Europe. However, it is in this contrast 
with ‘Europe’ that certain problems arise. As the European comparison is 
never made concrete in the works of Elvin and Huang, the real contrasting 
case remains the imagined Europe of the modernocentric narrative, which 
lacks any role for internal European differences. Moreover, the whole en-
terprise of explaining the lack of modern development arguably led the 
authors to exaggerate the stagnant nature of the Chinese economy, espe-
cially when compared to an idealized European path that no society can 
live up to. 
This was an important part of the argument of Kenneth Pomeranz’ trail-
blazing book The Great Divergence, which has been central in shaping east-
west comparison since it was published in 2000. In it, Pomeranz argues 
that China even up until about 1800 was on a par with Europe in terms of 
life expectancy, consumption standards, the efficiency of markets, and 
even technological sophistication. Secondly, he argued that the Malthusian 
constraints, that is, the pressure on ecological resources, in even the most 
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populated parts of China were not worse than in Western Europe, which 
also suffered from relative overpopulation. In order to explain the subse-
quent great divergence between the two areas, Pomeranz argued that it 
was the ‘ecological windfall’ provided by British coal and colonies which 
helped Britain escape from its Malthusian constraints, and enabled it to 
grow indefinitely.112 
Pomeranz’ work was groundbreaking and controversial in that it looked 
past the separate scholarly traditions and tried to fit European and Chinese 
economic development on the same, broadly Malthusian developmental 
trend. Furthermore, it was pioneering insofar as it challenged the estab-
lished pessimistic view of the Chinese economy by substituting precise 
comparative studies of China and Europe for the earlier broad generaliza-
tions. This has helped to constrain the following ‘Great Divergence debate’ 
by empirical studies, which have proved very fruitful to historical scholar-
ship. Following Pomeranz, a myriad studies have appeared comparing the 
British and Chinese economies, and a tentative conclusion has emerged – 
although China was indeed not especially poor, the comparison with Brit-
ain shows large and more importantly, growing, differences in countless ar-
eas. Moreover, Pomeranz’ specific explanation of ‘coal & colonies’ seems 
not to have held up to scrutiny, as he himself has conceded.113 
As I argued previously, however, a different conclusion you could draw 
from the debate is that Britain was indeed quite exceptional. In numerous 
studies, Britain has proved to stand far outside the European mainstream, 
both in terms of wealth, economic structure and in terms of developmen-
tal trends. As I will attempt to show here, when we remove Britain from 
the picture, some central tenets of Pomeranz’ thesis hold up remarkably 
well. When we compare the workings of the Chinese economy to those of 
France or the Habsburg Empire, we do indeed see a ‘world of surprising 
resemblances’, as expressed by Pomeranz. These resemblances are indica-
tive of a number of shared mechanisms which ruled economic develop-
ment in both regions. 
Following the general argument of the thesis, this chapter seeks to develop 
a unified framework in which we can interpret late pre-modern economic 
history of both China and Europe, not by lifting China into European 
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early modernity, but by sinking Europe into Eurasian pre-modernity. I ar-
gue then, that the Chinese historical experience can serve as a useful model 
for interpreting economic development on the European continent. This 
can enable scholarship on both European and Chinese economic history 
to avoid the unfortunate teleologies inherent in modernocentric history. 
Basics 
China, as everyone knows, is of continental size, and this fact has many 
implications for studies of its economy. For large size means large internal 
differences in every conceivable measure. These differences will inevitably 
be glossed over by country-wide averages, which are therefore not always 
of much use. As a result, many of the studies cited will be limited in extent 
to only certain parts of the country, and we must be careful with extrapo-
lating local findings to the whole of China.  
Following G. William Skinner, China can be thought of as separated into 
a number of macro-regions, each with an economic core and hinterland, 
each region being more integrated internally than they are with the rest of 
the country (see fig. 1).114 On a larger scale, we can separate China into 
three economic areas:  
1) A highly developed eastern part, consisting of most of the macro-
regions of North China, Lower Yangzi, the Southeast Coast and 
the eastern part of Lingnan. This area was home to around half the 
empire’s population, with population densities well exceeding any 
found in Europe. The eastern area as a whole was reliant on large 
imports of grain, in exchange for manufactured goods. 
2) A less developed part, consisting of the remaining parts of China 
proper, as well as Manchuria. Home to most of the remaining pop-
ulation of the empire, these areas were on the other end of the grain 
trade, exporting large amounts to the eastern provinces. Moreover, 
the largest parts of population growth and economic expansion 
during the Qing took part here. 
3) An undeveloped, ‘colonial’ periphery, consisting of Mongolia to 
the north, Tibet to the west and Xinjiang/East Turkestan to the 
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north-west. While important politically, they had almost no eco-
nomic significance to the empire, as they were very sparsely popu-
lated.115 
Following precedence, much of the discussion will center on the Yangzi 
Delta, the regional core of the Lower Yangzi region, and China’s most 
developed area. With a population of about 25 million by 1776, it is 
roughly comparable to the continental European empires.116 
 
Fig. 1: Macro-regions of China.  
Source: G. William Skinner, The City in Late Imperial China 
During most of the 17th century, the Chinese economy was in crisis. A 
concurrence of bad environmental conditions, rebellion, and epidemics, 
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all exacerbated by the chaos associated with the dynastic transition be-
tween the Ming and the Qing dynasties had resulted in a sharp fall in pop-
ulation of the empire and a general deflation of prices.117 But after the end 
of the fighting in 1683, when Qing forces captured Taiwan, China entered 
more than a century of relative stability and growth, which has been 
known to Chinese historians as ‘The Prosperous Age’.118 
The prosperous age was characterized by two phenomena that will loom 
large in any discussion of late pre-modern China – population growth and 
commercialization. Both can be seen as a continuation of earlier trends 
that go back at least to Song times, but had suffered setbacks in the pre-
ceding crisis. In the prosperous age, both developments picked up speed. 
Demographic developments 
One of the most remarkable phenomena of late pre-modern China is the 
spectacular population growth that occurred between the late 17th and the 
early 19th centuries. Already densely populated relative to the rest of the 
world, China’s population more than doubled, from around 150 million 
by 1700 to 300-340 million people at the end of the century.119 The rea-
sons for this steep growth are hard to pinpoint precisely, but certain 
guesses can be made. Firstly, after the completion of the Qing conquest, 
peace generally prevailed in China, with the only wars being fought in far-
flung territories of the empire. Secondly, when we look at climactic data, 
the 18th century appears to have been characterized by a robust rise in 
temperatures, which would likely have had positive consequences for the 
agricultural population (see Fig. 2). Thirdly, the large, relatively efficient 
market for grain and the state-run granary system both helped alleviate 
local subsistence crises which would have led to a fall in mortality.120 And 
fourthly, we cannot rule out some effects of the spread of new techniques 
such as inoculation and other health related practices.121 
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Fig. 2: Temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere, 1400-1900 
Source: Paolo Malanima, Pre-modern European Economy, 83 
The distribution of this population growth can be roughly characterized 
as following a ‘filling up’ pattern. While all parts of the empire saw popu-
lation growth, it was far stronger in rural, underdeveloped areas than in 
already densely populated regions, both on the province-level and the local 
level, likely as a result of population migration.122 In the already intensely 
cultivated eastern provinces, mountainsides were terraced, wetlands re-
claimed and large numbers of migrants left for less populated western 
provinces or overseas in search of land or livelihood. This pattern was 
reinforced by imperial support, as land obtained from clearances of previ-
ously uncultivated areas achieved tax-exempt status.123 
In older scholarly works, China was thought to be governed by crude Mal-
thusian population mechanisms – population growth was restricted only 
by so-called positive checks, such as famine, disease and war. The combi-
nation of high female fertility with these positive checks supposedly kept 
the Chinese population on the brink of survival, hindering any economic 
development. In the words of Eric Jones, “copulation was preferred above 
commodities”.124 Newer research shows that this was not the case – in 
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China, as presumably anywhere else, population growth was not only re-
stricted by positive checks, but also by preventive checks limiting fertility, 
although the nature of these checks certainly differed from European ones. 
In particular, female infanticide played a large role in managing family 
size.125 
As any other pre-modern economy, China was an overwhelmingly agrar-
ian society, with a large majority of its population residing in the country-
side. For China as a whole, the proportion of inhabitants living in cities of 
10,000 residents or more hovered around 4%, showing perhaps a slight 
tendency to fall during the period. This is quite a low number, even in a 
pre-modern context, but it conceals important regional differences - for 
the Yangzi Delta, the number rises as high as 15%, although it was perhaps 
also here declining slightly over time. Other areas show varying rates, gen-
erally falling from east to west. When including inhabitants in cities with 
between 2,000 and 10,000 residents, we can observe a somewhat larger 
countrywide decline, perhaps from 11% to 7%, although the numbers are 
very uncertain.126 Again we see a large regional variation, with the Yangzi 
Delta hovering steadily around 20%. The regional data suggests that the 
reason for the decline in urbanization could be the result of regional vari-
ations in population growth. As most of the ‘new’ population was born in, 
or migrated to, largely rural areas, the overall urbanization rates fell over 
time.  
Agrarian structure 
By the mid-Qing period, the Chinese countryside was mostly populated 
by independent, small-scale peasant cultivators. This had not always been 
the case. Rather, it was the culmination of a longer development reaching 
back to Song times which saw the gradual break up of an earlier manorial 
structure of agricultural production characterized by the use of various 
types of bonded labor. Even by the end of the 16th century, large manors 
cultivated by people of serf-like status were far from uncommon across 
the Chinese landscape. Many of these, however, had disappeared by the 
time of the Manchu conquest, and most of the rest were either destroyed 
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during the conquest or else disbanded in the following years.127 By the 
time of the Yongzheng emperor (1723-35), this development was legally 
backed up by the granting of formal equality to many groups previously 
considered of servile status, chiefly in the agricultural sector.128 
The resulting agricultural structure shows some regional variation. Gener-
ally, in the regions with the highest agricultural productivity, the Lower 
Yangzi, the southeast coast and eastern Lingnan, most land was farmed by 
long-term tenants, renting land from absentee landlords residing in urban 
locations.129 Elsewhere, a significant part of the land was owned by small-
scale owner-cultivators themselves. Some managerial agriculture could 
also be found, especially in the North China region, a fact which in China 
has been hailed as evidence of ‘incipient capitalism’.130 But these types of 
manager-landlords were few in number, and seem not to show evidence 
of any greater productivity or better cultivation techniques than small-
scale farmers, so they seem unlikely to merit that description.131  
Concomitant with the development toward small-scale independent farm-
ing was the gradually decreasing size of the average farm, from around 3.4 
acres in 1650 to around 2.5 acres by 1850. In the densely populated Yangzi 
Delta, the 18th century saw an even more marked decline from roughly 
1.875 To 1.16 acres.132 This is extremely low by global standards – in Eu-
rope, a 10 acre farm was considered small - and is indicative of the exceed-
ingly intensive farming practices of the Lower Yangzi region, and China 
in general. 
The intensive nature of Chinese agriculture was made possible by the spe-
cial character of rice farming, rice being the dominant food crop in south-
ern China. The yield ratio of rice, i.e. the relationship between grains sown 
and grain harvested, was in late imperial times around 10 times that for 
wheat – around 50:1 relative to 5:1.133 All else being equal, much less land 
was then needed to grow the same amount of food when farming rice. 
Conversely, much more labor is also required in rice farming than with 
wheat. So effectively, rice farming can sustain a much denser population 
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than most other food crops, which partly explains the extremely small 
sizes of Yangzi Delta farms compared to European ones. 
Commercialization 
Another prominent characteristic of the Chinese economy was the large 
degree of commercialization of every part of society. From the end of the 
Ming and continuing through the 17th and 18th centuries, China underwent 
what some have called its second commercial revolution, building on the 
already extant commercial developments under the Song.134 
One important aspect of this is the spectacular growth of rural markets. 
Following the growth in population, an increasingly dense network of ru-
ral markets was established throughout the empire. These provide clear 
evidence that the image of a traditional rural economy untouched by mar-
ket relations fits very badly with Chinese realities. Peasant life in China was 
simply intensely commercialized, with the rural markets performing a 
number of useful or even necessary functions, such as providing credit, 
channeling grain in and out of the villages depending on need, and serving 
as a place for social gathering. In a groundbreaking article, G. William 
Skinner even argued that the ‘standard marketing community’, composed 
of a rural market and its surrounding villages, should be seen as the fun-
damental social unit in rural China, rather than the village as traditionally 
thought.135 As such, the rural markets served as local nodes of a commer-
cial network integrating most of the empire into a relatively coherent 
whole. 
We must not, however, get carried away by visions of a modern, friction-
less market economy. While the links integrating the various market com-
munities were certainly there, outside of the major thoroughfares they 
were generally quite tenuous, often consisting of small-scale itinerant mer-
chants traveling from market to market. Furthermore, the physical infra-
structure between markets was weakly developed, the roads often being 
muddy and in bad shape.136 This lack of significant infrastructure devel-
opments led Skinner himself to describe the proliferation of markets as 
“false modernization”.137 This, however, is a prime example of the power 
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of modernocentric preconceptions – as Skinner shared the modernocen-
tric expectation that commercialization would naturally come with all 
other aspects of historical modernity, he apparently felt the need to invent 
a new category of failure to characterize the ‘divergent’ development of 
China. Conversely, bad infrastructure and friction in the outlying parts of 
a market system is exactly what is to be expected for a pre-modern econ-
omy, of course, and should not be taken as evidence against the relatively 
large degree of commercialization of Chinese rural society. 
Along the major waterways of the empire, principally the Yangzi, Yellow 
and Pearl Rivers as well as the Grand Canal, long-distance trade reached 
enormous proportions, and the degree of market integration was often 
higher between major urban centers than between these centers and their 
hinterlands.138 Large amounts of grain flowed down the rivers to feed the 
populations of the most heavily populated areas, in exchange for manu-
factured goods. According to one estimate, by the 18th century, 6.2 billion 
liters of grain entered the long-distance trade annually, enough to feed 
around 30 million people.139 In the Yangzi Delta, a fifth of the population 
was fed on imported grain.140  
The large flows of grain into the densely populated, eastern areas, together 
with the high productivity of local agriculture, enabled an increasing shift 
to the cultivation of cash crops by local producers. In the relatively devel-
oped province of Guangdong, by the 18th century more than half of all 
arable land was covered in cash crops such as tobacco, tea, cotton, mul-
berry trees (the leaves of which was used in silk worm rearing), and sugar-
cane.141 In the Yangzi Delta, cotton cultivation took over a large and grow-
ing part of the land, to be used in the local cloth production.142 Cloth pro-
duction itself, always the dominant manufactured good, was largely a peas-
ant occupation as well. Primarily in the Yangzi Delta, but increasingly also 
in other parts of the country, a large rural industry grew up around cotton 
spinning and weaving. Cloth production here became an integrated part 
of the peasant family economy, with the households’ women and children 
providing the labor, and leaving the men to take care of the fields.143 
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Hence, a large and increasing part of the Chinese population was in some 
way dependent on the market. Grain, manufactures, and everyday luxuries 
such as sugar or tea were heavily exchanged throughout the empire, ena-
bled by the relative freedom of trade enjoyed by Chinese merchants. Land 
itself was also commercially traded, and shifted hands relatively often. 
Huge imports of silver, used as the preferred monetary medium for large-
scale trade, as well as for paying taxes, aided this commercial develop-
ment.144 As the silver was often traded for Chinese  manufactured goods, 
such as textiles and porcelain, this hastily growing foreign trade provided 
a further stimulus to production in the relevant regions—though of lesser 
importance in contrast with the in absolute terms vast domestic trade.  
Pessimism and optimism 
Although these basic patterns of demographic expansion and commercial-
ization are largely uncontroversial, the theoretical interpretations of these 
developments have been subject to much debate. Roughly, the current 
views can be separated into a pessimist camp and an optimist camp de-
pending on their overall assessments of the economic situation.   
In pessimist interpretations, the Chinese economy is seen as grating 
against the Malthusian ceiling of overpopulation. The large population 
growth of the period is therefore seen as a huge problem, driving the econ-
omy into a cul-de-sac. According to Elvin, the Chinese economy experi-
enced “quantitative growth, qualitative standstill”, as all economically pos-
sible improvements in productive technology had already taken place. The 
Chinese economy was simply stretched as much as it could be, with the 
only temporary reliefs coming from epidemic disease, which reduced the 
population pressure markedly.145 This view of standstill is also reflected in 
Angus Maddison’s publications on Chinese economic performance. Meas-
ured in terms of GDP per capita (on which more discussion below), Mad-
dison sets China at an unmoving and low 600$ throughout the period 
1300-1850.146 
Although clearly based on the same Malthusian vision as Elvin’s, Philip 
Huang provides a more dynamic, if even more dismal, picture of Chinese 
economic development. According to Huang, the decline in average farm 
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size led to a general intensification of agriculture, where increasing hours 
of work were required to produce the same output. The shift to cash crops 
should, according to Huang, be understood in the same manner: while 
cash crops were often more profitable to grow on a per-acre-basis than 
grain, the amount of extra work needed was often far larger than the eco-
nomic gain, leading to lower overall labor productivity. Rather than being 
a positive development then, cash crops were a way of coping with the 
increasingly tiny plots of land allotted to each family. 
Even the spread of rural manufacture can be seen as part of this process, 
Huang argues. With declining farm sizes, even when using intensive farm-
ing methods, there was simply not enough work to occupy both adult 
members of the household, as had been the case in earlier times. Pressed 
out of agricultural work, it became necessary for peasant women to find 
alternative employment in handicraft production for the market. But while 
activities such as silk worm rearing, cotton spinning, and weaving made it 
possible for a family to survive on very little land, it was ultimately less 
profitable per hour of work than farming, further contributing to falling 
labor productivity. Moreover, as more and more peasant families engaged 
in handicraft production, prices, and thereby profits for the individual pro-
ducer, decreased further over time. As long as population continued to 
grow, peasants were thus trapped in a downward spiral of longer work 
hours, falling productivity and ultimately declining GDP per capita. These 
are the central features of the developmental pattern which Huang terms 
‘involution’.147 
Other, more optimistic interpretations of the Chinese economy instead 
focus on the gains arising from increased trade and market access enjoyed 
by peasants. In the work of Li Bozhong, the Yangzi Delta is depicted as 
undergoing a successful intensification. The developed trade networks en-
abled a degree of regional specialization to emerge: the Yangzi Delta peas-
ants imported large quantities of both fertilizer and grain, facilitating a shift 
to intensive, but quite profitable, cultivation of cash crops. Moreover, the 
peasants rationalized their cultivation practices and their use of scarce re-
sources. The increased investment in the land in the form of fertilizer, as 
well as the improved agricultural techniques, both contributed to raising 
land and labor productivity in spite of the decreasing farm sizes.148 A num-
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ber of scholars have arrived at the conclusion that this successful intensi-
fication can be characterized as an “East Asian Miracle”, or a specific East 
Asian developmental path toward economic modernity, reliant on labor 
intensification but no less modern or effective than the ‘European’ path.149 
Looking away from farming practices and the question of labor produc-
tivity, another optimist view can be found when looking at popular con-
sumption of manufactures and ‘everyday luxuries’, as Kenneth Pomeranz 
have done. Marketed consumer goods such as sugar, tea, and tobacco 
seem to have been consumed in fairly large quantities, at least comparable 
to consumption in contemporary Europe. There were of course large var-
iations across the span of the empire, but certainly the developed parts of 
China consumed their fair share of these products, providing evidence that 
they were at least enjoying some fruits of the developed market econ-
omy.150 Consumption of manufactures such as cotton was also compara-
tively high among the peasantry – as expressed by Huang, “In 1350, no 
one in China wore cotton cloth; by 1850, almost every peasant did.”151 
The same is also true regarding other manufactures, such as books, furni-
ture etc.152 
Still other optimist accounts stress the commercial diversification and in-
stitutional innovation associated with commercialization. William Rowe 
follows the Chinese ‘Sprouts of capitalism’-literature in documenting the 
spread of “capitalist enterprise” in mining and farming operations as well 
as workshop production.153 Susan Naquin and Evelyn Rawski similarly 
write about innovation in the banking sector and in the field of customary 
law.154 
The complexity of pre-modern economic development 
While both optimist and pessimist interpretations capture important as-
pects of the Chinese experience, they risk misleading scholars into seeing 
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this experience as either good or bad, as either ‘development’ or ‘involu-
tion’.155 This problem arises from the application of modern standards of 
development to a thoroughly pre-modern context. Rather than seeing 
China as being caught in a trap, or suggesting that China was on its own 
path to the common goal of modernity, we should recognize that Chinese 
developments instead represented a typical case of pre-modern economic 
development. 
In our modernocentric world, economic historians are used to work with 
only one scale of ‘economic development’—that represented by GDP per 
capita. In this framework, the higher the GDP per capita in an economy, 
the more developed it is. Scholars therefore highly value intensive growth, i.e. 
growth in GDP per capita, and in contrast don’t value extensive growth, i.e. 
growth of total output (mostly by way of population growth). This can be 
problematic in the study of pre-modern societies, as extensive growth was 
by far the most important phenomenon of the two. The problem is clearly 
illustrated by figure 3—Focusing only on GDP per capita quickly leads us 
to the absurd conclusion that nothing changed in Europe between 1300 
and 1800. If we seek to understand pre-modern societies on their own 
terms, we cannot let modern expectations of intensive growth be the yard-
stick for economic development.156 
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Fig. 3: Per Capita GDP in Europe, 1000-1900 (int. 1990$ PPP)  
Source: Paolo Malanima, Pre-modern European Economy, 287 
The work of Anthony Wrigley shows why this is the case. Based on a 
reading of the classical economists, in his 1988 book Continuity, Chance and 
Change Wrigley distinguished between two kinds of economic systems – 
that of the “Advanced Organic Economy” described by these economists 
and that of the “Mineral-based Energy Economy” of the later industrial 
age.157 In the pre-industrial world, before the widespread adoption of fos-
sil fuels as a source of energy, the economy was ‘organic’ in that it was 
ultimately based on energy sources derived from agriculture. According to 
Wrigley, the dependence on organic sources of energy placed a number of 
limitations to what could be achieved in terms of growth in an economy. 
These limitations made the dynamics governing economic development 
radically different from those governing ‘mineral-based’ economies, which 
could rely on the immense energies of “the subterranean forest” of coal 
deposits.158 The economic world of the 17th and 18th centuries therefore 
cannot be understood in the same terms as the economies of the industrial 
age. 
Instead, I argue that the Chinese economic experience, in all its complexity, 
is best understood through the prism of Ester Boserup’s theories of pre-
modern agricultural growth. 159  Boserup’s work focuses on population 
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growth as the main driving force of economic development in pre-indus-
trial times. Contrary to strictly Malthusian views, in which agricultural 
technology together with the inherent quality of the land determine the 
possible maximum size of the population, according to Boserup agricul-
tural practices represents a response to local population densities. The his-
torical trend toward intensification of agriculture, from primitive slash-
and-burn practices to advanced multi-cropping regimes, should be seen as 
the result of peasants trying to cope with progressive overpopulation. As 
population grows in a given territory, the amount of land per person in 
agriculture declines. To achieve the same output per person as before, 
peasants have to work harder in their fields, e.g. weeding more closely or 
ploughing the fields an extra time. Even if new land is brought under the 
plough, it tends to be of inferior quality to the land already cultivated, and 
therefore also requires extra labor to produce the same amount of food. 
Faced with this problem, peasants often respond by shifting their practices 
to more intensive types of agriculture, such as introducing irrigation or 
sowing an extra crop per year. These technological ‘advances’ mitigate the 
problems of falling labor productivity, but only partially—generally, the 
trend toward harder work for the same output continues, but at a slower 
rate that it would if less intensive types of cultivation had been retained.160 
Nevertheless, as Boserup also recognized, a number of dynamics tend to 
lighten this otherwise quite dismal picture.161 First and foremost, popula-
tion growth can give rise to ‘Smithian dynamics’—the productivity gains 
connected with the division of labor and the resulting labor specialization. 
When population density increases, the opportunities for labor specializa-
tion and trade expand, as relative transportation costs fall.162 The incen-
tives for the building of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and markets 
similarly increase as population becomes denser. We will thus expect an 
increasingly diverse and sophisticated commercial sector to develop with 
a growing population. Additionally, knowledge will spread more easily 
through the population, which helps peasants conform to best practices 
of agricultural production. 
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Following Boserup, we can see how population growth in pre-modern so-
cieties involves a complex interplay of dynamics, going in different, some-
times opposite, directions, which can hardly be characterized as either suc-
cess or failure. The development of labor productivity in agriculture, for 
example, is a product of the balance between the ‘involutionary dynamics’ 
of agricultural intensification, which lowers productivity, and the 
‘Smithian dynamics’ of the division of labor, which increases productivity. 
Which dynamic tends to dominate at any given time is an empirical ques-
tion, but both dynamics will certainly be present. 
The complexity of Boserupian growth also carries profound implications 
for questions of pre-modern living standards, which has been a central 
part of the Great Divergence debate. Given the opposing dynamics, in a 
situation of population growth we can expect food prices to rise relatively 
to all other prices, apart perhaps from the price of land. Conversely, we 
can also expect prices of manufactures and luxury products to fall rela-
tively. Consequently, peasants and wage workers will have to work harder 
to survive, but will increasingly be able to afford what was earlier consid-
ered rare luxuries, such as tobacco and cotton cloth. Hence, we can see 
how discussing living standards in opposite terms of either improvement 
or deterioration flattens the picture into an unhelpful one-dimensional 
framework, and lead us to miss important complexities of pre-modern de-
velopment. 
A Boserupian view of China 
By applying a Boserupian perspective on the economic history of late pre-
modern China, I believe that we can resolve much of the tension between 
the optimist and pessimist camps of scholarship, and begin to perceive the 
complex workings of pre-modern economic dynamics. 
Continuity, efflorescences, and revolutions 
The Boserupian perspective has a clear implication of continuity, and this 
should lead us to question the relevance of identifying a second commer-
cial revolution in China. This is also suggested by the observation that the 
more revolutions you identify the less revolutionary each of them becomes.  
Although there are disagreements about the extent of each revolutionary 
period, taking the more extensive, but by no means obscure, definitions 
results in the absurd conclusion that China’s economy underwent revolu-
tionary change most of the time after 700. The first medieval economic 
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revolution as described by Mark Elvin already covers more than 500 years, 
from sometime in the 8th to the 14th century, and thus hardly merits the 
term “revolution”.163 After a brief interlude of two centuries, we now have 
a second revolution, covering roughly from the middle of the 16th to the 
end of the 18th century.164 Remaining are two short non-revolutionary pe-
riods, one between 1350 and 1550, and one after 1800. 
It has even been suggested that the negative picture of the first non-revo-
lutionary period between 1350 and 1550 is somewhat overstated. In a now 
more than a decade old anthology, a number of prominent scholars argue 
that the Song-Yuan-Ming-transition period (1100-1500) was characterized 
by far more continuity than was previously assumed.165 For example, in 
the Yangzi delta Li Bozhong suggests that agricultural development con-
tinued in a slow tempo, binding the developments of the first and the sec-
ond revolutions neatly together.166 
In a now prominent article, Jack Goldstone attempted to somewhat nor-
malize these revolutionary periods by interpreting them as instances of the 
regular pre-modern phenomena he called “efflorescences”, defined as “a 
relatively sharp, often unexpected upturn in significant demographic and 
economic indices, usually accompanied by political expansion and institu-
tion building and cultural synthesis and consolidation”.167 This way Gold-
stone attempted to find a common conceptual framework in which one 
could understand the ups and downs of Chinese and European economic 
development. As commendable as that is, Goldstone’s concept of efflo-
rescences remains somewhat problematic as it reproduces the view of eco-
nomic history as governed by revolutionary periods of change. In a Chi-
nese context, “efflorescence” simply acts as a synonym for “economic rev-
olution”, and so tend to be a near-constant phenomenon. Dividing eco-
nomic history into periodic cycles of efflorescence and crisis remains 
problematic as it fails to capture the essential continuity of economic de-
velopment in China, and as we shall see, Europe as well. 
With the revolutionary periods extending so far as to become normal, we 
should perhaps instead refrain from thinking Chinese economic history in 
terms of revolutions altogether. The historical background for the claims 
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of Chinese economic revolutions was the now outdated view that the 
norm in China was stagnation. The evidence suggests that we should in-
vert our conceptions of normalcy and exception, and see things in a dif-
ferent perspective – that of long periods of slow, steady expansion interrupted by 
shorter periods of crisis. 
A number of points are important to note here: First, expansion does not 
mean a steady improvement, or growth in GDP per capita. Neither does 
it refer to only extensive growth, i.e. “quantitative growth, qualitative stand-
still”. It simply means a continuation of Boserupian growth patterns – de-
mographic growth, agrarian intensification, commercialization, diversifi-
cation and so on. GDP per capita is basically a red herring in a pre-indus-
trial setting, as it tells us very little about the actual level of economic de-
velopment. Second, we should not expect the periodic crises erupting 
from time to time to be endemic to the economic system, or caused by 
transitions between economic systems, as in the Marxist interpretation of 
economic change. Rather, periods of crisis should be seen as occasioned 
by more contingent factors, such as climate change, disease, or political 
problems. Third, as Boserup also mentions168, continuous economic ex-
pansion may at times be subject to threshold effects. Therefore, shifting 
trends in agricultural productivity are to be expected, depending on 
whether Smithian or involutionary dynamics are strongest at the time. The 
general trends are thus subject to short-term variation, but show continu-
ity on longer timescales. 
Involution, commercial expansion, and living standards 
Boserup’s generalized model of agrarian intensification closely resembles 
Philip Huang’s involutionary model of China. However, a number of im-
portant differences in perspective exist. Whereas Huang envisions his 
model of involutionary growth as being a specifically Chinese phenome-
non, it is in fact an example of a general pattern of pre-modern economic 
development. The problem in Huang’s work thus lies less in his analysis 
of the Chinese economy than in his contrasting of this with an idealized 
“Euro-American experience,” where “agrarian change in the early modern 
and modern periods was generally accompanied by expansion in both ab-
solute output and output per unit labor.”169 Though Huang is also some-
what too pessimistic about the fate of the Chinese peasants, the main 
                                              
168 Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, 41. 
169 Huang, The Peasant Family, 12. 
69 
 
problem is his overly optimistic interpretation of the European econ-
omy.170 China in the late pre-modern era indeed suffered from overpopu-
lation, but overpopulation is in the Boserupian view a permanent fact of 
agricultural life, as, crucially, it is a relative phenomenon. Chinese peasants 
responded in the expected ways, by clearing new land, expanding to less 
populated areas, and intensifying their agricultural practices. 
While Boserup herself did not include as central parts of her analysis mar-
kets, trade, and manufacture, as has been critically pointed out171, the Chi-
nese case shows how it easily fits into her general picture. In addition to 
intensifying cereal agriculture, increased market access provided the Chi-
nese peasants with a number of other opportunities for coping with pop-
ulation pressure. As previously mentioned, the shift to cash crops and the 
rise of rural manufacture can indeed be seen as a further intensification of 
peasant land use, as the extensive grain trade enabled cotton cloth, silk, 
and other manufactures to act as a proxy for cereal cultivation. The intro-
duction of markets in the Boserupian analysis then presents us with only 
further layers of agrarian intensification. 
The commercialization of the Chinese countryside was thus, precisely as 
Huang suggests, at least partly driven by necessity.  But this does not mean 
that it was ineffective in countering the Malthusian trend of declining 
productivity. The latest study by Robert Allen suggests that agricultural 
labor productivity in the Yangzi Delta remained largely constant from 
1620 to 1820, even at a comparatively high level—around 90% of British 
and Dutch levels, which were the highest known in the contemporary 
world.172 But, as the same study also shows, the opportunities for further 
intensification were not inexhaustible. Having reached an impressive level 
by the mid-17th century, peasant family incomes had by the 18th century 
entered a slow decline, as a result of a decline in agricultural work days 
available per household and decreasing prices on cotton manufactures. 
The same declining trend is visible in studies of real wages for China’s 
small, wage-dependent population. 173  Huang’s involutionary view then 
again comes out partially vindicated, but with the addendum that it was 
exactly what is to be expected of a pre-modern economy. Extraordinarily 
                                              
170 Pomeranz, “Beyond the East-West Binary.” 
171 De Vries, The Industrious Revolution, 77–8. 
172 Allen, “Agricultural Productivity.” 
173 Allen et al., “Wages, Prices, and Living Standards in China, 1738-1925.” 
70 
 
large rural incomes, as evidenced in the 17th century Yangzi Delta, were 
indeed extraordinary and could not be maintained over time. 
However, as previously mentioned, the decline in incomes does not di-
rectly map onto a decline in living standards, contrary to what is some-
times assumed.174 For example, the declining price of cotton manufactures 
not only meant declining incomes for the producers, but also a far greater 
availability of cotton cloth, which was strongly preferred over alternatives. 
Likewise, the increasing amount of land dedicated to sugarcane in the 
south must have resulted in the wider availability of sugar, a much coveted 
luxury. Although these developments are very hard to show directly with 
our fragmentary evidence, they seem highly plausible. This interpretation 
fits well with the evidence presented by Pomeranz, and should lead us to 
think twice before making broad statements about either improving or 
deteriorating standards of living in China. 
A look into how rural markets proliferated in China in the 19th and 20th 
centuries gives us a good example of both the limits and the positive re-
sults arising from commercialization (see fig. 4). Aside from minor varia-
tion, the proliferation of markets in China did not influence greatly the 
number of inhabitants per market, which remained nearly constant at 
around 7-8,000. The proliferation of markets which plays an important 
role in the ‘Second Commercial Revolution’ was perhaps then not so 
much a commercialization of areas previously untouched by markets, but 
simply the result of strong population growth coupled with a constant 
population-to-market ratio. But what is also evident is the marked de-
crease of distance both from peasant to market and between markets fol-
lowing increased population density. This fact must have reduced transac-
tion costs greatly, as transportation of goods over land generally was ex-
orbitantly expensive. 
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Fig. 4: Average Area and Population of Standard Marketing Communities, as a 
Function of Population Density, 1948 Estimates 
Source: G. William Skinner, Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, I, 34 
The relationship between long-distance trade and population growth in 
China is somewhat more complex. Generally, we may assume that the 
lower transaction costs associated with denser populations also incentiv-
ized trade over long distances, though to a comparatively lesser degree 
than short-distance trade. However, as have been argued by Pomeranz, 
demographic expansion in the less developed regions of China, which ex-
ported grain to highly developed regions such as the Yangzi Delta in ex-
change for manufactured goods, could have been detrimental to this 
trade.175 As regions such as the Upper and Middle Yangzi (see fig. 1) be-
came increasingly populated, they developed into centers of manufacture 
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in their own right, beginning a process of ‘import substitution’. Gradually, 
as the developed area of China expanded, long-distance trade between the 
now developed regions thus contracted and regional integration declined.  
Serfdom, managerial agriculture and institutional innovation 
Even institutional developments such as the decline of serfdom can be 
interpreted as responses to Boserupian growth patterns. As Boserup her-
self mentions, the use of unfree labor can be seen as a response to rural 
underpopulation, as a way to artificially intensify agriculture, and thus per-
haps make it easier for landowners to exploit their land.176 By the Ming-
Qing transition, bonded labor was indeed most prevalent in less developed 
areas of China, and almost entirely absent in the Yangzi Delta, were it had 
disappeared far earlier. Following the general pattern of extensive devel-
opment radiating out from the eastern core177, bonded labor gradually dis-
appeared as commercial development proceeded further into the country. 
In an increasingly commercialized economy, it simply made more sense 
for landowners to exploit their peasants commercially, through loans and 
rent, than through physical force. 
Slightly more controversially, the changing fortunes of managerial agricul-
ture can also be seen in the same perspective. It is telling that the cases of 
managerial agriculture expounded by Chinese scholars as signs of incipient 
capitalism in China are located in the North, away from the most devel-
oped parts of the country.178 Philip Huang shows why this is the case: in 
the Yangzi Delta, even given the comparatively low wages prevailing there, 
landowners could make larger profits by renting out their land than by 
directly managing production.179 It seems managerial agriculture is best 
fitted to places of intermediate development than either very high or very 
low. To talk of managerial agriculture as a sign of capitalism is then to miss 
the point completely. 
This is not to say that economic institutions are only the product of the 
given level of demographic development. The relationship between insti-
tutions and economic expansion is certainly much more complex, and a 
topic of much debate among economic historians. But in a field such as 
economic history where institutions have long been seen as a key factor in 
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shaping development180, that the causal arrow often points more strongly 
in the other direction is a point well worth repeating.181 
China as a prototypical Advanced Organic Economy 
The economic developments of 17th and 18th century China, as described 
above, conform well to the expanded Boserupian model of development. 
I would argue that this Chinese model can be fruitfully used as a prototype 
to understand economic change in what Wrigley termed Advanced Or-
ganic Economies. There is no need to categorize Chinese development in 
terms of a failure to modernize, or on the contrary as a case of early mod-
ernization or incipient capitalism. Rather, as a thoroughly pre-modern 
economy it was characterized by its own dynamics and developmental 
trends. These trends did not lead toward any specific goal, or in any case 
not a goal we could identify as modernity, although some of the processes 
of pre-modern development might well be necessary for the later emergence 
of modernity. In order to understand their significance, we must keep their 
pre-modern nature in mind. 
That China did not conform to the perceived patterns of European eco-
nomic development is no new insight. But what I suggest in this chapter 
is that neither does large parts of Europe. I argue instead that using the Chinese 
case as a model for Europe can bring us fresh insights into the essentially 
pre-modern nature of economic development in the 17th and 18th century 
French and Habsburg realms. 
France 
In the field of economic history, we have seen, China has always lived 
under the conceptual shadow of Europe. Its successes and failures are 
measured in terms of its conformity to idealized European developments, 
and given its lack of modernization, its dynamics has always been seen as 
wholly different from European ones. It is a curious fact that almost the 
exact same things could be said about the economic history of France, in 
the very heart of Western Europe.  
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Just as with China, scholarship on the economic performance of France 
in the 17th to 19th centuries has long been characterized by what has been 
called a “historiography of retardation”.182 In its constant competition 
with Britain, both real and in the eyes of modernocentric scholars, France 
has often been seen as lagging behind in economic development, or as in 
some way blocked from participating in the British process of moderniza-
tion. The backbone of the scholarly tradition of retardation consists of the 
classic studies of French rural history by prominent members of the An-
nales School, e.g. Marc Bloch, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Pierre Goubert, 
and Ernest Labrousse among others.183  Through their widely acclaimed 
studies, these scholars drew a picture of the French countryside as caught 
in a Malthusian cycle of stagnation and poverty—“l’histoire immobile” 
(immobile history), in the words of Le Roy Ladurie—until at least the mid-
dle of the 18th century. Other prominent scholars of French economic 
history have gone further and denied the existence of real economic ‘pro-
gress’ until well into the 19th century.184 Similarly, in the seminal work of 
Douglass North & Robert Thomas, France is characterized as an “also-
ran”, as its institutions of property were too little developed to facilitate 
modernization.185 
However, since the 1970’s, a number of scholars have protested this char-
acterization of French economic history, arguing that the French economy 
was not at all stagnant or lagging behind, but was rather modernizing just 
as effectively as Britain, just after another fashion. According to the dis-
tinguished economic historian Patrick O’Brien, that Britain was the first 
industrializer was only the result of “a less than remarkable conjuncture” 
of a broadly European trend.186 In his earlier work with Caglar Keyder, 
they similarly argued that France performed as well as Britain in terms of 
economic growth through the 18th and 19th centuries.187 The same opti-
mism regarding French growth and modernizing development in the 18th 
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century is expressed by a number of other scholars.188 Richard Roehl even 
went a step further and suggested that France could be seen as the first 
industrializer, in place of Britain.189  More recently, Philip Hoffman has 
been powerfully arguing for a strong, market-driven development in the 
early modern age, ‘rescuing’ the French peasants from their supposed tra-
ditionalism.190  
As this long-running debate closely parallels the debate surrounding 
China’s economic history, using the Chinese example as a non-moder-
nocentric model for France provides important insights into the nature of 
French economic development in the 17th and 18th centuries. In the fol-
lowing, I will propose an interpretation of French economic history based 
on the insights gained from comparing it with the China model advanced 
on the previous pages. 
Basics 
France by the end of the 17th century was the largest state in Europe, both 
in terms of area and population. The economic and social organization of 
French society was therefore extremely differentiated across its territory, 
we are often told. Still, compared to China, it was positively tiny, covering 
only a fraction of the territory, and with a seventh of its population. With 
a population at around 20 million, France is perhaps more comparable to 
the Yangzi Delta than China as a whole. In terms of population density, 
France was in the moderately high end of Europe at about 38 per-
sons/km2, but paled in comparison to the densities achieved in developed 
parts of China, where half of the population lived in areas with densities 
above 100 persons/km2.191 
During much of the 17th century, the French economy was in a bad state, 
as part of the broader general crisis of Europe at the time.192 Paralleling 
Chinese developments, by the turn of the century the economy shifted 
into an upswing lasting throughout the 18th century, until the revolutionary 
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wars. Though it would be far-fetched to call this an era of peace and pros-
perity, as France was at war for most of the period, wars were generally 
kept away from French soil, and so in the life of most of the population, 
peace generally prevailed.  
Demographic developments 
During the 18th century, the French population grew considerably, from 
around 20 to around 29 million people, and thus finally reached numbers 
well above those achieved just before the arrival of the Black Death in the 
14th century. In the traditional literature, much is made of this fact, which 
is seen as evidence that France had finally broken out of the histoire immobile. 
As the Malthusian wisdom had it, France as a traditional society was sub-
ject to a harsh regime of population stagnation, with death rates by neces-
sity following birth rates through ups and downs. The evidence of a fall in 
mortality which was not accompanied by a fall in fertility in the 18th cen-
tury consequently was taken to mean that a qualitative change had hap-
pened. Fernand Braudel accordingly described the 18th century as a “wa-
tershed of biological regimes” characterized by a “shattering” of a “bio-
logical ancien régime”.193 Earlier literature similarly identified in the 18th cen-
tury a “demographic revolution”.194  
Although there has been a good deal of criticism of this characterization195, 
newer research still presents this population growth as the beginning of 
“the demographic transition”.196 This term refers to the demographic de-
velopments from a traditional pattern of high fertility and high mortality 
to a modern pattern of low fertility and low mortality (see fig. 5, in which 
18th-century France is supposed to be situated in the beginning of phase 
2). 
                                              
193 Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life, 70. 
194 Meuvret, “Les crises de subsistances et la démographie de la France d’Ancien 
Régime.” 
195 E.g. Goubert, “Révolution démographique au XVIIIe siècle?”; Morineau, 
“Révolution agricole, révolution alimentaire, révolution démographique.” 
196 Malanima, Pre-Modern European Economy, 36–47. 
77 
 
 
Fig. 5: Model of the Demographic Transition 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
However, the modernizing interpretation of the population growth evi-
denced in the 18th century carries no merit. First of all, there is no evident 
reason to place any special significance on the population levels achieved 
in the 14th and 16th centuries. The conceptualizations of exactly this level 
of population as a natural population ceiling was based on outdated Mal-
thusian theories of population dynamics that should not still be taken se-
riously. The Black Death, the wars of religion, changes in climate, and the 
other catastrophes responsible for the recurrent episodes of declining 
population cannot in any plausible way be said to be caused by the high 
population levels themselves, as would be necessary for these levels to 
constitute a natural ceiling. The surpassing of these levels thus does not 
merit any great conclusions about demographic revolutions, but should 
rather be seen as a merely contingent development. 
As we have seen in relation to China, the strictly Malthusian vision that 
formed a central part of the stagnationist theories does no longer seem to 
hold up. This has also been shown regarding France, where no simple 
relationship between population growth and improved technological or 
economic conditions can be found. 197  Population movements cannot 
solely be explained in terms of levels of agricultural technology, but are 
the product of a more complex set of factors.198 As is evidenced by the 
example of China, population densities can continue to grow to very large 
levels without any explanation connected with modernity. The temporal 
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coincidence of French population growth with Chinese suggests that com-
mon factors may have played a role, and given that our climatic data fits 
population trends (compare figures 2 & 6), it would be no surprise if the 
warmer climate of the 18th century constituted a large part of the reason 
for the strong population growth of the century. A positive effect of the 
absence of large-scale domestic political troubles, and of foreign soldiers 
on French soil, between the end of the Frondes in 1659 and the revolution 
in 1789 also appears probable. Finally, we must mention the disappearance 
of the plague from France in 1720 as a probable factor.199 
It could be argued that some of the causes suggested were themselves part 
of a development toward modernity—for example, the emergence of the 
modern state might be taken as having helped to quarantine and control 
disease, reign in the behavior of armies and dampen political violence. But 
if one wishes to do so, one is left with the conundrum of an even greater 
Chinese population growth in a context very far from any modern state 
(see chapter 4). 
When taking a more long-term view of population growth in France and 
China, as in figure 6, it becomes very probable that we need to find an 
explanation of the main trends in mechanisms common to both. This ob-
servation of broadly similar trends in Europe and China has earlier led to 
a number of scholars to argue that these similarities are evidence of a de-
gree of global interconnection of the world economy exhibiting long-term 
cycles of economic activity and stagnation comparable to the modern 
business cycles.200 However, global interconnections are not necessary for 
the populations to show similar trends. What are required are simply 
mechanisms that impose similar consequences across the spectrum. Alt-
hough the precise relationship between climate changes and population 
trends are certainly very complex and hard to pin down, it would certainly 
be surprising if climate was not an important factor. We could also look 
for global disease patterns, such as the global spread of the plague in the 
14th century, which require only a minimal degree of global interconnec-
tion. Additionally, we should not disregard the possibility that chance 
played a substantial factor in the similarities of the growth trends, espe-
cially on the smaller scale.  
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Fig. 6: Population of China and France (millions) 
Source: Richard von Glahn, The Economic History of China; Jacques Dupâquier, Histoire de la Population Fran-
çaise; Paolo Malanima, Pre-modern European Economy 
 So, instead of interpreting the French population growth of the 18th cen-
tury as the breaking of earlier Malthusian dynamics, as a sign of the way 
out of the Great Agrarian Cycle, or as a harbinger of modernity in the 
form of the demographic transition, we must put it in its pre-modern place. 
Agrarian populations in pre-modern times evidence a tendency to grow, 
absent any catastrophes of either epidemic, climatic or political nature. 
The relatively large growth of the 18th century is simply the result of a 
confluence of positive developments in all three aspects, and has nothing 
to do with modernity. The temporal conjunction of pre-modern popula-
tion growth in the 18th century with the truly modern population growth 
of the 19th and 20th centuries, driven by scientific advances in areas such 
as medicine and hygiene, is merely a coincidence, and should not lead us 
to conclude that modernity stretched further back in time than it did.  
Looking at the proportion of French population residing in cities also calls 
into question the idea of a steadily improving, modernizing Europe. The 
urbanization rate, defined as the proportion of the population living in 
cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, rises steadily from 1550 to 1700, 
from a value of around 4% to around 9% (see fig. 7). After having reached 
its highest point in 1700, however, the number begins declining slightly 
throughout the 18th century. Similar patterns of urbanization are to be 
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found in the rest of northern Europe, with the usual exception of Brit-
ain.201 When including inhabitants of cities with a population larger than 
5,000 the numbers show a marked stability, with an increase of barely 2% 
from 1500 to 1700 and stagnation thereafter.202 
 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 
>10,000 4.2 4.3 5.9 7.2 9.2 9.1 8.8 
>5,000 9,1  8,7  10,9 10,3 11,1 
 
Fig. 7: Urbanization rates in France – percentage of population living in cities 
with more than 10,000 or 5,000 inhabitants 
Source: Jan de Vries, European Urbanization, 39; Anthony D. Wrigley, “Urban Growth and Agricultural 
Change”, 718 
Though urbanization rates were stagnant through the 18th century, the pe-
riod’s population growth meant that the absolute sizes of cities expanded 
greatly. Between 1700 and 1800 in France, the absolute number of inhab-
itants in cities with a population over 5,000 thus rose by almost a mil-
lion.203 On the background of the population increase of the period then, 
even stagnant urbanization rates can thus be aligned with the image of 
urban prosperity and growth that we get from qualitative descriptions of 
the period. 
Agrarian structure 
Most descriptions of the general structure of French agriculture stress the 
great diversity of ownership forms and production methods even within 
relatively small areas of France.204 For making large-scale comparisons, 
however, a general picture can be assessed. 
Throughout France, most farmland was tended by small-scale peasant cul-
tivators. A large part of them owned at least some land themselves, with 
total peasant-owned land amounting to around 40% of the cultivated area. 
However, even within the peasant class, this land was very unevenly dis-
tributed, so that most peasant plots were very small, often less than 5 
acres.205 The rest of the land was owned by nobles (20-25%), clergy (6%) 
and the urban bourgeoisie (20-30%). This land was rented out to local 
peasants in a variety of forms, with the most dominant being a form of 
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sharecropping, in which the owner and tenant shared both input costs and 
the output in the form of natural goods. Through the period, though, these 
arrangements tended to be slowly replaced by commercial leases where 
tenants paid a fixed rent in cash to the owner.206  
The 17th and 18th centuries also saw the establishment of some large-scale, 
entrepreneurial farming, mostly in the Paris Basin and the North-East, 
which, as has been done with their Chinese counterparts, has been hailed 
as the beginnings of a modern, capitalist agrarian production.207 However, 
newer research has shown that farm size did not affect productivity mark-
edly, and that consequently the slight gains in productivity of these areas 
should rather be attributed to a reduction in transaction costs associated 
with better market infrastructure.208 Furthermore, these managerial estates 
were few in number, and during the 18th century again tended to lose 
ground to peasant smallholders.209 
This picture of landownership is further complicated by the overlapping 
layer of seigneuries. As the remains of a more feudal structure of land 
ownership, the seigneuries were institutions with intersecting social, polit-
ical and economic aspects. A seigneurie generally included full ownership 
of a piece of land, but also varying rights on the production of inde-
pendently owned land, as well as a hodgepodge of ‘traditional rights’, such 
as certain jurisdictional rights and the right to buy property ahead of others. 
Over the late pre-modern period, seigneuries tended to lose their social 
and political aspects, and were treated more and more like a kind of private 
property, that could be traded freely – even to the point where they have 
been described as a kind of ‘investment portfolio’.210 
The period thus generally saw a commercialization of land ownership, 
with monetary payments being increasingly important, both as rent pay-
ment and as seigneurial dues. This fits well with a broader image of 17th 
and 18th century France as undergoing increasing commercialization. 
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Commercialization 
The commercialization of the French economy during the late pre-mod-
ern era is, like in the Chinese case, a complex phenomenon burdened with 
a strong notion of its significance for the development of modernity. 
There seems no doubt that France in the 17th and 18th centuries experi-
enced a large growth in trade volumes, both over long and short dis-
tances.211 Apart from the growth provided by the period’s strong increase 
in population, there is also substantial evidence for a growing market in-
tegration, in what is often, anachronistically, referred to as the emergence 
of a ‘national market’.212 The cause of this intensifying market integration 
was probably the further development, especially in the latter half of the 
18th century, of an integrated road and canal network spanning the country. 
Additionally, the political removal of a number of internal barriers to trade 
might also have contributed.213 
The growth in trade volumes was coupled with the proliferation of small-
scale markets through France. Although precise statistics are nowhere to 
be had, Braudel presents some evidence of the number of markets in the 
généralité of Caen in northern France by 1725, and compares this with num-
bers for Bavaria and England. In all cases, he finds a relation of about 1 
market per 7,000 people.214 Curiously, this is about the same ratio we 
found regarding China (see above). Although Braudel is very careful to 
note that we should not “suppose that there is some sort of law”215, this 
could lend support to the Boserupian view that commercialization and 
market density is mainly a product of population growth. 
The ballooning of foreign trade during the 18th century has attracted con-
siderable interest among economic historians, who often attribute large 
transformative powers to foreign trade. For example, according to Peter 
Kriedte, “the appropriation of foreign purchasing power presented the 
only possibility of overcoming the limitation of domestic markets and of 
increasing the demand for industrial products”.216 The advent of modern 
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Global History has exacerbated this trend, as global trade streams are in-
creasingly treated as inherently important for the construction of the ‘early 
modern world’.217 
However, the importance given to foreign trade can be criticized in two 
ways. Firstly, the distinction between domestic and foreign trade is some-
what arbitrary, as it is solely a question of whether trade crosses state bor-
ders. As a result, geographically large states have correspondingly small 
amounts of foreign trade, relative to their total trade volumes, and small 
states have correspondingly large amounts of foreign trade. It is therefore 
no surprise that the Dutch Republic have a large part of their trade cate-
gorized as foreign, France a somewhat smaller part, and China a minimal 
part. The parameter worth comparing should instead be long-distance 
trade, however one defines ‘long-distance’. Secondly, before the advent of 
steam ships, long-distance trade made up an exceedingly small part of total 
economic activity. According to Paul Bairoch, by the end of the 18th cen-
tury, even after a long period of strong growth of foreign trade, only about 
4% of (territorially fragmented) Europe’s total economic output crossed 
national borders, and more than 75% of this stayed inside Europe.218 As 
for intercontinental trade, Jan de Vries has recently reminded us that the 
total volume of goods sent annually from Asia to Europe at the end of the 
18th century amounted to about 50,000 tons, which is less than a 3,000th 
of the current annual tonnage and could fit several times into one large 
modern container ship.219 Despite a strong growth in long-distance trade, 
then, most trade by far occurred at more local levels. 
At the other end of the spectrum, how far the commercialization pene-
trated into peasant communities has also been a subject of much debate. 
Older works of the Annales School tend to represent the French peasantry 
as isolated from markets, producing mainly to cover subsistence needs. 
According to this view, the market only became part of peasant life toward 
the end of the 18th century, where its forces proved destructive to the tra-
ditional peasant way of life. Newer economic history of France paints a 
very different picture. Already from the late middle ages French peasants 
can be shown to have been “deeply involved in markets”, resulting in 
                                              
217 Flynn and Giráldez, China and the Birth of Globalization in the 16th Century; Frank, Re-
Orient; Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories.” 
218 Bairoch, Commerce Extérieur, 79; O’Brien, “European Economic Development,” 4. 
219 De Vries, “Understanding Eurasian Trade,” 15, for current numbers, see 
http://container-news.com. 
84 
 
“economic growth in the countryside”.220 A large number of prominent 
studies have now shown how the market was a large part of peasant life 
far back in time, and that French peasants maneuvered somewhat success-
fully through markets in a rational manner, at times even leading to in-
creased output, i.e. growth.221 The rehabilitation of the French peasantry 
has led to the conclusion among a number of scholars that market inte-
gration should be seen as the single most determining factor of economic 
development through the era, inspired in no small part by Douglass 
North’s New Institutional Economics.222 However, as we will see, the eco-
nomic developments of the 17th and 18th centuries are better explained 
through the Boserupian framework, with population growth seen as its 
driving factor. 
Agrarian intensification 
The development of French agriculture in the period is subject to intense 
debate over whether it experienced ‘modern’ market-driven growth or re-
mained basically stagnant. As is the case for the debate concerning Chinese 
agriculture, the structure of the debate as being a question of either ‘de-
velopment or stagnation’ conceals the fact that agricultural change in the 
17th and 18th centuries might be better understood outside the framework 
of modernization. Following our China model, we will see that many of 
the differences of scholarly opinion can be resolved by interpreting French 
agricultural developments as a case of agrarian intensification of the 
Boserupian type. 
The French countryside experienced large population growth in the 18th 
century, adding 6 million people to the already (in a European context) 
numerous peasantry. This growth necessitated an intensification of agri-
cultural production on already existing land and/or the expansion of agri-
culture into areas previously unused owing to its lower quality. One of the 
consequences of this was the declining sizes of peasant farms.223 By the 
end of the 18th century, in the words of Gwynne Lewis, “well over half of 
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the agricultural workforce did not own enough land to raise, comfortably, 
a medium-sized family of four or five.”224 
The rising pressure on the land is also visible in the relative price move-
ments of various commodities.  The single category of commodities that 
exhibited the largest rise in prices over the 18th century was the price of 
land, and thus the rents charged by landowners.225 This also helps explain 
why landowners increasingly preferred money rents to sharecropping 
agreements, as noted above. Following land, prices on basic foodstuffs 
also tended to rise faster than other necessities, and so tended to occupy 
a larger role in family budgets.226  
These relative movements point to steadily falling real incomes of the 
French peasantry, especially the ones without surplus grain to sell, for the 
benefit of the landowning classes – nobles and bourgeoisie.227 The posi-
tion of landless laborers was even worse. This is evident both when look-
ing at the rent-wage ratio, which rose markedly throughout the period, and 
when looking at real wage data, which has been estimated to have fallen 
by as much as 25% over the 18th century.228  
However, there were multiple ways for the peasants of responding to this 
threat. One such response was the shift from cereal agriculture to new 
world crops such as maize and potatoes, to secondary old-world crops 
such as chestnuts or buckwheat, or to cash crops such as vines or mulberry 
trees. This shift was often coupled with another strategy, that of cultivating 
previously unused marginal lands, as most of the new crops could be sown 
in somewhat worse conditions than was suitable for the traditional wheat 
cultivation. Additionally, all of these new crops were characterized by a 
considerably higher productivity per hectare than traditional cereals, and 
thus enabled land-starved peasants to make a living on their reduced plots. 
As a result, these crops spread fast throughout large parts of France.229  
Especially the shift into cash crops was made possible by the extended 
reach of the market into peasant communities. This provides the stepping 
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stone for Philip Hoffman’s thesis that the peasants’ increased market op-
portunities led to “growth in a traditional society”, as Total Factor Produc-
tivity in his estimate rose by some 10-15% in the period from 1650 the 
revolution.230 But, as have been convincingly shown by Stephen J. Miller, 
this growth came at the expense of massive increases in the amount of 
hours worked by the peasants. The new crops all had markedly higher 
labor requirements than traditional wheat, and most of the new land put 
under cultivation required massive amounts of labor to be made suffi-
ciently fertile. The increased market participation of the French peasantry 
is thus properly seen as a response to population pressure, mitigating the 
worst problems of the declining amount of land to each person, but not 
absolutely improving the life of peasants.231 Seen in this light, the stagna-
tion in agricultural labor productivity through the period is then not some-
thing to be lamented, but attest to the success of the French peasantry in 
staving off the decreasing returns to labor in a time of rapid population 
growth. 
Another response on the part of the peasants was to take up part-time 
manufacturing work in one form or another. As there was a lot of seasonal 
variation in the labor required for agriculture, the periods of low labor 
requirement could be spent working in manufacture, either at home or in 
rural or urban centers of manufacture. Thus, by the end of the 18th century 
between a quarter and half of the employed population worked both inside 
and outside the agricultural sector.232 The increasing supply of low-cost 
labor by landless peasants or peasants with insufficient land had the effect 
of gradually drawing industry out into the rural areas.233 The relatively 
strong growth of rural industry, together with the absolute growth of cities, 
resulted in a large expansion of industrial production during the 18th cen-
tury. Although precise numbers are uncertain, it appears that French in-
dustrial production grew around 1% per year, a number comparable to the 
growth experienced in Britain.234 This fact of industrial growth is the pri-
mary evidence on which several scholars base their arguments that France 
was on par with Britain in industrial development.235 But while the abso-
lute numbers might correspond between the two societies, what should be 
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of interest is not the net value of economic growth per se but rather the 
specific context and trajectories of economic development, which cannot 
be understood apart from its social embeddedness. 
Industrious revolution? 
Be that as it may, the expansion of proto-industrial activity throughout 
France has long been seen as a necessary stepping-stone to the develop-
ment of modern industry. Already in 1923, Henri Sée commented that 
domestic industry was an “intermediate stage between the old urban pro-
fessions and the big industry of the 19th century and which prepared the 
advent of the latter”.236 Likewise, in the tradition following Franklin Men-
dels, who originated the term “proto-industrialization” in the 1970’s, the 
expansion of rural industry in the 17th and 18th centuries is thought “as 
part and parcel of the process of “industrialization” or, rather, as a first 
phase which preceded and prepared modern industrialization proper.”237 
In more explicitly Marxist approaches, the spread of rural industry is seen 
as “one of the central elements … in the disintegration of the feudal sys-
tem and the transition to capitalist society.”238 
The most recently popular instantiation of this theory is that of Jan de 
Vries’ “Industrious Revolution”. 239  Borrowing the term from Akira 
Hayami’s description of Japanese early industrialization, the term “indus-
trious revolution” refer to the developments “during a long eighteenth 
century, roughly 1650-1850, in which a growing number of households 
acted to reallocate their productive resources (which are chiefly the time 
of their members) in ways that increased both the supply of market-ori-
ented, money-earning activities and the demand for goods offered in the 
marketplace.”240 This reorientation originated in an “innovative consumer 
behavior” linked to “for lack of a better word, modernity.”241 In de Vries’ 
view, an increase in the demand for consumer goods by agentic house-
holds, enabled by increased market access, fueled “northwestern Europe’s 
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economic growth process”, and “preceded and prepared the way for the 
Industrial Revolution”.242 
Haven taken the term from an East Asian context, de Vries is at pains to 
distinguish European from Asian industrious revolutions. In his view, 
“They are not the same thing, and the chief difference is located in the 
greater role of markets and specialization in Western Europe.”243 De Vries 
then contrasts an Asian industrious revolution, unconnected to markets 
and driven by necessity and population pressure, with a European indus-
trious revolution, driven by market-oriented consumer demand. This dis-
tinction has then subsequently been reproduced elsewhere.244  
However, the distinction proposed by de Vries, as well as his entire rein-
terpretation of the industrious revolution, seems to me to be somewhat 
unhelpful, as it both exaggerates the differences between East and West 
and paints a rather too rosy picture of the European experience. In the 
Chinese context, it is hard to imagine how weaving peasants could not be 
entirely dependent on market participation for generating the income 
needed – after all, the only way of supplementing your income by domestic 
manufacture is to actually market your products. And in the European 
context, scarcity of land seems most generally to have been the main driver 
for the growth of domestic industry. 
In the French case, it has long been apparent, even to those who saw 
proto-industrialization as a stepping-stone to industrialization proper, that 
it was caused mainly by peasants with insufficient land to uphold their 
living standards. According to Henri Sée, the growth of domestic industry 
was the result of an abundance of man-power, as the limited amount of 
land per person forced peasants to take up manufacture on the side.245 
This picture has been substantiated by several other scholars since then.246 
An interesting further fact is the observation by Sidney Pollard that where 
there appeared good agricultural alternatives to intensify production, such 
as the cultivation of mulberry trees and other imported crops, the coun-
tryside often experienced de-industrialization.247 This lends considerable 
support to the view that, as was the case in China, the rise of domestic 
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industry in France should really be interpreted as a proxy for agrarian in-
tensification, driven by population pressure. While rural industry indeed 
did contribute significantly to the growth of the economy, measured in 
GDP or even GDP per capita, this should not lead us to forget the pre-
modern character of this growth, which followed essentially the same tra-
jectory as what we saw in China. 
Living standards 
The traditional, Boserupian, character of economic development in 17th 
and 18th century France is further corroborated when looking at trends of 
wages, consumption and living standards. In the historiography, opinions 
on the development of living standards are divided between an optimist 
and a pessimist camp, based on their use of different forms of empirical 
data.248 Scholars studying the movement of wages and prices have tended 
to support pessimist conclusions, as real wages declined through most of 
the early modern period. On the other hand, scholars studying probate 
inventories have tended to present a much more positive picture, as they 
show a tendency to include increasing amounts of objects, and not only 
among the rich.249 This assumed paradox can fit comfortably inside a 
Boserupian interpretation of economic development. 
Returning to the question of relative price movements, mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, we would expect population growth to have the effect of 
raising prices of land and rent. This would tend to cause rises in grain 
prices, as well as that of derived agricultural products such as meat. Con-
versely, the surplus of labor produced would result in a relative drop in 
the prices of manufactures and items dependent on larger trade networks. 
This is exactly what was observed in the case of France by Labrousse.250 
These relative movements would tend to have a marked effect on living 
standards, but not in a straightforward fashion, and not equally for every-
one.  
Among the lower classes, where food constituted the dominant budget 
item in the household, this would result in falling real wages and a lowering 
of the dietary quality. We see this evidenced in the marked decline in the 
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amount of meat eaten per person, as less land could be dedicated to inef-
ficient meat production.251 The deterioration of the diet is also visible in 
the declining statures of young men registered by the army.252 The rise in 
food prices also necessitated an increase in labor hours, as increasing 
amounts of work was required to feed a family. On the other hand, the 
relative fall in prices of labor-intensive manufactured products made some 
of these accessible to even relatively poor households.253 The same goes 
for luxury products traded over large distances – economics of scale, in-
creasingly integrated trade networks and low wages tended to reduce 
prices of such luxuries as sugar or tobacco, making small amounts of these 
accessible for only a small part of a typical household’s budget.254 We thus 
see increasingly malnourished, toiling peasants being able to enjoy the rare 
luxury of cotton cloth, a small piece of furniture, or a pipe of tobacco – a 
complex picture not easily fitted into the binary opposition of increasing 
or decreasing living standards. 
Among the rich, land-owning classes, the rise in rents and relative fall in 
wages will have resulted in a large increase in income and a decrease in 
spending on wage-earning retainers, as well as the added bonus of rela-
tively falling prices on manufactured and traded goods. All this together 
will have amounted to an extraordinary increase in the living standards, 
and the economic power, of landowners. Similarly, urban elites profited 
from the expansion of possibilities of trade, as well as falling wages of their 
employees. Overall, if your income was comfortably above what was 
needed on basic subsistence, your living standard will have tended to rise 
owing to the growth and diversification of luxury industries. If you were 
less well off, the picture was considerably more complex. 
Sprouts of capitalism? 
Lastly, it is worth considering certain developments which could merit the 
description of them as modern, namely the introduction of steam-driven, 
mechanical, large-scale industries in certain sectors. Most notable are the 
metallurgical corporations Le Creusot and Indret, which succeeded in the 
18th century in establishing some steam-driven mining and metalworking 
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industry, but also in other industries were modern techniques slowly in-
troduced toward the end of the 18th century.255 But rather than showing 
the modernizing potential of the French pre-modern economy, these ex-
ceptions actually casts into stark relief the discontinuities between the gen-
eral pre-modern nature of the French economy and the forces of modern-
ization, which were completely alien to it. 
Firstly, we must note the peripheral nature of these modern ventures. Far 
from playing any substantive role in the economy, they were few in num-
ber and limited in scope. In the important textile industry, technologies 
such as the spinning jenny and the waterframe, both crucial in British industry, 
were only slowly introduced into the French setting – by 1790, only about 
900 spinning jennys had come into use (compared with an estimated 20,000 
in Britain), and only a handful of places had incorporated the waterframe.256 
Moreover, throughout the 18th century modern industries showed mark-
edly lesser growth than traditional, artisanal or especially domestic, manu-
facture.257  
Secondly, the limited success of established modern industry in the period 
is illustrative of their ill fit into the French economy of the times. None of 
these modern, industrial techniques of production were developed in 
France, and consequently every step of modernization was dependent on 
the assimilation of techniques developed in Britain, often aided by visiting 
British engineers. 258  Furthermore, this assimilation frequently proved 
highly challenging, as the modernizers found conditions in France delete-
rious to their projects.259 The integration in France of modern technology 
thus transpired very slowly, and importantly, was heavily dependent on 
either state subsidies or the direct initiative of the state.260 As noted by a 
contemporary observer, in face of competition from rural, domestic man-
ufacture, without subsidies from the government large industries could 
not survive at all.261 Even the corporation most successful in the applica-
tion of modern industrial techniques, the metallurgical giant Le Creusot, 
experienced severe difficulties in its establishment, even when subsidized 
generously by the state and aided by English experts – with the result that 
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their modern techniques of production were not copied by any other com-
panies until well into the 19th century.262  
The presence of a few “sprouts of capitalism”, as these modern ventures 
would be called in the Chinese tradition, should thus not mislead us into 
concluding that France had entered a trajectory of modern growth. Instead, 
the difficulties met in establishing these modern industries serve to under-
line the pre-modern nature of the French economy. The truly growing 
sector of the economy was rural manufacture, driven by the increased pop-
ulation pressure on the countryside, and not the tiny modern industry fac-
ing ruinous competition from the former.  
The Habsburg Empire 
Before we conclude by refining our Boserupian framework in the light of 
the Chinese and French historical experience, we must briefly turn toward 
our third case, the Habsburg Empire, to show how economic develop-
ments here fit into the general model. Although the economic structures 
of the Habsburg Empire differed substantially from those of France and 
China, when looking at its development over time, the trends appear to 
converge. This convergence suggests that we can profitably interpret 
Habsburg economic developments as largely produced by similar dynam-
ics as in our other cases, only working in a different context. 
The historiography on the Habsburg Empire’s economic development in 
the 17th and 18th centuries shows every sign of following the same pattern 
that we are now used to. Faced with the unrealistic comparison to an ide-
alized ‘Europe’, though in this context rather a ‘western Europe’, eco-
nomic developments in the Habsburg Empire traditionally have been 
found wanting. In what David F. Good named the “economic failure the-
sis”263, the Habsburg economy has been thought of as essentially “back-
ward”264, and as a “traditional society breaking up”265. This negative pic-
ture has from the 1970’s onwards been challenged by a number of scholars, 
who have instead argued for the participation of the Habsburg Empire in 
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creating a modern economy.266 In the words of John Komlos, “during the 
millennium before 1800, Europe as a whole built, little by little, the foun-
dations of a modern economy, and Austria, as part of Europe, did not lag 
far behind.”267 
As it was in our earlier cases, the problem with these views resides in a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of pre-modern development. 
When any economic change can be construed as modern, modernity be-
comes a permanent feature of Eurasian history. But seen in a Boserupian 
perspective, pre-1800 Habsburg economic development can regain its pre-
modern essence while still providing room for the presence of substantial 
change. 
Basics 
By 1648, the Austrian Habsburg Empire came out of the chaos of the 
Thirty Years’ War that had engulfed central Europe as one of the largest 
and most powerful states in Europe, rivaled only by France. After the 
treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, in which Hungary was returned from Otto-
man to Habsburg control, the empire’s core area attained a territorial size 
comparable to France, and the Habsburg emperors ruled a population of 
somewhere around 15 million people (see below). Through the 18th cen-
tury, despite frequent wars not always fought successfully, the empire ex-
perienced strong population growth and a large expansion of the economy. 
In economic terms, as in almost every other aspect, the various territories 
of the Habsburg Empire were quite disparate. In the West, the Bohemian 
and Austrian provinces were fairly developed, with comparatively high 
population densities and flourishing manufacturing bases, while most of 
Hungary was much less populated and had no industrial sector to speak 
of, much less any dynamic urban environments. But internal differentia-
tion is of course ever-present anywhere at almost any level of analysis, and 
so this should not keep us from acknowledging certain common trends. 
Demographic developments 
Although precise population figures are hard to attain, due to both frag-
mentary evidence and the shifting boundaries of the empire, there is no 
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doubt that the Habsburg lands experienced considerable population 
growth from the end of the thirty years war to the Napoleonic wars. Var-
ious population figures have been given, but it seems that growth over the 
18th century was in the order of about 50% or above - somewhat larger in 
Hungary, and somewhat smaller in Austria.268 This internal differentiation, 
with most population growth occurring in the least populated areas, was 
partially a result of the migration from west to east of peasants in search 
of cheap farmland. 269 This process mirrors the Chinese experience of 
strongest growth in the least populated areas at two distinct levels: the first 
internally in the Habsburg lands, the second on a wider European level, 
where Habsburg population growth significantly exceeded that of more 
densely populated France.270 
Urbanization levels in the Habsburg lands were comparatively feeble, but 
rose considerably during the period. In Austria and Bohemia, the urbani-
zation rate (the percentage of population living in cities with at least 10,000 
inhabitants) increased from 2.4 in 1650 to 5.2 by 1800, while in Hungary 
it was in effect zero.271 For the entire empire, it was by 1800 still as low as 
3.2.272  
Agrarian structure 
In contrast to both China and France, the agrarian structure of the Habs-
burg lands was characterized by a significant presence of bonded labor. 
Serfdom was overall the default state of affairs, with peasants owing a sub-
stantial part of their produce and their labor time to their feudal lords, to 
which they were legally bound. Although this was the case everywhere, the 
amount of labor time due to the feudal lords varied considerably across 
the empire. In Galicia, the burden could be as heavy as 6 days a week in 
the summer, whereas in western Austria it amounted to one day a week 
only.273 
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During the 18th century, the dominating presence of serfdom in the Habs-
burg Empire waned. The most decisive break with serfdom came from 
above, as the state under the ‘enlightened’ governance of Maria Theresa 
and her son Joseph II sought first to limit the amount of labor owed by 
serfs to their lords, and then to eliminate serfdom altogether by 1781.274 
However, the political decision to abolish serfdom was preceded by a slow 
bottom-up conversion of feudal into commercially organized agriculture. 
On a number of estates, landlords began splitting up their demesnes into 
smaller pieces of land to be rented out to peasants on commercial terms, 
as this resulted in higher profits.275 Other landlords, faced with a growing 
population of serfs and accordingly growing labor supply, converted a 
number of the serf’s labor dues into money rents, thus in effect converting 
them to semi-free tenants.276 
The gradual fading of serfdom before its final death knell sounded in 1781 
supports the above contention that economic institutions as often can be 
seen as the product of the level of economic development that as its cause. 
The relatively low population densities of the Habsburg lands was condu-
cive to bonded labor, but as population increased, it became increasingly 
unprofitable to maintain an economic system best suited to keep peasants 
on their land in situations of labor scarcity. In Bohemia, high levels of 
labor service were introduced after the Thirty Years’ War, which had had 
disastrous results for the local population levels.277 In Hungary, the same 
process can be seen immediately following the reconquest of 1699. 278 
Only after a century of significant population growth did the trend turn, 
as land scarcity overtook labor scarcity as the dominant problem. 
Agrarian intensification and commercialization 
With strong population growth occurring, the Habsburg lands experi-
enced the same trend toward agrarian intensification that we have ob-
served with our previous two cases. Total agricultural output increased 
markedly, but output per worker in agriculture remained stagnant at levels 
below what had been attained in 1400, though fluctuating somewhat.279 
When we include in our estimates an apparent increase in hours worked 
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per year, which seems probable, labor productivity in agriculture would 
seem to be falling.280 The number of animals in agriculture also seems to 
have fallen, indicating a stronger reliance on human labor, and a focus on 
optimizing land productivity rather than labor productivity.281  
Mitigating this trend was increased opportunities for trade. Even for the 
hard-pressed Polish serfs of Galicia, markets had played a large role in 
their daily lives for a long time.282 But through the 18th century, population 
growth and political reform resulted in a significant improvement in the 
market integration of the various provinces of the empire.283 Although 
trade statistics are exceedingly hard to come by in the Habsburg realms, 
there can be no doubt that trade significantly increased inside the em-
pire.284 Especially the grain trade from relatively lightly populated Hungary 
to the relatively densely populated areas of Bohemia and Austria was ex-
panded considerably in the 18th century, in order to feed the increasing 
number of people in the western provinces of the empire.285 
Following up on the speculations above concerning the relationship be-
tween market density and population, we can note that a quick look at the 
numbers for markets in the non-Hungarian part of the empire given by 
Dickson, compared to his population figures for the same year, shows a 
ratio of 8,261 inhabitants per market.286 This compares very well with the 
figures from Caen in France and Sichuan in China and supports further 
the view that market density is primarily, if perhaps not exclusively, deter-
mined by population density. 
Manufacture 
The expansion of empire-wide trade facilitated a substantial growth of 
both domestic and urban manufacture in the western provinces, particu-
larly in the Bohemian territories. The most important of these manufac-
tured products was textiles, as was generally the case with pre-industrial 
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production, but other industries such as ironworking also expanded.287 
This growth in industrial production is presented by a number of scholars 
as clear evidence for the modernity of Habsburg economic developments 
in the 17th and 18th centuries. Following the early theories of proto-indus-
trialization noted above, Good argues that the growth of domestic indus-
try, “an intermediate type of economic organization between the handi-
craft and factory systems … was an important step in the evolution of 
capitalist relations.”288 John Komlos goes a step further and describes it as 
“the beginning of the industrial revolution”289, and Herman Freuden-
berger likewise concludes that "By the end of the [18th] century, then, the 
Habsburg Monarchy, with Bohemia and Moravia foremost, was well into 
the preparatory stages of industrial revolution."290 Farthest goes Richard 
Rudolph, who argues that “Austrian industrialization was well under way 
before the mid-18th century”.291 
This interpretation of manufactural growth as the beginning of the indus-
trial revolution, I must stress at the risk of repeating myself, is profoundly 
misleading. As in our previous cases, manufactural growth was rather a 
product of population growth, and show the unmistakable signs hereof. 
First it should be noted that a large part of the new industry consisted of 
rural, domestic production. Even the large, urban manufactories have 
been shown in many cases to be completely dependent on rural produc-
tion – undertaking only the final, capital-intensive stages of textile produc-
tion, and leaving the rest of the production process to domestic work-
ers.292 Second, neither the urban nor the domestic manufacturers worked 
with any equipment that had not been available for centuries. As Freuden-
berger himself admits, "Modern machines had a difficult time … until the 
middle of the nineteenth century.”293 What we observe is an expansion of 
traditional forms of industrial production in the context of a growing pop-
ulation, not a revolutionary process at all. 
Supporting this view is also the fact that the growth of this rural manufac-
ture was largest in the areas of the empire with highest population densities, 
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both on an empire-wide level and at the local level. The only exception to 
this pattern is the comparatively large expansion of rural manufacture in 
relatively rugged and mountainous regions of Bohemia, where population 
density might be a bit lower than more fertile areas.294 But this exception 
only lends support to the view that rural manufacture should be seen as 
an intensification of production in the context of increasing shortage of 
land. Rudolph also notes the correlation of population growth with the 
expansion of rural manufacture and additionally the production of iron, 
but interprets this in a (now outdated) Malthusian perspective, and thus 
flips the causation, so that he argues that manufacture creates population 
growth.295 But given what we can discern about the development of living 
standards, the Boserupian interpretation seems much more warranted. 
Living standards 
If the Malthusian interpretation of the expanding industry was true, we 
would expect to see that the growth of manufacture caused living stand-
ards to rise substantially, which would lead population numbers to soar. 
But as was the case broadly in Europe, living standards seem in many re-
spects to have fallen during the otherwise economically prosperous 18th 
century. The main driver for this fall was a relatively large increase in grain 
prices, due to the increased pressure on the land. During the entire period, 
the prices of agricultural products (as well as land itself) rose faster than 
the prices of all other goods. With grain prices rising greatly and money 
wages generally stagnant, real wages declined strongly, especially during 
the 18th century.296 For most of the lower occupations, wages expressed in 
grain more than halved from 1730-1790.297 The decline in living standards 
is also evident by the continuing fall in the consumption of meat.298 Kom-
los, in his work of anthropometric history, notes how the stature of the 
Habsburg population falls throughout the 18th century, evidently as a re-
sult of a decline in nutritional standards.299 In his conclusion, otherwise 
positive in regard to the potential of Habsburg proto-industry, he even 
admits that “the immediate effect of industrialization in Bohemia and 
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Lower Austria was to bring about a deceleration in the rate at which the popula-
tion’s standard of living was declining.”300 This conclusion fits perfectly into our 
Boserupian framework, in which the shift into more labor intensive forms 
of work staves off, but does not eliminate, the tendency to falling labor 
productivity. 
Conclusion 
As I have shown in this chapter, the traditional interpretations of 17th and 
18th century economic developments in China, France and the Habsburg 
Empire show many problems, and lead to a number of conclusions that 
are untenable in a comparative perspective.  
The commonality between various current interpretations, and the deeper 
reason for their problematic nature, is their tendency to view economic 
development as a one-dimensional process straddling the divide between 
pre-modern and modern economies. The view of economic development 
as one-dimensional is shared by both groups of scholars who I have here 
loosely categorized as “pessimists” and “optimists”.  The pessimist views 
are broadly characterized by some kind of (neo-)Malthusian interpretation, 
and see the economy as essentially standing still, until it was at some point 
“liberated” by some constellation of modern economic forces and could 
finally “take off”.301 This is the traditional view of economic history, po-
etically expressed by the economist Eric Beinhocker as “for a very, very, 
very long time not much happened; then all of a sudden, all hell broke 
loose.” 302  The optimist, revisionist views are broadly characterized by 
some theory of “Deep Modernization”, and see the modern economy as 
slowly but continuously growing out of what came before.303 Optimist 
views generally represent a reaction to pessimist views, led by supposed 
discoveries of economic change in the centuries before the industrial rev-
olution. Though in stark disagreement over timing, both camps share a 
conception of “development” as a one-dimensional process, which they 
conflate with “economic modernization” (as visualized in figure 8). 
                                              
300 Komlos, 180 (italics mine). 
301 For the notion of “take-off”, see Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. 
302 Beinhocker, Origin of Wealth. 
303 The term is taken from Andrade, The Gunpowder Age. 
100 
 
 
Fig. 8: One-dimensional Models of Economic Development 
As I have shown in this chapter, this one-dimensional model of economic 
development, whether in its pessimist or optimist interpretations, is woe-
fully inadequate. What is needed in order to make sense of the economic 
developments at both ends of Eurasia in the centuries preceding the in-
dustrial revolution is a model with a second dimension of pre-modern devel-
opment. As I have suggested in the preceding analysis, this second dimen-
sion can be provided by a ‘Boserupian developmental axis’, as seen in con-
trast to a modern or industrial developmental axis (see fig 9). The eco-
nomic changes undergone by all three cases here studied are best explained 
as cases of Boserupian development unconnected to any process of mod-
ernization whatsoever. Or, to stick with the terminology, it should be un-
derstood as movement along the Boserupian developmental axis. 
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Fig. 9: A Two-dimensional Model of Economic Development 
How should we characterize Boserupian development then, and how do 
we distinguish between that and modern development? Several implica-
tions of the Boserupian paradigm has come into focus in this chapter, and 
will be reflected upon here. 
Distinguishing Boserupian development 
The concept of Boserupian development refers in its essence to growth 
driven by the process of intensification of the economy owing to popula-
tion growth, including its various secondary effects. The concept should 
be distinguished from earlier conceptual categories of growth, be it 
Smithian, Schumpeterian, Kuznetsian, extensive or intensive. It is rather a 
complex process involving several types of growth, as The Boserupian 
paradigm implies that what had earlier been regarded as ‘mere’ extensive 
growth actually involves various processes of Smithian and intensive 
growth as a natural consequence. At the same time, it distances itself from 
the modern, Kuznetsian and Schumpeterian, types of growth, which it im-
plies nothing about. Boserupian development is thus a wholly pre-modern 
phenomenon, but involves economic processes that are sometimes as-
sumed to be related to modernity. 
Demography and Malthusianism 
According to traditional Malthusian views, population levels was seen as 
dependent on a host of other factors, most importantly the quality of land 
coupled with the level of agricultural technology and organization. It has 
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become clear from the previous cases that this view is hopelessly outdated. 
Without any substantial technological change in agriculture, the popula-
tions of France and the Habsburg Empire grew by more than 50% in the 
18th century, while the Chinese population doubled, in all three cases with-
out adding new land at anything near comparable rates. It was thus evi-
dently possible, even in the case of the densely populated Yangzi Delta, to 
sustain far more people by means of the same amount of land, and without 
any technological improvements. This possibility belies any notion of a 
Malthusian population ceiling. 
The lesser changes in agricultural organization that did take place, such as 
the introduction of new crops and the commercialization of ownership 
arrangements, seem on the contrary to be caused by population growth, in 
the manner described by Boserup. They were all techniques that had long 
been available to producers, but were not introduced until made necessary 
or profitable by an increased population density. This would also help ex-
plain the slow spread of agricultural technologies in Europe previously 
thought to be pure ‘improvements’. 
While population growth is of course not completely causally unrelated to 
technological developments, it is in a far more direct manner governed by 
the vagaries of the three great pre-modern catastrophes of war, bad 
weather and epidemic disease.304 Absent these catastrophes, agricultural 
populations show a tendency to grow, slowly but surely. Hence we see the 
classic zig-zag pattern of slow buildup interrupted by drastic falls. This 
pattern is evident both at the local and state-wide levels, and over both 
short and long timeframes. We can also note that there is no inherent ne-
cessity for the population levels to go either up or down in the long run, 
but on the longer timescales and on a global level, there is evidently a ten-
dency to growth. 
The simultaneous nature of population growth in both China, France and 
the Habsburg Empire very likely results from similar experiences of the 
three factors of order, climate and disease. Although all three states were 
at war fairly often during the 18th century, the wars did not have drastic 
consequences for the upholding of state order, and did not ravage the 
states in any significant degree. Global climactic developments were natu-
rally also shared, most importantly the relatively warm climate of the 18th 
century. And no major outbreak of epidemic disease occurred at any point 
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in the period, which also saw the disappearance of the plague from France 
and its relative amelioration elsewhere. Mainly due to these factors, the 
18th century was a period of strong population growth in all three societies. 
Population density and commercialization 
The Boserupian development model also has interesting implications for 
the connection between population density and commercialization of a 
society. At a glance, the level of commercialization of a society is broadly 
congruent with its population density. This is illustrated well by the close 
relationship between market density and population density, where the 
number of inhabitants per market remains stable (at close to 8,000) despite 
population growth. As people live closer together, transaction costs drop, 
markets expand, and the cost of infrastructure declines relative to the 
number of people it will serve. Furthermore, a large reserve of labor is 
made available for services, including those connected with trade. 
The declining transaction costs connected with population growth lead to 
some economic gains connected with trade. Individual producers are bet-
ter able to specialize in market-oriented production, and this helps to drive 
up labor productivity, and thus works against the tendency inherent in ag-
ricultural intensification toward falling labor productivity. This specializa-
tion is also evident in long-distance trade, in which manufactured goods 
produced in densely populated areas are exchanged for cereals grown in 
relatively sparsely populated areas. This kind of long-distance trade could, 
however, be vulnerable to processes of import substitution, as lesser de-
veloped regions increase their population densities. 
The institutional organization of the economy also changes with popula-
tion growth. Or rather, the economic incentive structure changes, so that 
different types of organization of production become the most advanta-
geous for the economically empowered groups in society. In situations of 
low population density, some form of bonded labor tends to predominate. 
Labor is scarce, and peasants tend on their own account to work few hours, 
as this is all that is needed to feed their families. Peasants thus produce 
only a small surplus available for extraction by the elite. If elites want to 
raise this surplus, they need to apply some form of coercion, and in this 
way artificially intensify production. With increasing population density, 
land rather than labor becomes the scarce factor, and therefore ownership 
of the land, rather than its people, becomes the important source of eco-
nomic gain for the elite. Peasants simply cannot leave their land, because 
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there is no other land available for them. It thus becomes increasingly ad-
vantageous for the elite to rent out their land to free peasants rather than 
farm them using coerced labor. Thereby, the productive energies of peas-
ant self-interest is released, and the landowners get a solid income, due to 
increasing prices of land, without having to do anything apart from col-
lecting rent. 
This process is evident in different forms in all our three cases. In China, 
manorial agriculture was long gone in the most developed areas, and dis-
appeared entirely from the north in the middle of the 17th century. In 
France, the commercialization of the seigneurial structure was far under-
way, and continued its path all through the period. And in the Habsburg 
lands, where serfdom was still dominant at the beginning of the 18th cen-
tury, landowners gradually began abolishing feudal arrangements on their 
land in favor of commercial agreements with a freer peasantry, up until 
this process was given powerful support by state decrees at the end of the 
century. 
Intensification of production across sectors 
The hallmark of Boserup’s theory of agricultural growth concerns the in-
tensification of agriculture in conditions of population growth by applying 
ever increasing amounts of labor to the land. The main criticisms of this 
theory have been its lack of focus on markets, trade and production out-
side the agricultural sphere.305 But as we have seen here, these further sec-
tors can easily be accommodated within a Boserupian framework. The 
commercialization of a society, itself furthered by population growth, pro-
vides opportunities for peasants to orient their production toward the 
market, and thus reap the gains of specialization. This includes the take-
up of industrial production, usually in the form of domestic manufacture. 
But rather than interpreting this shift to market-oriented production as a 
‘freeing of the peasants from the Malthusian yoke’, as has been common 
in European history, we should recognize that it generally served as a func-
tional proxy for agricultural intensification, somewhat akin to Philip 
Huang’s thesis of involutionary development. 
This process of intensification of production across sectors is evident in 
several forms during the early modern era. Peasants shifted crops from 
traditional cereals to more labor intensive crops at both ends of Eurasia. 
                                              
305 De Vries, The Industrious Revolution. 
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These labor intensive crops included both food crops and cash crops. 
Where needed, agricultural production was supplemented by some kind 
of domestic manufacture, in most cases textile production. From the per-
spective of the peasant producers, these processes had the common goal 
of substituting labor for land in their household economies. So irrespec-
tive of the specific route taken, the common observation is one of increas-
ing workloads coupled with stagnant or declining labor productivity. 
The interplay of domestic industry and long-distance trade also holds an 
interesting observation. The shift of work hours into domestic industry at 
the expense of agriculture in the densely populated areas only works as a 
proxy for agricultural intensification if a surplus of grain produced else-
where is available for import. This direction of intensification is therefore 
intrinsically connected to intensification processes in the lesser populated 
hinterlands, where there emerges a strong pressure to intensify production 
above what would be predicted in terms of population density. Shifting 
work hours into domestic industry in one specific area can therefore also 
be seen as a proxy for agricultural intensification elsewhere. 
Another observation to make is the tendency to a ‘ruralization’ of indus-
trial production over time. With rural labor increasingly available for in-
dustry as population increases, often at prices far below urban wages, in-
dustrial production tends to disperse into the rural areas at the expense of 
the more expensive cities, so far as the capital requirements for production 
are not prohibitively large. In China’s extremely densely populated Yangzi 
Delta, textile production was almost entirely rural. In France and the 
Habsburg Empire, the process of ruralization was still under way, but 
moved quickly during the period, supported by the weakening of urban 
guilds by political interference. 
Proto-industrialization should therefore definitely not be seen as a stage 
of development preceding industrialization proper, but should be recog-
nized as a process intrinsic to Boserupian development. It is thus an en-
tirely pre-modern phenomenon. While in some aspects proto-industriali-
zation can, indeed, be seen as preparing the ground for factory-based in-
dustrialization, such as in its disciplining of the work force, in other aspects 
it appears to be directly harmful. This is the case regarding the competitive 
pressures it puts on capital intensive production, which have difficulties 
underbidding domestically produced goods, as they have labor costs es-
sentially below subsistence costs. 
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Living standards, GDP and Boserupian development 
Some of the most important aspects of the Boserupian development 
model developed here are its implications for the relationships between 
living standards, GDP, and the population density of a given area. In the 
traditional one-dimensional development model, development could sup-
posedly be measured in terms of GDP per capita, and was perceived as 
proportionate with the level of material living standards in a society.306 In 
reality, the relationships between these various factors were significantly 
more muddled. 
While GDP per capita accords well with modern notions of development, 
it is a fairly misleading measurement of the dynamics of the Boserupian 
development dominating the period before 1800. As a number expressing 
the total value of goods produced per inhabitant, GDP per capita is blind 
to the value of leisure, and values all other products equally and abstractly, 
not leaving any room for qualitative distinctions.307 Over the 17th and 18th 
centuries, work hours increased for peasants in all three cases, but this fact 
is not represented in measurements of GDP. A rise in GDP per capita 
could thus be the result of an intensified production without any signifi-
cant progress in labor productivity, or even in a context of its decline. 
Furthermore, there is doubt as to how precise such measurements can 
really be, and consequently of how much use they are. In the case of Mad-
dison’s pinning of Chinese GDP per capita to a stable 600$ over more 
than five centuries, it is clear that this is a mere pseudo-quantification of 
rather qualitative judgements of the Chinese economy. Other measure-
ments may simply reflect the capacity of the state to record economic ac-
tivity rather than measuring economic activity itself. And even the more 
scrupulous measurements of GDP per capita fail to account for its often 
contra-intuitive and in any case complex relationship to the lived experi-
ence of the population. 
As for these experiences, we can begin by noting Jan Luiten van Zanden’s 
observation that population density, and therefore Boserupian develop-
ment, is inversely related to wage levels expressed in grain.308 Expressed 
in manufactured goods, however, I would doubt if the same correlation 
holds. As we have seen, living standards cannot simply be expressed in a 
                                              
306 See e.g. Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth, 1270–1870. 
307 See Reinert, How Rich Countries Got Rich and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor for a deeper 
critique of the abstract nature of GDP. 
308 Zanden, “Wages and the Standard of Living in Europe, 1500–1800.” 
107 
 
single dimension and mapped onto any measure of development. With 
increasing population density, the nutritional standards of the population 
tend to deteriorate, as is also evident in declining statures. Conversely, cer-
tain luxury products and manufactured goods become much more widely 
available to the population. In a nutshell, people eat less meat, but wear 
cotton clothes. They work longer and harder, but can enjoy a pipe of cheap 
tobacco at the end of the day. We should wisely refrain from judging these 
developments to be either improvements or deteriorations in the living 
standard of the population.  
Boserupian development as a central dynamic of pre-modern history 
The application of Boserup’s development model is traditionally restricted 
to relatively primitive societies. As I have argued in this chapter, when it 
is developed to include processes of commercialization, Boserup’s theory 
is applicable to all agrarian societies, irrespective of their level of develop-
ment, and can indeed help explain central features of this development. 
What I would further suggest is that the Boserupian development model 
should be seen as the central framework for explaining pre-modern eco-
nomic history. As pre-modern societies are at all times dominated by their 
agrarian sectors, all economic life revolves around the dynamics of agrar-
ian production, which are so well explained by Boserup. The structure of 
pre-modern economic history is therefore formed by the process of 
Boserupian development – the slow expansion of economic activity across 
the globe, coupled with continuing intensification of production every-
where. In this view, the economic history of the centuries preceding the 
industrial revolution can be seen as ‘only’ a further extension of these pro-
cesses. Extensive, pre-modern, Boserupian growth is the central feature 
of economic history in this period, at both ends of Eurasia. 
This realization sidesteps the various debates surrounding ‘The Great Di-
vergence’. We can comfortably accept that Chinas Yangzi Delta represents 
a level of Boserupian development over and above what was achieved in 
either France or the Habsburg Empire, or frankly anywhere else in Europe. 
This fact, however, does not have any direct implications whatsoever for 
the later modern developments growing out of Europe. While we may 
speculate that the development of modernity is not equally likely on all 
places of the Boserupian developmental axis, it is not in the least certain 
that The Yangzi Delta’s placement on the far end constitute the most ad-
vantageous position. It also does not tell us much about relative GDP’s 
per capita, relative living standards, and much more – but instead gives us 
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a framework in which more does not equal better, pre-modern ‘success’ 
does not equal modern ‘success’, and in which we can see pre-modern 
economic development as a process separate from the distorting influence 
of modernocentrism. 
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Bureaucratic Empires 
Ce n’est donc pas à des circonstances particulières qu’il faut attribuer la perpétuité de 
son gouvernement, c’est à un ordre stable par essence. 
It is not therefore to any particular circumstances that the perpetuity of its government 
must be attributed, it is to a fundamentally stable order. 
- François Quesnay’s Le Despotisme de la Chine, 1767 
 
After capitalism, the second most important linchpin of modernity is the 
modern state. It should therefore not come as a great surprise that histor-
ical scholarship on state formation during the 17th and 18th centuries is 
deeply influenced by modernocentrism. The history of state formation in 
Europe is widely seen as the story of ‘the creation of the modern state’ out 
of the embers of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. The 
histories of single states either conform to this pattern, or, conversely, tell 
a story of failure to conform. Common for both is that all developments 
are interpreted as relating in some way to the phenomenon of moderniza-
tion, which thus constitutes the basic framework for understanding state 
formation in this period. 
Though normally couched in terms of Eurocentrism, the same problem 
exists with scholarship on Chinese state formation. For a long period, the 
Chinese state has been analyzed through the prism of the Weberian bu-
reaucratic ideal-type, with scholars variously extolling the bureaucratic 
character of rule or casting their focus on the various ways in which cor-
ruption or arbitrary despotism weakened the state. Recent decades, how-
ever, have seen China scholars move away from these interpretations to-
ward a perspective that analyzes Chinese state formation on its own terms, 
less structured by expectations derived from the European experience. 
In this chapter, I argue that the insights derived from modern interpreta-
tions of Chinese state formation can be profitably imported back into the 
European context, seen as an illuminating example of pre-modern pro-
cesses of state formation. In China, France, and the Habsburg Empire, 
state formation was governed by similar dynamics arising from the di-
lemma between state centralization and the problem of local power. In 
certain aspects, these common dynamics lead to a degree of convergence 
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in forms of rule, leading to the gradual emergence of the ‘Bureaucratic-
Imperial State’ in France and the Habsburg Empire, and to its perpetua-
tion in China. In other aspects, differences in the interstate environment 
led China to resolve the above dilemma in favor of centralization, whereas 
France and the Habsburg Empire were forced to resolve it in the favor of 
local power. This resulted in a major divergence in the relative capacities 
of the three states. However, this divergence can ultimately be contained 
within a pre-modern framework of state formation. 
State formation in Europe and China 
What type of state was the polity ruled by the French kings in the 17th and 
18th centuries? Was it a feudal state, an absolutist state, a composite state, 
a fiscal-military state, a nation-state, a baroque state, or even an empire? 
The bewildering array of state typologies applied to France is indicative of 
the extent of the debate on how to theorize European state formation in 
late pre-modernity. In scholarship on the Chinese state, the same question 
is relatively easily solved: everyone agrees that for most of its history, it 
was an empire.  
This contrast between European conceptual frugality and Chinese con-
ceptual parsimony is a clear image of the traditional conceptions of Euro-
pean and Chinese history, still exerting their influence today. Europe is 
marked by dynamic change and China by stagnation. A primary reason for 
this contrast is that scholarship on state formation historically has been 
produced in order to explain the rise of the modern state in Europe.  As 
theories and histories are created to explain this, they necessarily focus on 
change rather than continuity, evoking different ‘stages of development’ 
through which European states reached modernity. In China there is no 
rise of the modern state to explain, and scholars therefore accept the term 
‘empire’ as covering almost the entire historical period. As the large-scale 
continuities of the Chinese imperial state have been perceived as requiring 
less explanation than European change, there have been relatively few at-
tempts at gauging the dynamics responsible for this continuity.309 
Moreover, the essentially backward-looking project of searching for the 
explanations for the rise of the modern state in Europe have resulted in a 
                                              
309 See Wong, China Transformed, 1997, 79–80 for a similar argument. Refreshing excep-
tions are Zhao, The Confucian-Legalist State; Pines, The Everlasting Empire. 
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widespread teleological essentialism – the notion that a pattern of moder-
nity was from early on at the core of European states, only waiting to be 
realized in the fullness of time. Generally, this teleological essentialism has 
taken one of two forms: one tradition proceeds from the identification of 
a set of specific modern elements of the state, and genealogically traces 
them back through European history to account for their emergence. An-
other tradition looks to more system-wide explanations in the form of 
certain ‘modernizing dynamics’ in European inter- or intra-state relations 
leading inevitably to the formation of modern states. 
A useful example of the genealogical approach is Joseph Strayer’s seminal 
1973 essay On the medieval origins of the modern state, which claims that “The 
modern state, wherever we find it today, is based on the pattern which 
emerged in Europe in the period 1100 to 1600.”310 Strayer then analytically 
identifies modernity with a set of “essential elements of the modern state” 
which began to appear between 1000 and 1300.311 The elements identified 
are “Political entities, each with its own basic core of people and lands, 
[which] gained legitimacy by enduring through generations. Permanent in-
stitutions for financial and judicial business were established. Groups of 
professional administrators were developed. A central coordinating 
agency, the chancery, had emerged with a staff of highly trained clerks.”312 
The teleological problems of this approach are evident. As the modern 
state developed in Europe, inevitably it will share certain traits with its 
forerunners in earlier centuries. But this is of course no guarantee of the 
modernity of the relevant traits, or of their importance to the emergence 
of the modern state.  
The alternative approach of looking for the origins of the modern state 
not in any number of specific elements, but rather in certain modernizing 
dynamics, is exemplified by Michael Mann’s The Sources of Social Power. To 
Mann, the explanation for the formation of modern states must be sought 
in the “essential continuity of [a] dynamic” put in place at some point dur-
ing the European Dark Ages, before the turn of the first millennium.313 
Explanations that center on later developments are “weak … for one rea-
son: They start too late in history.”314 Another example could be that of 
Patricia Crone, who in her Pre-Industrial Societies also subscribes to the idea 
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that the emergence of the modern state was decided early on. From the 
16th century, she writes, “everything … simply spells out implications of 
the previous development”.315 Similarly, she claims that “all [societies] 
were developing along the lines laid down in their respective formative 
periods.”316 In both these cases, a modernizing dynamic is claimed to have 
been instituted early in European history, leading inevitably toward the 
formation of the modern nation-state. Apart from its obvious teleological 
problems, this strategy also reproduces a unidirectional model of state for-
mation in which all change in the history of European states led in the 
same direction, which is that of modernization. 
Come globalization 
In the context of the recent globalization of history, the problem arises of 
how to fit the Chinese experience of state formation into these general 
frameworks. In most cases, the history of the East is simply left out of the 
picture (as with Strayer317), or relegated to a place of stagnation on the 
sidelines of history (as with Mann). In the recent couple of decades, how-
ever, a number of China scholars and global historians have in various 
ways sought to remedy this problem, by incorporating the history of the 
Chinese state into the established framework of early modern state for-
mation. 
Responding to the genealogical approach described above, a number of 
scholars have sought to include China in the world historical framework 
by identifying some number of supposedly modern traits in the late impe-
rial Chinese state – in most instances quite an easy task. For example, Eve-
lyn Rawski claims that the Qing can reasonably be called early modern due 
to the presence there of sophisticated methods of revenue collection, ad-
ministrative centralization, refined mapmaking etc. 318  Laura Hostetler 
similarly claims that the Qing state was equally part of the ‘early modern 
world’, as shown by their uses of “early modern cartographic and ethno-
graphic modes of representation”.319 Based on the Yongzheng emperor’s 
“drive to rationalize bureaucratic administration and centralize imperial 
control” William Rowe brands him “an early-modern state-maker of the 
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first order.”320 Taking this process to its logical conclusion, Francis Fuku-
yama claims that the modern state was in fact invented in ancient China, 
which saw the establishment of bureaucratic modes of rule.321 
The claims that the presence of specific traits traditionally connected with 
modernity somehow makes the Chinese state also modern (or early mod-
ern) fail for the same reasons as they do in the European case: because the 
claim that these traits signify modernity is itself spurious and unargued. 
Due to the genealogical reasons for their status as modern, modernity be-
comes equated with similarity to Europe. It then simply becomes an empty 
exercise in finding something that looks like Europe, and using this as 
evidence of the modernity of the Chinese state. The ultimate absurdity of 
this endeavor should be obvious from the case of Fukuyama’s supposedly 
modern ancient Chinese state. 
A more promising way of integrating Eastern and Western state formation 
into a more common framework would be to deal instead with the dy-
namics of state formation, in a way that does not reproduce the teleologi-
cal assumptions described above. A number of global historians have in 
recent decades engaged with this issue of political trajectories, and offered 
various global frameworks of state formation. Two deserve mention here, 
as they eminently exemplify both the strengths and the weaknesses con-
nected with the currently popular paradigms of a ‘global early modernity’ 
or ‘multiple modernities’. The first is Victor Lieberman, who has worked 
to identify common global trajectories of state formation, the second Roy 
Bin Wong, who construes Europe and China as following fundamentally 
different, but equally successful and modern, trajectories of change. 
Victor Lieberman’s massive Strange Parallels is an impressive attempt at cre-
ating a truly global history of state formation. Expanding on his study of 
Southeast Asian state formation between 800-1830, he argues for a num-
ber of parallel developments in state formation across Eurasia, driven not 
by any continent-wide integration, but by comparable sociological dynam-
ics. In places as diverse as France, Russia, Japan, China and South Asia, as 
well as his initial Southeast Asia, he finds evidence of (1) increased terri-
torial consolidation and penetration by the state, (2) administrative cen-
tralization, as well as (3) cultural integration around the dominant culture 
                                              
320 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 66–8. 
321 Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, chap. 5–7. 
114 
 
of the central state. Furthermore, Lieberman argues that these develop-
ments were roughly synchronized between all the societies he included in 
his study, owing to a diverse array of factors.322 
There are reasons to be skeptical about Lieberman’s claim of global syn-
chronicity, at least at the level Lieberman implies. In order to fit all socie-
ties into the same mold, he often has to unduly stretch periodizations to 
the degree that they lose analytic value. For instance, the period 1240-1470 
is characterized as a period of state breakdown, while 1430-1600 is dedi-
cated to consolidation.323 The overlap between these two periods allows 
state breakdowns in some areas to coincide with state consolidation else-
where, thus contradicting any claim of synchronicity. But aside from 
claims of synchronicity, the general trends of state consolidation identified 
by Lieberman are no doubt broadly correct, and genuinely thought-pro-
voking as an attempt to unify Eurasian history.324 
However, Lieberman’s work falls somewhat prey to modernocentrism. In 
an earlier publication on the same theme, he describes his goal of seeking 
“to relax distinctions not only between East and West, but between ‘pre-
modern’ and ‘modern’, regarding both distinctions in their more categor-
ical form as self-flattering conceits.”325 But as is so often the case, Lieber-
man’s rejection of the distinction between pre-modern and modern ends 
up privileging modern dynamics as the main driver for history. In Strange 
Parallels, he ends up branding all his cases as “early modern”, as the devel-
opments he describes are assumed to be essentially continuous with mod-
ern developments.326 To Lieberman then, the global history of the state 
ends up being an origin story of the modern (Western) nation-state, de-
spite his claims that it is not.327 
Wong, in his equally impressive China Transformed, argues for an almost 
opposite conclusion than Lieberman: that Chinese and European state 
formation proceeded along entirely different trajectories, owing to their 
different situations regarding domestic and interstate order. By analyzing 
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Chinese and European state formation through a prism of different chal-
lenges, capacities, claims and commitments, he concludes that states at 
both ends of Eurasia had their different strengths and weaknesses due to 
the different challenges posed by their political and social environment – 
and that consequently no side should be seen as more ‘advanced’ or ‘mod-
ern’ than the other.328 Wong’s emphasis on seeing Chinese state develop-
ment on its own terms rather than only in relation to Europe’s was cer-
tainly needed, and his identification of separate European and Chinese dy-
namics of state formation, neither of which is to be privileged as more 
‘modern’, is very helpful in countering the problems of modernocentrism. 
However, Wong’s insistence that ‘modernity’ belongs to either none or to 
all, due to its supposed nature as a value-laden concept, leads to a failure 
to perceive the workings of the actual mechanisms of modernization 
sweeping over the world form the 19th century on. As Wong denies that 
“only one of these [Chinese or European] dynamics leads to “modern” 
state-society relations”, modernity ends up as the common goal of all so-
cieties, even if it remains distinct types of modernity to each society.329 
The history of state formation thus remains a history of the emergence of 
the modern state. 
European states revisited 
Simultaneously with the above attempts at integrating China into the 
global history of state formation, a tradition has sprung up in European 
scholarship far more critical of the assumed modernizing trajectories of 
European states before the 19th century. The main target of this revisionist 
scholarship has been the ‘absolutist’ state developed under the Bourbon 
monarchs of late pre-modern France. This is particularly interesting, as the 
French state of the 17th and 18th centuries had traditionally been seen as 
one of the epicenters of the emergence of the modern state. This is true 
already from Alexis de Tocqueville, who described the emergence in the 
pre-revolutionary period of a truly powerful, centralized, and despotic 
state created ‘beneath’ the old order.330 The establishment of absolutism in 
France, as has become the byword for the creation of this newly powerful 
state, was long perceived as a stepping-stone to modernity. For nationalists, 
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it served as a founding myth of the French nation-state331, while for Marx-
ist scholars it served as an intermediary stage between the feudal and the 
capitalist state – either as a class compromise between the nobles and the 
bourgeois, or as a tool of the bourgeois to break down the old order.332 
From the 1980’s the vision of an all-powerful French state has come under 
sustained attack from a variety of angles. A number of (mostly Anglo-
phone) scholars studied the interaction of the monarchy with local pow-
erholders more closely, and have come up with an alternative thesis that 
William Beik has summed up as “absolutism as social collaboration”.333 
Instead of seeing the central state expand at the expense of noble power, 
these revisionist scholars argue that local powerholders retained or even 
reinforced their power over local society – in the words of Beik, they are 
seen to be “basking in the sun” of the Roi Soleil.334 Others have focused 
on how the supposedly modern state was to a large degree ruled by per-
sonal links of patronage and power broking, rather than through bureau-
cratic means.335 And still others have described the pervasive dysfunction 
of the various government institutions. 336  Together, these revisionists 
deny the value of modernization paradigm as a tool for understanding 
state formation in France, and hold that France throughout the pre-revo-
lutionary era was governed by entirely traditional, pre-modern means. 
At the broader European level, there have also been challenges to the 
modernization paradigm. Abandoning the idea of a late pre-modern Eu-
rope composed of (proto-) nation-states, it has now become more fash-
ionable to think of European states in terms of ‘conglomerate’ or ‘com-
posite’ states.337 There has emerged a growing recognition that the unitary 
nation-state was only a product of the 19th century, and that consequently 
thinking of state formation in earlier periods through the prism of the na-
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tion-state suffers from teleological problems. As Elliott argues, “If six-
teenth-century Europe was a Europe of composite states … its history 
needs to be assessed from this standpoint rather than from that of the 
society of unitary nation-states that it was later to become.”338 Regarding 
the continuing validity of the framework of the composite state up 
through the 18th century, Elliott himself remarked that the “monarchies 
of the eighteenth century remained essentially composite” 339 , a claim 
which has been further explored by other scholars.340 
As the concept of a composite state denotes a polity consisting of several 
different territorial entities gathered under the authority of one ruler, Dan-
iel Nexon has remarked that it in many aspects resemble the notion of 
empire.341 Both state forms employed a form of indirect rule through in-
termediate elites, accepted a wide political and cultural differentiation be-
tween their territories, and organized their territories around a center dom-
inated by the person of the monarch. Nexon uses this parallel to argue for 
the continued viability in late pre-modern Europe of dynastic-imperial 
modes of governance. Daniel Goffman and Christopher Stroop have sim-
ilarly argued for the close comparability of the mechanisms of rule in Eu-
ropean composite monarchies and the Ottoman imperial state.342 Also 
Krishan Kumar has argued for the utility of interpreting European late 
pre-modern states as “empires in miniature”.343 
A question of empire 
So, instead of trying to integrate the Chinese experience of state for-
mation into already established European patterns, perhaps the solution 
to the problem of finding a common framework capable of transcending 
the East-West dichotomy lies in the appropriation of the imperial model 
to the process of European state formation. In this lies a conundrum, as 
traditionally the political history of post-Roman Europe has been defined 
precisely by the absence of empire.344 In late pre-modern European his-
toriography, the word ‘empire’ usually refers to either the overseas colo-
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nial empires, or to the “dream” of reestablishing pan-European hegem-
ony.345 But however much pan-European hegemony remained only a 
dream, the late pre-modern era did see a consolidation of sovereign 
power in the hands of a declining number of large, territorial, agrarian 
states, spanning several distinct communities of subjects. Foremost 
among them was France and the Habsburg Empire, which by the end of 
the 18th century, although they may have controlled only a limited part of 
Europe, ruled over a combined population the size of the ancient Ro-
man Empire. The territories and populations of France and the Habs-
burg Empire were large and diverse enough to make them suffer from all 
the infrastructural problems associated with imperial governance, and so 
make them eminent candidates for the imperial typology. Following 
James Collins, “Rather than thinking of France as a coherent nation-
state, we might do better to consider it a polyglot empire, with a wide 
range of local institutions adapted to the many local cultures.”346 
What, exactly, is meant by the notion of empire? In recent years, the topic 
of empire has been of growing interest to a number of scholars, who have 
worked with various aspects of the imperial state.347 Most generally, an 
empire is a relatively large state, usually established by conquest, embody-
ing various degrees of differentiation of rule across its territories, and sup-
porting sharp hierarchies among its subject population in order to extract 
resources. This definition, which I have amalgamated from those found in 
the literature, distinguishes empires from nation-states, city-states and 
tribal groups, but is broad enough to include most other pre-modern states 
of a certain size. The broadness of the definition could lead to the seem-
ingly reasonable objection that it becomes an empty term. The framework 
of empire is therefore here understood in a loose fashion, and serves 
mainly as a heuristic tool to disengage oneself from the teleological frame-
work of the birth of the modern nation-state. It serves to give us a set of 
different expectations and perspectives, by which we can make sense of 
the structures and developments we observe in our period. When, as Peter 
F. Bang observes, “the problem of the pre-modern state … turns out very 
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much to be a question of empire” 348, the framework of empire similarly 
becomes suited for exploring the dynamics of pre-modern state formation. 
The modern and pre-modern state 
In the following, I use the Chinese model of imperial governance to illu-
minate the dynamics of state formation in France and the Habsburg Em-
pire. Specifically, I compare patterns of bureaucratic governance, resource 
extraction and military organization to show how similar underlying dy-
namics of state power shaped state formation in all three cases. Even 
though the result of these dynamics was in certain aspects a clear diver-
gence between the Chinese state on the one hand, and the French and 
Habsburg states on the other, I find it both productive and necessary to 
situate this divergence squarely in its pre-modern context. None of the 
differences found here should imply that one state was more modern than 
another. As the modern state of the 19th century emerged out of late pre-
modern European states, it necessarily shares some basic features with its 
predecessors, for simple genealogical reasons. But this does neither imply 
that the overall dynamics of state formation prevalent in Europe were re-
sponsible for modernity, nor that European states were developing in a 
direction of modernity. 
The modern state is simply crucially dependent upon the technologies of 
modernity to function – primary among them modern means of commu-
nication and the power of an industrial economy. Before the advent of 
these technologies in the 19th century, states were severely limited in their 
power to control and effect change, and were subject to the same under-
lying infrastructural problems that universally shape the contours of pre-
modern states. The historic developments undergone by European states 
in the centuries before the emergence of modernity took place in a pre-
modern technological environment, and were ‘designed’ to make states fit 
into that world, not to create another. 
The Chinese model of Bureaucratic Empire 
The term ‘China’, although used freely above, is not a quite accurate de-
scription of the Qing state.  It was a state created by the Manchus, origi-
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nally a semi-nomadic people living northeast of China in a tributary rela-
tionship with the Ming dynasty (see fig. 10). In the first half of the 17th 
century, the Manchu ruler Nurhaci (1616-26) and his successor Hong Taiji 
(1626-36) consolidated the influence of the Qing state over the northeast-
ern steppe and farmlands, while emulating the institutions of the Ming 
dynasty. By the middle of the century, as the Ming state was in complete 
disarray, the Manchus crossed the Great Wall, captured Beijing and 
crowned Hong Taiji’s underage successor Emperor of China. Though 
most of China fell relatively quickly to the Manchus, the empire was only 
securely under Qing control after a series of revolts had been suppressed 
and Taiwan had been occupied by 1683, almost 40 years after the original 
incursion. The acquisition of China was followed during the next century 
by the Qing conquests of Tibet, East Turkestan (Xinjiang), and the rest of 
Mongolia.  
China was thus only one part of what should more precisely be called the 
Qing Empire, ruled by emperors who kept strongly identifying with their 
Manchu heritage.349 But although the ‘Manchuness’ of the Qing at all 
times played a role in their rule, it is not far off the mark to say that, from 
an administrative perspective, the Qing ruled first and foremost as Chinese 
emperors. China proper was by far the dominant territory in terms of 
economy, population, culture, and most other aspects, and consequently 
the Qing state related primarily to that. The Qing ruled by taking over 
much of the ideological and administrative structure of the previous dyn-
asty, making only some alterations. They governed from the Forbidden 
City of the Ming, in the tradition of the previous emperors, and through a 
bureaucracy manned mainly by Chinese officials, although at the highest 
levels the Manchus were far more visible.350 
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Fig. 10: Map of Qing China c. 1800 
Source: Peter Perdue, China Marches West, 2 
The central dilemmas of the state 
In a functionalist perspective, the goal of the Qing state, as with other pre-
modern states, was relatively simple. It was a machine for extracting re-
sources from producers, and redistributing them upwards in the social hi-
erarchy defined by the state itself. In the terminology of Shmuel Eisenstadt, 
its purpose was to create and extract “free-floating resources, i.e. resources 
– manpower, economic resources, political support, and cultural identifi-
cations – not embedded within or committed beforehand to any primary 
ascriptive-particularistic groups.”351 In order to facilitate this extraction, it 
was necessary to establish sovereignty and a tolerable level of order. In 
this, however, lay a dilemma, as the enforcement of that order required 
the committal of resources into less free-floating arrangements. In order 
to hold power, local agents of the state needed to be embedded into local 
society, which again reduced their capacity to act ‘freely’. 
Another dilemma regards the size and scope of the state. The establish-
ment of order over a territory is dependent on the ability of the state to 
gather information about that territory, and move people and resources 
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across it.352 In the most basic example, in order to suppress a revolt, the 
state needs first to learn of it, preferably as early as possible, and move an 
army to deal with it. Communication and transportation are accordingly 
the logistical basis of state power. Given that the difficulty of communica-
tion and transportation increases greatly with distance, especially in a pre-
modern setting, there exists a tradeoff between intensive and extensive 
power. Briefly put, the smaller the territory of a state, the greater its ability 
to control it. 
The system of governance maintained by the Qing should be seen as a 
response to the above dilemmas, adapted to the specific context surround-
ing the Chinese empire. The first thing to note regarding context is the 
near total lack of interstate competition. After their conquest of China 
Proper, no foreign power had the power to challenge the Qing. As had 
historically been the norm, the enormous size of the Chinese empire 
simply outclassed any other state competitors, who usually preferred a se-
cure place in the Chinese tributary system to the prospects of war. Fur-
thermore, the secondary historical threat posed by nomadic peoples on 
the steppe frontier, from where the Manchus themselves originated, sub-
sided somewhat in the age of gunpowder warfare, to be finally eradicated 
by the closing of the steppe frontier in the middle of the 18th century. The 
resultant absence of external threats made the issue of internal control the 
primary challenge to the Qing state. A second thing to note is the enor-
mous scope of Qing rule. The Qing state covered an immense territory, 
and ruled over hundreds of millions of people. The challenges involved in 
governing such a large area therefore meant that the state could only hope 
to establish a relatively weak level of control at the local level.  
The institutional structure of the Qing state should therefore be under-
stood as dealing mainly with establishing this extensive control, and not as 
attempting, and failing, to establish intensive control, as has been an im-
plicit assumption in some historiographical veins.353 Indeed, many aspects 
of the Qing institutional structure worked actively against the establish-
ment of intensive power. Keeping control over a large empire without ex-
ternal enemies meant, first and foremost, to impede the development of 
alternative power centers in the realm. Intensive state control over a local 
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area required the buildup of powerful local actors, and as this would con-
stitute a threat to the regime, it was generally avoided. At the same time, 
due to the lack of interstate competition, the Qing state was never obliged 
to intensify their rule. They did not need large armies or expensive bureau-
cracies, which would tie down resources locally, and retained an extremely 
lean institutional structure throughout the 17th and 18th centuries and on-
ward. In the terminology of Michael Mann, the Qing state acquired a high 
level of despotic power, but a low level of infrastructural power.354 Fol-
lowing Philip Huang, the system of governance resulting from this can be 
termed “centralized minimalism”.355 The system of centralized minimal-
ism has to European observers since the 19th century seemed grossly per-
verted, ineffectual, and plagued by corruption. But the very institutional 
structure that made the empire seem weak and ineffectual to early scholars 
was the same that kept the empire stable for centuries.  
Emperor and state 
At the center of the Qing state stood the emperor and his court. The im-
perial court stood, as courts do, as a curious blend between a personal 
household and a public institution. One the one hand, the imperial family 
seems to define the state to a degree that the term ‘the Qing Dynasty’ is 
often used as a description of the state. On the other hand, the emperor-
ship of China was clearly an institution that surpassed in duration and 
symbolic meaning the family currently holding the throne. 
The emperorship of China was a millennia-old institution consciously ap-
propriated by the Manchus as they sought to topple the Ming.356 They thus 
placed themselves in a long line of legitimate rulers occupying the imperial 
‘office’. The emperor held a fixed position in the Confucian cosmos, being 
the link between the divine Heaven and earth. Legitimacy was granted by 
the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, which presented the emperor with near-absolute 
power in the earthly realm, but at the same time imposed certain duties on 
him. The emperor had a responsibility to act as a father to his people, and 
to keep society in good order, in accordance with Confucian morals.357 
The emperor was thus supposed to have an obligation to the economic 
and moral well-being of his subjects. He therefore, both symbolically and 
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in practice, sponsored agriculture, seen as the foundation of wealth, as well 
as scholarship and culture more broadly defined.358 
To conclude on the basis of this, as Karl Bünger has done, that “In Chi-
nese political theory, and according to public opinion, the emperor was 
not considered to be an absolute ruler”, is certainly missing the mark.359 
The Chinese emperorship was not constitutional in any form. But neither 
was the Chinese state just the plaything of the emperor, to use as he saw 
fit. It is rather the case that the very claim of absolute rule necessarily 
comes with absolute responsibility. And the Chinese system acknowl-
edged no limits to the emperor’s power.  As Chinese imperial ideology 
conflated the Chinese state with the world, the notion of the state as a 
patrimonial inheritance was out of the question. Instead, the emperorship 
was perceived as a part of the world order, irrespective of its current in-
cumbent. 
Differentiation of rule 
Traditionally, the development of states is thought to be a unidirectional 
process proceeding from concrete, personal relationships of power, to 
more abstract, bureaucratic forms of rule. Categorizing the Qing state in 
either end of the spectrum would be futile, as it operated by very different 
methods over its different territories. 
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Fig. 11: A Model of the Qing Structure of Rule 
The structure of rule can be described as radiating outward from the em-
peror in a set of concentric circles, each with a decreasing level of bureau-
cratic administration (see fig. 11).360 In the innermost circle we find what 
is generally known as China Proper, the area formerly occupied by the 
Ming. China Proper was governed by a bureaucracy manned by merito-
cratically selected officials, and was subjected to a homogeneous admin-
istration, with each of the 18 provinces having a similar administrative 
structure. Outside of China Proper, we find the outer regions – Manchuria, 
Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. The outer regions were governed indirectly, 
and loosely, through a variety of arrangements suited to the local needs - 
Tibet through the Yellow Hat Sect (of which the Dalai Lama is still a mem-
ber), Xinjiang through local Muslim chieftains, and so on.361 At the outer-
most level of control were the tributary states, (e.g. Korea, Burma, Vi-
etnam etc.). These were theoretically subject to the emperor, but the only 
substantive consequence of this subordination was the expectation that 
the subjected states sent ‘tribute missions’ to the capital at fixed intervals. 
As these tribute missions were normally reciprocated with lavish gifts from 
the emperor, it is clear that the importance of tributary relations lay more 
in the symbolism of overlordship than in any economic benefits obtained 
by the Qing.  
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Because of this layered structure, the ‘level of development’ of the Qing 
state looks very different depending on which part of the empire you look 
to. In the tributary realm, the emperor had mostly a ceremonial function. 
In the outer realm, the ceremonial function was overlaid with a patrimo-
nial system of rule. And in China Proper, to the former two was added a 
layer of bureaucratic rule. Differentiation was also the rule at lower levels 
of the state. The levels of taxation inside China Proper differed greatly 
between provinces, with the wealthier, easy to control areas paying much 
more than poorer, less accessible regions. Areas populated by people out-
side the Chinese cultural sphere were mostly allowed to rule themselves, 
provided they submitted to the emperor. 
Differentiated rule across the territory of the state was a product of the 
huge variations to be found between its numerous areas. It was simply 
impractical to rule the Mongolian steppes in the same way as the heavily 
commercialized Yangzi Delta. Method of rule followed the character of 
the specific territory, and should not be seen as a reflection of the level of 
development of the state.362 The Qing emperors found it necessary to act 
not only as emperors of China, but also as Manchu and Mongol Khans, 
as well as Tibetan Chakravartin (Buddhist universal rulers). In the words 
of Pamela Kyle Crossley, the emperorship was “simultaneous” – its ac-
tions deliberately designed to be easily interpreted through a variety of 
separate cultural frames.363 
However, differentiation of rule was not a goal in itself, and we should not 
err in the other direction by always expecting the Qing to ‘divide and con-
quer’. The Qing did not abstain from various homogenizing initiatives in 
parts of their realm. In some frontier areas, they did pursue a strong policy 
of “sinizication”, creating incentives for Chinese settlers and initiating lo-
cal leaders into the bureaucratic examination system.364 Within limits, the 
Qing sought to replicate its ‘Chinese’ system of control, which was the 
most dependable and effective of their varied systems. 
Bureaucracy 
Following Albert Feuerwerker, The Qing bureaucracy can be thought of 
as having a distinct two-layered structure: At the top level, the Qing state 
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functioned by impressively bureaucratic standards, with formalized proce-
dures, meritocratic recruitment practices, and central oversight (what Feu-
erwerker calls Level I). At the bottom level, government was informal, 
uncontrolled and driven by local power and initiative (Level II). Feu-
erwerker sees these two levels as characterized by opposite, conflicting 
dynamics, Level I tending toward universalism and specificity, Level II 
toward particularism and diffuseness.365 While this schematic is very help-
ful, it tends to understate the degree to which the two levels were in fact 
necessarily intertwined, often in practice being two sides of the same coin.  
At the top of the bureaucratic pyramid was the emperor, aided by his cen-
tral staff – the Grand Council, the Grand Secretariat, the Censorate, the 
Six Boards, and a number of other smaller institutions. Officials in these 
institutions acted as staff to the emperor, and actual governance was left 
to the provincial officials who stood directly below the emperor as well. 
China proper was divided into 18 provinces, which were each governed 
by a provincial governor, or in some cases, a governor-general. Addition-
ally, governors-general were appointed to administer pairs of provinces 
together with their respective governors. The 18 provinces were divided 
into 84 circuits, containing around 180 prefectures, which were in turn 
divided into some 1500 departments or counties. 
As noted, the administration of China was set up so as to effectively inhibit 
the development of alternative power centers – which implied close con-
trol of the upper layers of the bureaucracy. One tool for this was the dou-
bling of the head offices in the central administration. Most of the central 
organs had two directors, one Manchu and one Chinese, and four vice-
directors, also ethnically distributed.366 In the provinces, the presence of 
both a governor and a governor-general, with largely overlapping respon-
sibilities, also served this function. 
The nature of the Chinese bureaucracy is especially clear when we look at 
the lowest administrative officials in the bureaucracy – the county magis-
trates. The magistrate was head of one of the empire’s 1500 counties (or 
departments), and ruled over a population of on average several hundred 
thousand people from his official seat in a walled city. The magistrate was 
a veritable one-man government. He was personally in charge of taxation, 
customs, justice, public works, postal service, education, public welfare, 
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religion and ceremony, local defense and more – in short, the total admin-
istration of his county. However, it was generally recognized that his pri-
mary duties were tax collection and the administration of justice.367  
The large formal powers allocated to the magistrate can be severely mis-
leading if one takes it to signify his actual power, since they were not fol-
lowed by any substantial funding to back them up. Only a couple of sub-
officials per magistrate were paid by the central government, and apart 
from this the magistrate was supposed to make do with his own relatively 
meager allocations, which were perhaps enough to cover the employment 
of a couple of personal secretaries. In practice, this lack of funding severely 
limited the power of the magistrate to perform his dedicated functions. 
Moreover, funding was far from the only restraint on his powers. The ap-
pointment of a magistrate followed the ‘law of avoidance’, which meant 
that he could not serve within 250 km of his home town, and that he could 
not serve in the same province as a relative or any person he had taken the 
official examinations with. Additionally, a magistrate was limited to serv-
ing three years in any county, and often in practice served for an even 
shorter time, after which he was moved to another county or either pro-
moted or demoted. Furthermore, magistrates were subject to yearly eval-
uation and control of their performance by the system of Disciplinary Reg-
ulations, which had broad powers of promotion and demotion, often de-
moting magistrates before their tenure ended.368 
The magistrate was thus by design in a position far away from home, with-
out any local connections, could often not speak the local dialect, had no 
official staff to speak of, and was bound to leave the county before being 
able to build up any substantial relations or knowledge of the county he 
presided over. This arrangement effectively removed any chance of mag-
istrates building separate power bases independent of the central state, but 
at the same it severely limited the magistrate’s local power. In order to 
project any kind of power, and carry out his official responsibilities, the 
magistrate was therefore utterly dependent upon local people outside the 
scope of the central bureaucracy. Two groups of locals were essential to 
this – the unofficial clerks and runners employed by the county office, and 
the local powerholders in society, usually called the gentry. 
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The county clerks and runners were local people employed by the magis-
trate’s office to take care of the actual administration of the county. Alt-
hough the central government allowed a certain quota of these sub-bu-
reaucrats to be employed, no funds were allocated to paying them, and the 
quotas stipulated were anyway always far below what was required to per-
form the administrative functions they were responsible for. A typical 
county employed hundreds, or even thousands, of clerks and runners, and 
these numbers tended to grow over time as the population expanded.369 
As no wages were provided by the government, clerks and runners sub-
sisted by charging ‘customary fees’ to anyone who came in contact with 
the administration. This practice was often castigated by officials as a form 
of corruption, but it was absolutely indispensable to the functioning of the 
system of governance. The result of this mismatch between official regu-
lations and local practice has been described by Bradley Reed as “a system 
of local administration about which the central government had only the 
vaguest knowledge and over which it exercised even less control.”370 
The second group the magistrates turned to in order to govern their 
county was the class of local notables usually labeled the gentry.371 This 
group consisted of the locally resident graduates of the state examination 
system, who usually doubled as the large landowners and leaders of the 
local society. Being educated in the Confucian canon and officially privi-
leged by the state, the gentry were the social peers of the magistrate, who 
therefore tended to find working with them easier than with his employed 
clerks. The position occupied by the gentry as intermediaries between 
magistrate and local society offered them a large influence over the admin-
istration, and they played quite an active role in governance.372 When the 
state had to actively do something other than the regular gathering of taxes 
and administration of justice, the gentry was involved at every step of the 
process. In providing education, managing irrigation, building public 
works etc. members of the gentry usually took the initiative, provided the 
funding, and controlled the process.373 
The clerks and the gentry, then, were essential to the functioning of the 
state, as they provided the magistrate with local power to govern. But by 
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interposing themselves between the official state and the people, they also 
constituted the networks of real power in the county, sometimes at the 
expense of the magistrate. If set upon contriving against the magistrate, 
there was very little he could do to stop it – especially if gentry and clerks 
were working together. The administrative records are full of examples of 
this, and the officials constantly complained about illicit behavior on the 
part of the clerks and gentry, but in practice the state was powerless to 
change it.374 And following their disposition to act only when ultimately 
necessary, as long as the taxes were flowing and the sovereign justice of 
the emperor unchallenged, local society was in practice left to govern itself. 
This gave the central state a high degree of freedom, but limited its effec-
tive reach into society. 
Resource extraction 
The two-layered centralized minimalism of the Qing state is also evident 
in its most central function, the extraction of resources from the popula-
tion. The most important mode of revenue collection was the land tax, 
which made up three quarters of government revenue. The other major 
source of income was the salt tax, which contributed roughly 12% - mis-
cellaneous duties and taxes making up the remainder.375  
The land tax was a universal tax on farmland, paid by all landowners, 
though the gentry paid preferential rates. Following the rising commercial-
ization of Chinese society, taxes were for the most part paid in cash rather 
than kind, as had been the practice earlier. Collection of the land tax was 
the main responsibility of the county magistrate, whose future career was 
heavily dependent on his success in collecting the full amount stipulated 
by the Board of Revenue.376 Some 80% of the funds collected were to be 
sent to the central government, with the remaining kept for local use – in 
reality even more was sent, as a number of fees to the Board also needed 
to be included.377 Only 20% of income was bound up locally, with most 
of this going to the upkeep of military forces under central control. Seen 
from the top of the government, this constituted a quite centralized, ef-
fective system, as by far the largest part of the taxes became freely available 
for use at the discretion of the emperor.  
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At the lower layers of government, the story was again another one. As 
the magistrate was the lowest official in charge, in practice the population 
was to a large degree left to tax themselves. In assessing tax rates, the mag-
istrate depended on the help of the gentry, whose cooperation was indis-
pensable for the success of tax collection.378 Methods of actually collecting 
the tax varied greatly, but were generally put in the hands of unofficial 
clerks, local tax farmers, village headmen, or other local power holders.379 
As these were all unpaid, they secured revenue by demanding surcharges 
to the tax payments, much as the regular clerks and runners.  
This illustrates a general point: The price payed by the state for official 
taxation being so effectively controlled by the center was that provincial 
administration had next to no resources left to perform their functions. 
The presence of customary fees, tax surcharges and other forms of irreg-
ular revenue thus had to be an integral part of the system. The populace 
paid clerks and runners, who paid magistrates, who subsequently paid 
higher provincial officials, who also needed ‘gifts’ and ‘voluntary contri-
butions’ to run their administration. Rather than seeing it as examples of 
corruption, as has often been done in the literature380, it constituted a lo-
cally organized, second system of resource extraction placed somewhere 
between ‘state’ and ‘society’. The existence of this unofficial “Level II” 
was the flipside of the coin to the highly centralized “Level I”. 
Another important characteristic of the Qing state that is especially clear 
in relation to issues of taxation is what we can call its “satisficing” nature. 
Satisficing is a concept developed by the economist and political scientist 
Herbert A. Simon as a more realistic alternative to the optimization strat-
egy usually expected by agents in rational choice theory.381 In its short ver-
sion, the theory states that an agent facing a choice of action will, because 
of her lack of perfect information, not look for the optimal strategy in 
terms of what best achieves her desired objectives. She will rather look for 
the easiest way to achieve a result that somewhat satisfies her needs – 
something that is ‘good enough’. Thereby the agent exhibits a “bounded 
rationality”, that is, acts rationally within defined limits, though not as a 
perfectly rational homo economicus. 382 While the term is widely used 
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within organizational studies, behavioral economics and psychology, it has 
only sporadically entered the historical sciences although I find it very use-
ful in understanding pre-modern, information-poor states.383 
At every level of the Qing state, it acted in satisficing rather than optimiz-
ing ways, but as noted, taxation is a prime example. Readers of European 
history are used to expect rulers to be engaged in a constant struggle to 
extract every last penny from the populace, but in China this was far from 
the case. The Qing state had an explicit goal of reducing the tax burden 
on its people, emerging from both ideological and practical considerations. 
Consistent with the presentation of the emperor as father of the people, 
Confucian ideology emphasized the need to keep taxes low in order to 
guarantee the well-being of the populace: in the 18th century this received 
expression in the oft repeated idiom “storing wealth among the people”.384 
On a more practical level, keeping taxes low was thought of as essential to 
avoid peasant rebellion or rioting, as was surely also the case.385 As The 
Qing state was not generally under any substantial threat, which could 
have necessitated a rise in spending, the regime had no need to increase 
their already sufficient revenue. The central state treasury usually ran a 
surplus, and total revenue even increased over time, owing to population 
growth, expanding some 50-60% from 1650 to 1800.386 As a result, the 
Qing never completed a cadastral survey, making do with updating those 
dating from the Ming dynasty, and even officially froze tax rates “perma-
nently” from 1712, even though the population expanded significantly. 
The substantial underregistration of land that resulted from these deci-
sions was not seen as a problem, but instead as a sign of imperial benevo-
lence.  
The total tax burden upon the peasantry consequently was comparatively 
light – Peer Vries makes a purposefully high estimate of 3-4% of family 
income on average – and declining over time. More realistically, it was 
perhaps half that or less.387 On top of this, however, one has to add the 
various surcharges and fees that made up ‘the Level II tax’, which perhaps 
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equaled the official rates.388 Even after this addition, it is clear that the state 
apparatus functioned quite cheaply.  
Military power 
In addition to collecting taxes, projecting military power was everywhere 
in the pre-modern world one of the central practices of the state. So it was 
in the Qing state, where around two-thirds of government revenue was 
spent on the military in peacetime.389 As had been the long-standing prac-
tice in Imperial China, the emperor at all times kept a standing army, which 
could be expanded if necessary in times of war. In the organization of its 
imperial army, the Qing state’s practices of centralized minimalism and 
satisficing behavior can be clearly seen. 
The Qing kept two distinct army organizations, each with completely dif-
ferent structures: the Military Banners and the Green Standard Army.  The 
Banners were 24 military contingents (8 Manchu, 8 Mongol, and 8 ‘Mar-
tial-Chinese’) created by the Manchus before their conquest of China, 
which acted as the elite military force of the Manchu regime. They were 
constituted as a separate social caste, occupation was hereditary, and they 
were placed in closed compounds at strategic places around the empire, 
especially close to the capital. The Green Standard Army was created from 
the remains of the Ming dynasty army, and was thus a ‘Chinese’ force con-
trolled by the regular bureaucracy. 
The number of soldiers is hard to ascertain, but we have some estimates. 
In the last phases of the Qing conquest, the bannermen numbered perhaps 
300-500,000 and the Green Standard Army 900,000, totaling 1.2-1.4 mil-
lion men.390 The Qing had no significant navy to speak of, as they had no 
pressing need for one.391 After the completion of the conquest, the num-
bers were reduced markedly, as the state had no need of such an expensive 
force. During the 18th century, the state had on its rolls some 200-300,000 
bannermen and 600,000 in the Green Standard Army, some 800-900,000 
in total.392 This number is of course very large in absolute terms, but com-
pared to the Qing Empire’s huge population and area, its army was actually 
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quite insignificant – at the end of the 18th century only about 3 persons in 
1,000 were soldiers. Furthermore, it is important to note that these num-
bers refer to the paper strength of the armies. In real terms, the number 
of soldiers was certainly less, as no army unit operated at full strength.393 
This is especially so in a situation where most of the army is rarely if at all 
called into action, and so no real incentive for maintaining full strength is 
forthcoming. At the height of military mobilization in the 18th century, at 
most 150,000 men (on paper) were put in the field, and usually the small 
frontier wars pursued by the Qing required much less.394  
It was not only the number of troops that deteriorated in the long era of 
relative peace after the conquest, but also the fighting quality of the army. 
In the 18th century, many officials commented on the poor state of the 
bannermen, who resembled an effective fighting force less and less.  Dis-
cipline was breaking down, and in practice many lived as civilians.395 Alt-
hough the emperor shared this worry, no significant initiative was taken 
to ameliorate the problem, as it was never a pressing need.396 Also regard-
ing equipment, the Qing army was far from ideal. As Nicola di Cosmo has 
shown, during their conquest of China the Qing made huge advancements 
in military technology, developing their use of firearms and cannon. But 
after the conquest ended, military development abruptly ceased.397 With 
the Ming defeated, all remaining enemies were already militarily primitive 
compared to the Qing, leaving no reason to further develop their fighting 
capacities. 
Command of the army units was organized so that no military commander 
could threaten the Qing regime, which in practice meant that “effective 
mobilization against any really large-scale internal or external enemies was 
extremely difficult.”398 The Green Standard army was spread out over 
thousands of outposts across the empire, often with tiny contingents. 
Command was spread out between governors, governor-generals, provin-
cial commanders-in-chief, and large numbers of brigade generals, who 
each controlled a maximum of 5,000 men, and only within a limited juris-
diction. Officers were recruited mostly by an official military examination 
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system, and rotated regularly to inhibit the build-up of personal loyalties 
between soldiers and commander. Any mobilization of larger armies re-
quired central coordination and written orders by the emperor himself, 
and were usually put in the hands of commissioners from the imperial 
family or Manchu bannermen.399 
The picture we get from the organization of military power in the Qing 
affirms what we have observed for its civil bureaucracy. Central control 
and the prevention of alternative power centers being built up was priori-
tized over functional efficiency. Army size was kept relatively low, and as 
long as no crisis erupted to challenge the regime, no serious effort was 
taken to maintain its fighting strength. This arrangement worked very well 
for the Qing until the shock of the Opium Wars, where they came up 
against the vastly superior fighting power of the British navy.400 The later 
defeats at the hands of industrial powers should not blinds us to the fact 
that through the 17th and 18th centuries, the Qing army performed its func-
tions perfectly - it remained the most powerful military force on the east-
ern half of the Eurasian continent at a comparatively low cost, conquering 
the Qing’s enemies, while at the same time posing no threat to the civilian 
government.  
Summary 
All in all, the Qing Empire was a state geared to ensure the stability of its 
regime, substantially continuing the millennia-old Chinese tradition of em-
pire. Rule was structured concentrically around the emperor, with declin-
ing intensity of control the further out you got. As the uncontested super-
power in its region, the most dangerous threats to regime survival were 
internal, and so the administration was primarily adapted to handle these. 
The state was kept minimal at the ground, so taxes could be kept low, to 
avoid discontent. Conversely, the upper bureaucracy was tightly controlled, 
to prevent the emergence of alternative power centers. Military power was 
closely supervised and kept relatively cheap. This resulted in a state that 
was remarkably stable, but with very little reach into local society. 
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France – an empire in the making 
At first glance, the French state in late pre-modernity looks utterly differ-
ent from the contemporary Qing state – much smaller in terms of territory, 
placed in an entirely different interstate context, ideologically dissimilar, 
and organized in a very different fashion. But when looking closer at the 
functioning of the state and its change over time, the superficial character 
of some of these differences becomes clear, and we can begin to gauge the 
similar dynamics underlying state formation in both cases. Over the course 
of the 17th and 18th centuries, the ideological and bureaucratic aspects of 
the French state increasingly began to converge on the bureaucratic-impe-
rial form exemplified by Qing China. In other aspects, notably in their 
capacities for resource extraction and military mobilization, we observe a 
marked divergence between the Chinese and French state. However, the 
specific methods by which this divergence in the coercive capacities of the 
two states emerged imply that we should interpret them not through the 
framework of modernization, but as distinct, pre-modern adaptations to 
variations in similarly distinct, pre-modern environments.  
In contrast to the Qing state, the French state was located in a decidedly 
hostile interstate environment. France was at all times surrounded by po-
tential enemies, and therefore in a constant state of military competition – 
through the 17th and 18th century being at war more often than not. This 
competition put pressure on the state, necessitating its constant expansion 
in terms of resource extraction and military capabilities. The central im-
portance of this interstate competition to state formation in Europe has 
been made clear by a number of scholars, most notably Charles Tilly, who 
epitomized this relationship as “War made states and vice versa.”401 
It is certainly the case that war was central in shaping the French state. As 
Peter Campbell writes, “Institutional change was almost always ad hoc and 
can generally be related to the imperatives of war.”402 However, it can be 
doubted whether the developments of the 17th and 18th centuries should 
be interpreted as continuous with the creation of the modern state, as it 
has traditionally been. In fact, it is possible to argue, as Victoria Hui has 
done, that the pressures of war resulted in state deformation in Europe, 
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because of the relegation of state power to private groups, a strategy she 
terms “self-weakening expedients”.403 Even though Hui’s conclusion falls 
short in view of the immense fiscal and military achievements of the late 
pre-modern European states, it does point to an important fact: that the 
organizational achievements of the French state (and other European 
states) in this period were reached by essentially pre-modern means. As in 
the case of the Qing state, “self-strengthening reforms” and “self-weaken-
ing expedients”, in the language of Hui, are really two sides of the same 
coin, and not two separate strategies, as she makes them out to be.404 Over 
the course of our period, the French state sometimes built up power pre-
cisely by empowering others, and at other times sacrificed effectiveness in 
order to retain central control. 
King and state 
The period between the 15th and 18th centuries saw a profound develop-
ment in the perceived nature of the French state and its monarch. From 
the medieval conception of the state as the patrimonial possession of the 
king and his family, the state itself came to acquire a more defined perma-
nence, with the king performing a defined position of supreme authority 
within it. The changed conception of the state and the monarch’s role 
emerged together with the establishment of the absolute monarchy. This 
development is interpreted in the literature as part of the emergence of the 
modern state in France, on its path to become a modern nation-state, and 
is explicitly contrasted with developments outside Europe.405 However, 
seen in a comparative perspective, the changes in French statehood can 
be interpreted alternatively as moving toward not the modern state, but as 
converging toward the model of the bureaucratic-imperial state.  
The emergence of imperial ideology in the French court provides strong 
clues in this direction. The work of Frances Yates, and especially Peter 
Burke, has laid forth the multiple ways in which imperial ideology was 
appropriated by the French kings, most notably Louis XIV.406 The French 
kings were associated with the sun, or the ancient sun god Apollo, “with 
the implication that there is one supreme ruler in the world as there is one 
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sun in the heavens.”407 The image of the king as a “Monarch of the Uni-
verse”, in theoretical possession of world supremacy, was a political state-
ment intended to assert his undivided sovereignty vis-à-vis the Holy Roman 
Emperor as well as internal power contenders. This picture was coupled 
with the assertion that the French ‘empire’ was the successor to the Ro-
man Empire, with the classical tradition constantly referenced to assert the 
parallels between the ancient emperors and the French kings.408 
The image of imperial kingship projected by the Bourbon monarchs 
granted them supreme authority as ‘absolute’ rulers, placed above the 
law.409 But as we saw with the Qing emperors, the position of supreme 
authority came with a cosmological significance which subjected the 
French kings to act according to a number of principles of divine order. 
As a sacred ruler, the king was required to rule according to natural law, in 
the “image of God”, or else lose his divine right.410 Simultaneously he was 
subject to a number of fundamental laws of the French realm, which ce-
mented that France was not his possession, but that he only filled its most 
august office.411 
In the influential book Lords of All the World, Anthony Pagden has de-
scribed how the ideology of universal empire gradually became unfashion-
able both in scholarly circles and as a basis for notions of sovereignty over 
the 17th and 18th centuries.412 However, the demise of the imperial model 
was far from guaranteed even by the late 18th century. Curiously for this 
study, a number of influential French scholars in the mid-18th century, 
most famously Bertin, Voltaire, and Quesnay, began quite explicitly using 
the Chinese state as a model to be imitated. This was not idle talk, though 
their image of the Chinese empire was certainly idealized. As especially 
Bertin and Quesnay exerted considerable influence on royal government, 
late 18th-century reform was closely connected to their ideas.413 This is es-
pecially evident in the French appropriation of the Chinese imperial ritual 
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of the ‘tilling of the soils’, in which the emperor symbolically ploughed the 
fields, by both Louis XV and Louis XVI.414 (see fig. 12) 
 
Fig. 12: Louis XVI Tilling the Soils  
Source: Bibliothèque Nationale de France 
Differentiation of rule 
Alone among the major powers of Europe, France was not explicitly a 
composite monarchy, as all its territories (except tiny Navarre) were gath-
ered under the royal title “King of France”. This fact, along with the usual 
teleological expectations, has led earlier scholars to present France as the 
prime example of a nation-state in the making. In recent years, however, 
this characterization has come under scrutiny by a number of scholars, 
who argue that in practical terms, France was indeed closer to being a 
composite state than a nation-state.415 Terminology aside, it is clear that 
the French state was not governed in any unitary fashion. Different forms 
of control were instead adapted to local circumstances. 
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First of all, the territories of France were divided into pays d’élection and pays 
d’états in the familiar pattern of concentric circles around the center of 
government (see fig. 13). The pays d’élection, closest to the king, were gov-
erned ‘directly’, that is, by royal officials. The Pays d’états, provinces histor-
ically incorporated into the kingdom of France at a later date, were instead 
governed through provincial Estates – assemblies of local notables who 
were entrusted to govern their respected provinces in negotiation with the 
king. Further outside this structure was the colonial sphere, subjected to a 
variety of arrangements involving indirect rule. Other differentiated pat-
terns of governance crisscrossed this arrangement. In the field of jurisdic-
tion, France was divided into the Land of Customary Law in the north, 
and the Land of Written (Roman) Law in the south. Regimes of indirect 
taxation were divided following yet another pattern, dividing the territory 
between “provinces of the cinq grosses fermes”, “provinces reputedly for-
eign”, “and provinces effectively foreign”. 
141 
 
 
Fig. 13: Map of Eighteenth-Century France  
Source: William Doyle, Old Regime France, 263 
The differentiated administration stemmed from the historical processes 
of territorial expansion and integration into the kingdom. The old territo-
ries of the kingdom were administered directly, while later additions nor-
mally were allowed greater autonomy. This compromise with local tradi-
tion was essential to keeping the kingdom together. As noted by Swann, 
“The relative success of the French Monarchy in integrating new prov-
inces is better ascribed to its willingness to permit the continuing existence 
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of difference.”416 We could then, instead of looking backward through the 
lens of the modern French nation-state, understand the French state as 
the imperial rule of the kings of Ile-de-France over its wider territories 
without stretching the imagination too far. Furthermore, rather than mov-
ing toward increasingly unified rule, over time the differentiation only pro-
ceeded further. Although a few provincial Estates were suppressed, the 
general tendency was toward the expansion of the Estates’ powers over 
their territory.417 From the perspective of the center, this was accepted as 
it was coupled with an increase in funds received by the state through var-
ious channels.  
Bureaucracy 
The bureaucratic machinery of the French state has been at the corner-
stone of the idea of France as the prototypical modern state, and at its 
surface it seems as far from Chinese realities as can be. In contrast to the 
Qing state’s minimalism, France has been described as “the most over-
administered country in Europe.”418 Looking at the raw numbers of gov-
ernment officials, we can contrast China’s stable 20,000 with some 50-
80,000 in France by 1665 and increasing, for a population a tenth the size 
of China’s.419 Nevertheless, there emerge some clear parallels between the 
workings of the two bureaucracies when looked at from a certain angle, 
which hints at the common dynamics governing both. 
The number of French officials really did expand enormously in the late 
pre-modern period, but not for the purpose of state-building. An abso-
lutely essential aspect of French office-holding was its venal character. 
Nearly all offices in the administration, except certain key posts, were sold 
to the highest bidder.420 The main reason for the growth of offices was 
the need to secure resources for the constantly underfunded state. Many 
offices had no administrative function. Offices were often doubled or 
even tripled, with responsibility shared between the multiple holders. The 
office holders for their part treated the office like “an object of trade”, 
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with their main interest in securing office being the acquisition of the ac-
companying title and wage, as well as the opportunities for amassing more 
power and wealth through the levers of the state.421 
The venal character of state offices had deep implications for the func-
tioning of the bureaucracy. Since the officials were completely secure in 
their positions, as a rule they worked slowly, if at all.422 As the king was 
always in need of funds, he repeatedly exchanged patrimonial concessions 
for a reduction of payment to his bureaucracy. Consequently, on the one 
hand, the wages paid to officials with actual functions were always insuf-
ficient to perform these properly, leading them to subsist increasingly “by 
their hands”, that is, by irregular incomes such as commissions or extra 
taxes.423 On the other hand, royal control with the officials increasingly 
diminished, as offices became hereditary possessions no longer granted by 
the king. In the eyes of contemporaries, the increasing concessions to the 
officials created dangers of treason and revolt.424 In essence, the gradual 
localization and patrimonialization of bureaucratic power created dangers 
for the state of alternative power centers emerging in the realm. 
The response of the central state to this danger was the institution of the 
provincial intendants. The intendancies were part of a select few bureau-
cratic positions not for sale, and therefore under direct bureaucratic con-
trol of the central state. During the 17th century, the 30 or so intendants 
evolved into the main arm of royal control in the provinces, so much that 
they have subsequently been seen as the central agents in the construction 
of a modern state in France.425 The old image of the intendants as all-
powerful agents of a modern state bureaucracy, however, has been thor-
oughly discredited over the previous decades. Instead, the complex roles 
of the provincial intendants present us with a clear image of the dilemmas 
between centralization and local power, similar to what we have seen for 
Qing China. 
The intendants were instituted as a centralized layer of bureaucracy above 
the already existing layer of royal officials. As effecting central control over 
the vast numbers of venal officials became increasingly difficult as their 
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numbers and patrimonial rights expanded, the intendants were partly es-
tablished to keep an eye on the officials themselves.426 The responsibilities 
given to the intendants were practically universal, with tasks ranging from 
taxation, church regulation, commercial development, military security, 
social work and much more.427 In reality, the intendants did not have the 
means to perform all these functions. In the words of Francois-Xavier 
Emmanuelli, they had “only an embryonic bureaucracy and derisory finan-
cial means.”428 As a result, most of the intendant’s work focused on the 
central states top priorities: resource extraction and provisioning of the 
army.429  
The prevention of the localization of the intendants was of central im-
portance to the central government. Regulation similar to the Qing law of 
avoidance was in place, stipulating that an intendant could not serve in his 
home province or stay for more than 3 years in one post.430 This practice, 
enforced in the early years, seems nevertheless to have lapsed somewhat 
during the 18th century, when longer intendancies were quite common. 
The prolongation of commissions was the result of apparent problems 
with controlling a province without establishing the networks of patron-
age and other personal relations required for the exercise of power in 
French society.431 This is only one aspect in which the central organization 
of the intendants ran up against the problems inherent in the dilemma 
between central control and local effectiveness. A creeping patrimonialism 
of the intendancy was also apparent in the regular appointment of the sons 
of intendants to the position of Joint Intendant to their fathers’ intendan-
cies.432 
The dilemma is even clearer in the gradual appearance of ‘subdelegates’, 
who were local notables semiofficially employed to aid the intendant in his 
province, along with the intendants’ coterie of personal secretaries and 
clerks. The central government frowned on this practice, and repeatedly 
tried to limit both the number and the tasks of subdelegates. In an illumi-
nating letter to the intendant of Lyonnais, the controller-general Colbert 
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wrote that “it is too dangerous to entrust [financial tasks] to men from the 
same province, who would always have interests and desires which would 
run counter to the course of true justice.”433 All the same, the number of 
subofficials kept growing, as they were absolutely necessary in order for 
the intendant to perform his functions. By the end of the 18th century, 
over 700 subdelegates were employed by the now 33 intendants, in direct 
opposition to the express wishes of the king.434 These subdelegates were 
unpaid from the center, and were subsidized partly by unofficial payments 
from the intendant, and partly from their sometimes secondary role as 
(underpaid) royal officials.435 
Even with the aid of subdelegates, it was hard for intendants to effect 
control in their provinces. Often the local notables and royal officials 
united their efforts against the intendant, who was perceived as a hostile 
stranger to local interests (as he in many cases was).436 Vincent Meyzie has 
described a revealing example of the problem of local control in a case in 
which a conflict erupted between a subdelegate and the urban elites of a 
provincial city. The subdelegate in question was employed by the intend-
ant because he had no strong ties to the urban elites, in order to guarantee 
his loyalty to the intendant. But his lack of local ties served precisely to 
delegitimize his actions in the view of the locals, who succeeded in remov-
ing him from his post and hindering his actions.437 
To conclude, it is hard to maintain the view of the intendants as the strong 
arm of bureaucratic absolutism. However, the problems connected with 
the institution of the intendancies were not due to the specific failings of 
the French state, but rather to fundamental limitations on effective state 
control in the pre-modern era. What the intendants did do was to establish 
a modicum of central oversight in the provinces in order to limit the pat-
rimonial power of royal officials. They served as ‘free-floating officials’ 
who linked “a congeries of local ties to a variety of national ties.”438 To 
draw the parallels to the Qing state out, they constituted a centralized and 
universal ‘Level I’ bureaucracy to keep in check what more and more came 
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to resemble a local, particularistic and diffuse ‘Level II’ of royal official-
dom. 
Resource extraction 
At all times, the top priority of the bureaucracy was to extract resources 
from the populace to fund the activities of the government, which mainly 
consisted in waging war. The circumstances of near-constant armed strug-
gle experienced by the French state made the problem of resource extrac-
tion even more pointed. Over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries the 
expenses related to war generally exceeded the revenues of the state, which 
resulted in a constant pressure to increase central revenue. For many 
scholars, the modernity of the French state hinges on the perceived suc-
cess or failure of this endeavor, as when Alain Guéry writes: “The strong 
increase of royal finances in the sixteenth century is the measured sign of 
the definitive establishment of the modern state”.439  
That the French system of taxation should in any way reflect modernity is 
belied by just a perfunctory look at its positively byzantine organization. 
First of all, both the organization and the levels of taxation differed widely 
between pays d’élection and pays d’états. As consistent with the radiating struc-
ture of rule, the directly ruled pays d’élection lifted a far greater share of the 
tax burden than the indirectly ruled pays d‘états.440 Furthermore, the Estates 
of the pays d’états had the official privilege of having to consent to taxation, 
and of taxing their territories themselves. Separate bureaucracies of taxa-
tion thus existed in these territories, and much taxation took the form of 
routinely paid “free gifts” to the king, a term designed to recognize their 
official semi-independence.441 
The ‘core’ tax was the taille, which in the previous centuries had provided 
most of the funds for the state. This was a regular tax on land payed by 
the lower classes, as the nobles were exempted from paying it. The taille 
was overseen by the provincial intendants, but actual collection was done 
by venal officials, who subsequently let parishes tax themselves, and in the 
process enriched themselves.442 Over the 17th and 18th centuries, inflation 
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slowly reduced the value of the taille, so several new direct taxes were in-
troduced in order to bolster the state treasury.443 These were to be directly 
managed by the intendants, which in practice meant that they had to ex-
pand their unofficial sub-bureaucracies, and pay them by skimming off the 
taxes.444 This move to centralize taxation by way of the intendants shows 
the inherent dilemma of centralization. Tax collection simply had to be in 
the hands of local people, if it were to function at all. The move to bypass 
local officials in the collection of the new direct taxes simply resulted in 
the buildup of a parallel local tax bureaucracy outside the view of the state. 
In the eyes of the central state, this removed the corruption associated 
with local participation, but on the ground level it made little difference. 
As a case in point, intendants often chose to simply use the existing bu-
reaucracy for collection of the new taxes as well as the taille, as that may 
have seemed an easier option.445 
Over time, due to inflation the importance of direct taxation decreased, 
and the state came to rely increasingly on indirect taxation and various 
extraordinary revenues.446 Indirect taxation was through a variety of ar-
rangements outsourced to great financiers, and passed through several lay-
ers of subcontractors, who all had to get a value for their investment, be-
fore reaching the populace. In an example given by Stephen Miller con-
cerning the salt tax in Languedoc, the state received only about 20% of 
what should have been collected in the province, the rest presumably go-
ing to other parties or not being collected at all.447 The sale of offices, also 
an important part of state revenue, was outsourced in a similar fashion. 
Yet, this lack of modern bureaucratic management should not induce us 
to disparage the French system of extraction as a failure in its pre-modern 
context. A tentative comparison with China easily serves to dispel this 
myth. As precise numbers are hard to trust in both cases, the comparison 
is necessarily quite rough, but it will serve the point in question. By 1755, 
the French annual state revenue totaled 253 million livres tournois, which 
translates to roughly 45 grams of silver per capita. In order to correct for 
price differences, we can convert that into wheat equivalents, which yields 
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about 1,570 million kg, or roughly 63 kg wheat per capita.448 For the Qing 
state, annual revenue in 1753 stood at 73.8 million taels according to Wang, 
to which one must add very uncertain numbers for extraordinary reve-
nue.449 If we take a rough guess of 90 million taels, that is equivalent to 
roughly 13 grams of silver per capita.450 In grain equivalents (here rice in-
stead of wheat), that amounts to 3,750 million kg, or 15 kg per capita.451 
This means that from a population base of roughly a tenth of that of China, 
the French state managed to acquire nearly half of the total revenue com-
manded by the Qing, expressed in terms of grain equivalents.  
What we see in France is a thus machinery of extraction stretched to its 
utmost to garner as many resources as possible in order to feed its bloated 
armies. My point here is thus not that the French state was not capable of 
drawing in large amounts of resources, but rather, that the method by 
which this was accomplished was far from by creating a modern state in 
any form. 
The development of the extraction form over time further reinforces this 
point. In the pays d’élection the state often failed to get the stipulated 
amounts of taxes, and annual income was far from stable.452 As a response, 
gradually the state ceded direct control over resource extraction to officials 
and corporate groups in society, as this seemed the only way to keep rev-
enue levels stably high. By empowering local notables, the state augmented 
the resources available. In the 17th century, government income rose mark-
edly, while in the 18th century the various initiatives taken by central gov-
ernment only managed to counter inflation, so that income in terms of 
grain remained fairly stable.453  The devolution of central power is espe-
cially evident in the pays d’états, where authority increasingly was swept into 
the hands of local power holders at the expense of the intendants. In-
creased local power was simply necessary to extract the required amount 
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of resources.454 In return for steady streams of revenue, an increasing pro-
portion of taxes was retained by local power holders.455 As much as half 
of all revenue did not leave the province it was raised in, going instead to 
local office-holders and other notables.456  
This localization of power restrained the freedom of central government 
by binding income to local groups. Furthermore, it created dangers of re-
volt and loss of royal authority in the provinces. This problem was explic-
itly recognized by Colbert, who at various points, unsuccessfully, tried to 
lower taxes to restore royal authority.457 The problem inherent in the 
whole situation is summed up by Mark Potter, “The long term political 
cost of this ‘coerced cooperation’, then, lay in the devolution of public 
power away from the crown to both individuals (office holders with 
strengthened property rights) and privileged corps, a devolution that 
would severely limit the crown’s financial options in the eighteenth cen-
tury.”458  
Military Power 
Apart from resource extraction, warfare was by far the most important 
activity of the French state. In the 17th and 18th centuries, France was at 
war repeatedly, totaling something like half the entire period. Moreover, 
as was almost universally the case in pre-modern times, payment for war 
made up the overwhelming part of the state expenditure. At all times, the 
procurement of resources for waging war was the primary driver of state 
formation in France. Changes in the institutional structure of the state, 
such as the massive growth of venal officials, the establishment of the in-
tendancies, and the creation of new taxes, always happened as a direct re-
sult of warfare, whether during a war, or afterward as attempts to secure 
repayment of the massive war debts taken by the regime.459 Changes were 
thus not enacted unless absolutely necessary, but the necessity of change 
was on the other hand an almost ever-present phenomenon. 
This change is naturally most obvious in the immense expansion of the 
armed forces. 1445 saw the establishment of the first standing army in 
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France of around 14,000 men. A century later, the peacetime forces of 
France remained at a similar level, although at wartime this was expanded 
to around 50,000. By the middle of the 17th century, this was expanded to 
a peacetime force of more than 70,000, with wartime figures totaling 
150,000. At the turn of the 17th century, this development climaxed with 
a peacetime force of about 150,000, and as much as 400,000 men during 
wartime. Throughout the 18th century, however, the numbers seem to 
have plateaued.460 As was the case in China, the notional strength of the 
French army did not correspond exactly to its realistic strength. Captains 
who were financially responsible for the upkeep of their regiments 
skimped on the cost, and avoided keeping their regiments at full strength. 
However, the constant testing of the army in wartime tended to keep this 
problem to manageable levels, so that realistic numbers is thought to have 
fluctuated around 80-90% of the paper figures.461 
These numbers fit well with what we have seen for revenue, as we would 
reasonably expect since most of the state expenditure went to the army. It 
also fits well with the comparison to the Qing state above, with the French 
army reaching around a third of the size of the Qing army during the fre-
quent wars. It is also telling that France, despite its comparatively small 
size, managed to mobilize between two and three times the absolute num-
ber of soldiers than the Qing did during its border wars. This underlies the 
marked difference in the nature of warfare between the two states, as the 
French wars were fought for the survival of the state, while the Qing fron-
tier wars were strictly unnecessary prestige projects of the Chinese emper-
ors. 
The organization of the army was similarly influenced by the constant mil-
itary pressure. The French state was forced to constantly balance the need 
for central control of the army with the need to retain its effectiveness in 
the field, a dilemma which we saw in the Chinese case to be resolved en-
tirely in favor of the former. In many cases, effectiveness was also in 
France sacrificed in order to retain central control. The army was subjected 
to a “patchwork quilt of jurisdictions” of the many different types of mil-
itary officers.462 As the army administration, similarly to the civil bureau-
cracy, was subject to the venal system of the sale of offices, it was top-
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heavy with officers, many of whom simply did not work.463 Although this 
impeded effectiveness, it served to spread authority wide in the army, pro-
vided extra resources for the state, and offered places of state-derived 
prestige to nobles.464 At the top level of the officer class, the army was 
controlled by commanders-in-chief, and these were carefully selected by 
the king with regard to their loyalty to the state. In many instances, the 
need to balance out the interests of various aristocratic families was prior-
itized over the abilities of the commanders.465 Moreover, commissions to 
lead armies were always issued in limited periods only, often rotating be-
tween different people over the seasons, which also limited effective-
ness.466 
In other cases, the French state was forced to give up central oversight in 
order to guarantee the effectiveness of the army. In general, the army was 
controlled by a decentralized system of regulation and inspection, rather 
than directly by the central state, a system that “left a great deal of authority 
outside of Paris.”467 Various attempts to increase central control over the 
commanders-in-chief met with hostility and disobedience from the offic-
ers, and were quickly given up as unworkable in practice.468 In order for 
the army to remain adequately funded, the central state tolerated various 
parts of the army acting at times as ‘states within a state’, performing gov-
ernment functions like taxation and administration separately from the ci-
vilian bureaucracy.469 Additionally, the recruitment and financial mainte-
nance of the troops were delegated to the captains, who had to pay out of 
their personal accounts, often spending huge sums in the process. The 
dangers of such patrimonialism in the officer ranks were recognized by 
the central government, but there emerged no alternative ways of securing 
the revenue needed.470 
After the catastrophic result of the Seven Years’ War (1756-63), from 1765 
a series of army reforms were instituted to further increase the efficiency 
of army command, as the venal system was recognized to limit its military 
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potential. The core of these reforms was to centralize the financial man-
agement of the armies, so that captains no longer financed their companies 
themselves. During the following decades, this was coupled with a reform 
limiting higher military offices to nobles with at least four generations of 
nobility behind them, or alternatively, a family history of military service. 
Whereas earlier scholarship has seen these reforms as driven by separate 
dynamics, the first as a part of a drive to modernize the army and the 
second as a part of an aristocratic reaction to this modernization, recent 
studies tend to understand it as different aspects of the same phenome-
non.471 The thought behind reform was to professionalize military com-
mand through a reinforcement of noble privilege, and the establishment 
of a caste of military officers in command. Rather than a path to modern-
ization of the army, it was a reorganization of the place of elite participa-
tion and fiscal responsibility, with mixed results. Although the reforms 
might have increased military effectiveness, they placed a greater burden 
upon the already pressed state treasury, and risked alienating large groups 
of the elite. 
Summary 
The French state expanded greatly in the 17th and 18th centuries, both in 
terms of officials employed, resources mobilized and military power. Ide-
ally, this growing power was centered on the increasingly imperial figure 
of the king, but in reality the state was riddled with local patrimonial seats 
of power. The expansion of the state was driven by the relentless pressure 
of war, and was marked by concessions to local powerholders in order to 
keep revenue flowing for the army. As the old bureaucracy became unre-
liable, a new layer of centralized administration was created to uphold cen-
tral power, with some success. Throughout the period, the state thereby 
managed to maintain one of the largest military forces on the European 
continent, but at the cost of an inherent instability of the regime. 
The Habsburg Empire – relocation and continuation 
The Habsburg Empire has traditionally been kept somewhat outside of 
the debates on state formation in Europe. It has been either “brought in 
only as background material for the study of other European states or 
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general trends”472, or else remained conspicuously absent in the compara-
tive literature.473 The reasons for this are not hard to guess. In its form, 
the Habsburg Empire obviously defies idealized conceptions of what the 
‘early modern state’ should look like, with its confusingly complex and 
differentiated structure and its lack of anything resembling ‘national’ co-
herence. Additionally, its lack of any direct modern descendant, other than 
the incomparably smaller Austrian state, has both served to split up schol-
arship in a number of languages and traditions coinciding with the modern 
nation-states inhabiting its territories, and introduced a strong element of 
teleological pessimism regarding its importance. Remaining outside the 
cone-shaped vision of modernocentric history, it has been neglected in the 
broader, theoretical history. 
The uncertainty regarding where to situate the Habsburg Empire in the 
traditional framework of state formation is also evident in the nomencla-
ture. In his widely influential book The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 
Richard Evans described it as “a complex and subtly-balanced organism, 
not a ‘state’ but a mildly centripetal agglutination of bewilderingly hetero-
geneous elements.” 474  To avoid the nomenclature of statehood, most 
scholars simply use the term ‘Habsburg Monarchy’. Others refer to it as 
an empire, as I do here. Uncertainty also pertains as to whether one can 
classify the Habsburg Empire as ‘absolutist’, drawing inspiration from 
scholarship on contemporary France. The use of the term quite explicitly 
derives from an attempt to include the Habsburg Empire in the history of 
European State Formation, in order to rectify its traditional position as 
‘something different’.475 On the other hand, the criticisms leveled at the 
use of the concept of absolutism in a French context appear even more 
valid regarding the Habsburgs, and so others deride the notion of a Habs-
burg absolutism as “at best, questionable and … potentially mislead-
ing.”476 Regarding the issue of modernity, opinions likewise vary. Some 
scholars see the Habsburg Empire as the very “antipode of the modern 
state”477, while others see its development in the 18th century as “The birth 
of the modern centralized state.”478 
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This dilemma results from the by now familiar problem of how to fit the 
Habsburg state into the modernocentric grand narrative. Including it in 
the story necessitates the use of teleological frameworks of modernization 
or the lack thereof. However, when we realize that this framework is un-
necessary, and move to the bureaucratic-imperial framework, the Habs-
burg Empire fits much more comfortably.  
Emperor and state 
Unlike the kings of France, the Habsburg emperors were inheritors of a 
long imperial tradition. This tradition stemmed from their role, kept con-
tinuously in the Habsburg family since the 15th century, as Holy Roman 
emperors. The Holy Roman Empire had existed in various forms since 
the 9th century, but was claimed to have an even longer pedigree, as the 
direct successor to the Roman Empire. The imperial succession was con-
ceptualized by the notion of a translatio imperii, in which imperial sover-
eignty was passed to worthy successors through time, until finally God 
had granted the divine right to rule to the Habsburgs.479 The Habsburgs 
additionally claimed to be the descendants of the Trojan hero Aeneas, a 
claim they shared with the ancient Romans, and specifically the Julian im-
perial family of ancient Rome.480 Their imperial sovereignty ideally cov-
ered the whole world, as expressed by the repeated inscription ‘AEIOU’ - 
Austriae est imperare orbi universo, Austria is to rule the whole world.481  
At the end of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, the Habs-
burgs saw their powers as Holy Roman Emperors somewhat limited. 
Their status as emperors, however, was confirmed, and the imperial ide-
ology was increasingly emanating from the by now permanent and ex-
panding court in Vienna. The emperors around the turn of the 17th century 
were presented as ‘the Austrian sun’, sustaining the world with their piety, 
and their court presented as the center of the world.482 The movement of 
the center of imperial ideology to Vienna and the Habsburgs’ hereditary 
lands, as opposed to the Holy Roman Empire was a gradual process, 
driven by the continuous expansion of Habsburg territory outside the em-
pire, as well as developments within it. The temporary loss of the imperial 
                                              
479 Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire, 430. 
480 Tanner, The Last Descendant of Aeneas. 
481 Ducreux, “Emperors, Kingdoms, Territories,” 283; Beller, A Concise History of Austria, 
chap. 2. 
482 Schumann, Die andere Sonne; Goloubeva, The Glorification of Emperor Leopold I; Mout, 
“Introduction,” 84–8; Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV, 173–7. 
155 
 
title in 1740-45 furthered the ideological relocation, as did the subsequent 
decades where imperial dignity was held by first the husband and then the 
son of the true ruler, Maria Theresia. When Joseph II at the end of the 
18th century performed his emperorship, it was clearly centered on the he-
reditary lands, even to the point that he contented himself with the impe-
rial title alone, remaining uncrowned in his separate realms.483 
The relocation of the imperial center was coupled with the development 
of the imperial form of rule in the hereditary lands. From being seen as a 
disparate collection of separate territories, the hereditary lands from 
around 1700 began to be conceptualized as the ‘Austrian Monarchy’, with 
its unity and indivisibility being declared in the document known as the 
‘Pragmatic Sanction’ from the early 18th century.484 In these lands, the 
monarchs were presented in an increasingly absolutist fashion, asserting 
imperial sovereignty at the expense of the local powerholders in the 
church and the Estates, although, as we will see, the latter kept being cen-
tral to actual governance. The universal aspects of absolute rule was 
stressed, with the emperor (or empress) acting in obedience with natural 
law, and thereby guaranteeing the happiness of the state and the common 
people, especially represented by the peasantry.485 
In parallel with the French case, it is of interest to note that also the Habs-
burgs were indirectly influenced by the Chinese model of empire through 
idealized philosophical writings on China. Although the precise degree of 
influence is unclear, a number of influential people at the Viennese court 
did write of the Chinese state as a model to be imitated, and their image 
of China had a degree of resemblance to the ideals of Joseph II.486 As with 
the French monarchs, a notable instance of this influence was to be seen 
in his parallel appropriation of the Chinese ritual of the ‘tilling of the soils’ 
(see fig. 14). 
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Fig. 14: Joseph II Tilling the Soils 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
Differentiation of rule 
The hotchpotch of separate territories ruled by the Habsburg emperors 
can make the Habsburg Empire seem as an ideal case of the composite 
state. The Habsburgs acted as emperors in the Holy Roman Empire, arch-
dukes of Austria, King of Bohemia and Hungary, and the list could go on. 
Each territory was governed through local Estates, according to its own 
laws. Or at least, such was the ideal case seen from the perspective of the 
Estates. 
In reality, over time the monarchy moved from resembling Evans’ “mildly 
centripetal agglutination of bewilderingly heterogeneous elements” toward 
a more concentric pattern of rule. To impose unified rule over all its terri-
tories was impracticable, but some form of territorial consolidation was 
possible to achieve. A first step was the permanent establishment of the 
imperial court in Vienna, as noted above. This meant the establishment of 
a center of rule around which to order the monarchy’s territories (see fig. 
15).487 During various periods of reform, most markedly during the reign 
of Maria Theresia (1740-80), the Austrian and Bohemian lands were de-
veloped into the empire’s core territory, subjected to firmer, bureaucratic 
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and autocratic control.488 Local Estates continued to exist, but came to 
function more as a tool of the central government than as an autonomous 
seat of political power. In Hungary the Estates had more power, and the 
Habsburgs ruled either through them, or through other groups of local 
notables. 489  The Habsburgs’ territories in Italy and the Netherlands, 
though substantial, were to a great degree left to be ruled by the local elites, 
who also retained most of the locally levied taxes. In the outermost circle 
were the various territories of the Holy Roman Empire. Habsburg over-
lordship here was mostly symbolic, contributing more to Habsburg pres-
tige than actual power. Additionally, along the southern borders of the 
kingdom of Hungary a special military frontier zone existed, where the 
local populations supplied recruits for the army in exchange for tax ex-
emptions and a degree of local autonomy.490 
  
 
Fig. 15: The Habsburg Empire under Charles VI (1711-40)  
Source: Charles Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 109 
In order to relate to the different territories of the monarchy, the Habs-
burg rulers projected a set of different images and roles, what Schumann 
calls “multiplying image cultivation”, but which we could equate with 
Crossley’s “simultaneity” presented above.491 For example, when acting as 
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Holy Roman Emperor, the entire court shifted around the ruler, to portray 
his status and function in that regard.492 However, while these multiple 
images remained important, over time the single image of the ruler as em-
peror of the Austrian Monarchy became comparatively more stressed. 
Bureaucracy 
The development of a bureaucracy in the Habsburg Empire is central to 
its perceived development into a modern state. This narrative of modern-
ization is generally focused on the form taken by the bureaucracy during 
and after the reform era under Maria Theresia (1740-80) and Joseph II 
(1780-90). A great deal of bureaucratization and centralization of admin-
istration did take place in this era, but the Habsburg bureaucracy remained 
somewhat chaotic and ultimately dependent on local powerholders. 
The administration of the Habsburg Empire was extremely differentiated 
across its lands, and any attempt at presenting a unified picture will have 
to gloss over countless exceptions to the general pattern. Broadly speaking, 
however, it can be described as a two-layered structure, similar to what we 
have seen above.493 The first layer of central government was primarily 
located in Vienna, and otherwise very sparingly spread out in the provinces. 
Below them, a second layer of local administration in each of the separate 
lands was in the hands of local powerholders represented in the numerous 
provincial Estates. 
The upper level of administration was, even in the 17th century, quite cen-
tralized and bureaucratically organized, and became even more so after the 
18th century reforms. Officials were recruited on a somewhat meritocratic 
basis of experience, and periodically rotated between offices.494 At the end 
of the 18th century, a very tight system of control with the central officials 
was put in place, as well as strict criteria for their education.495 
At the local level, as always, we see a different story. Until 1748, central 
government had no control over local administration, which was placed 
squarely in the hands of the provincial Estates.496 The Estates, manned by 
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hereditary local powerholders, were the agents of taxation, provided re-
cruits and supply for the armies, funded infrastructure, and coordinated 
everything else to do with local government.497 Below the Estates, the 
landlords who dominated the agricultural sector comprised the lowest 
level of ‘government’, in the sense that they were responsible for enacting 
the decisions taken by the Estates, though they remained essentially pri-
vate agents. The agents of central government sent out to the provinces 
were greatly outnumbered by the officials of the Estates and lordships, 
which had a relatively large and autonomous administration of their 
own.498 In addition, the centrally controlled officials in the provinces were 
as a rule very badly paid, which naturally resulted in them securing income 
by unofficial means, what we today would call corruption.499 In a general 
statement, H. M. Scott summarized the situation as the “magnates ruled 
in the name of the Habsburgs and implemented – or circumvented – the 
orders received from far-away Vienna”.500 
The mid-18th century reforms changed this picture somewhat for the cen-
tral realms of Austria and Bohemia. The number of central officials greatly 
increased (from about 6,000 to 11,000), the power of the Estates was re-
duced, and central officials were put in control of taxation and the army.501 
However, the power of local elites remained strong. The people holding 
the reins of power in local society remained the same as before the reforms, 
though some gained new government titles.502 Then, after the disastrous 
result of the Seven Years’ War (1756-63), the monarchy’s dire financial 
situation forced the central state to rely strongly on the still functional Es-
tates for their ability to forward resources, and the Estates thus saw their 
local power increase again.503 Faced by financial pressure, the central gov-
ernment was simply forced to delegate power to local elites, as they re-
mained the only way to get access to the resources of the population. 
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The dilemma between central bureaucratic control and local effectiveness 
in the Habsburg context is amply illustrated by the case of Galicia, as 
brought forth by Iryna Vushko.504 When Galicia, a formerly Polish terri-
tory, was annexed by the Habsburgs in 1772, the central government had 
plans to rule it in a strictly bureaucratic manner. To ensure central control, 
local powerholders were excluded from the provincial administration, as 
their personal ties to the region were perceived as a source of unreliability. 
The result of this was an inevitable collapse of administrative efficiency in 
the region, and the eventual incorporation of local elites into the bureau-
cratic structure, disregarding their lack of official qualifications. The ne-
cessity to secure resources from the region hence made the central author-
ities give up their insistence on a centralized bureaucracy. 
The bureaucratic reforms of the mid- and late 18th century resulted in a 
“new upper layer of central government”, but this remained a “very thin 
princely cover on top of an essentially estate-based apparatus.”505 Central 
control over the bureaucracy was somewhat strengthened, but local gov-
ernment remained firmly in the hands of local elites. 
Resource extraction 
We now move to the issue of resource extraction in the Habsburg Empire, 
the central task of the imperial bureaucracy. The importance of finances 
to the bureaucratic administration is illustrated by the fact that more than 
80% of all officials of the central government were financial in nature.506 
During the 17th and 18th centuries, continuous warfare forced the state to 
attempt to expand its revenue to pay for its growing armies. This was to a 
large degree successfully accomplished through reliance on traditional 
methods of extraction. 
The core of resource extraction in the Habsburg Empire was from the 17th 
century the contribution, a direct tax on land imposed to secure funds for 
the army. This tax had its origins in extraordinary wartime grants from the 
Estates, but in the 17th century developed into a permanent source of rev-
enue.507 The contribution was levied from the Empire’s central lands, Aus-
tria and Bohemia, as well as from Hungary, which nevertheless payed less 
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per capita than the central lands, consistent with the general ‘concentric’ 
structure of rule.508 In the imperial treasury, the contribution accounted 
for between 40 and 60% of revenue, the rest being made up for mostly by 
indirect taxes, most notably the salt tax which contributed 10-18%.509 The 
Habsburgs’ lands in Italy and the Netherlands also sent some taxes to Vi-
enna, but these were quite small sums compared to the wealth and popu-
lation of the territories.510 On top of this came the revenues from the Holy 
Roman Empire, which had not, contrary to the general impression one 
gets from scholarship, yet become totally defunct. Its support came largely 
through a number of extraordinary tax grants in times of war, as a sort of 
tribute, which were certainly important for the government, but remained 
a minor source of income compared to the income from the hereditary 
lands.511 
In levying the contribution, the central government relied on the Estates, 
which subsequently relied on local secular and ecclesiastical lords to do 
the actual collection.512 Direct taxation was thus until the mid-18th century 
completely out of the hands of the central government. The dominical 
property of the lords was either exempt from taxation or taxed at prefer-
ential rates, and with the lords themselves in charge of collection, direct 
taxation was in practice mostly borne by the peasantry. An effort to in-
crease taxation of lordly property was begun under Joseph II, but ulti-
mately failed.513 In the 1740’s a measure of central oversight and control 
of the contribution was imposed in the Austrian and Bohemian lands, but 
the Estates retained a large role in financial affairs and the lords remained 
in charge of collection. The relentless need to increase revenue, due to 
near-constant warfare, made the central government still more dependent 
on the financial services of the Estates, which consequently retained a 
large degree of fiscal power throughout the 18th century.514 Even by the 
1780’s, after decades of efforts to centralize taxation, only 74% of revenue 
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ever reached the central treasury – somewhat more than in France, but 
still less than in China.515 
One of the notable successes of the Habsburgs in the 17th and 18th century 
was the great expansion of total revenue received by the central govern-
ment. In absolute numbers, annual revenue increased from 5 million guil-
ders in 1650, through 20 million in 1700, reaching 90 million by 1790.516 
One of the main reasons for this was the continuous expansion of territo-
ries through the period, as well as general population growth, and of 
course inflation. If we very roughly ‘correct’ for this by converting to 
wheat equivalents per capita, we get a development from ca. 27 kg in 1650, 
through 45 kg in 1700, reaching 70 kg by 1790 – still an impressive increase, 
though far from the 18-fold expansion noted above.517 By the end of the 
century, central annual revenue was equivalent to around 1,500 million 
kilos of wheat. In these numbers, the Habsburg Empire is roughly com-
parable to France, and therefore also extracted roughly five times the 
amount of resources per capita as the Qing state. 
Military Power 
The military aspect of the Habsburg state in the 17th and 18th centuries has 
been a somewhat neglected area of scholarship, as romantic visions of an 
empire preferring diplomacy and marriage contracts to war has tended to 
shroud the importance of military power for the regime.518 However, war 
plays a central part in the history of the late pre-modern Habsburg state. 
Not only was the Habsburg Empire at war for most of the time here con-
sidered, war also in every case provided the impetus for reform of the 
various branches of the state, and is thus a defining factor in Habsburg 
state formation. 
As should be expected, by far the largest item of expense of the Habsburg 
Empire was its army. Though fluctuating across times of war and peace, 
army expenses remained consistently high. Throughout the 18th century, 
in peacetime the army consumed around 50% of total expenditure, with a 
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further 30% going toward repaying the debts incurred in the wars. In war-
time, the military share of the budget could reach up to 90%.519 
Through the 17th and 18th centuries, the Habsburg army went through a 
long period of continual change. This change is most obvious regarding 
its size. After the end of the Thirty Years’ War, the first standing army of 
the Habsburg Empire was created, comprising 25,000 men.520 By 1700 it 
had expanded to 100,000, and by the 1730’s reached 200,000 in wartime, 
to be reduced to 160,000 when peace arrived. By the late 18th century, it 
had expanded to more than 300,000.521 It should be remembered, though, 
that these numbers reflect the paper strength of the army, with its effective 
strength normally reduced by about 20-30%.522 
Two separate contingents of soldiers should be added to these numbers. 
The first is the contingent of border forces maintained in the militarized 
zones at the southern borders of the empire. Though they at all times con-
stituted a substantial force, the Border Forces also expanded over the pe-
riod, reaching around 70,000 by the late 18th century. The second is the 
often ignored military contribution of the Holy Roman Empire, provided 
by the Imperial Estates. In wars which were declared as Imperial Wars, 
these provided substantial contingents of troops to the Habsburg emper-
ors, as many as 130,000 during the War of the Spanish Succession.523 
However, help from the Imperial Estates was less dependable as a source 
of security than that provided by the Habsburgs’ own forces, and moreo-
ver the size of the Imperial army contingents stagnated through the 18th 
century, leading to a loss in its relative importance to the Habsburgs’ mil-
itary efforts. 
The expansion of the Habsburg army thus paralleled the French experi-
ence, reaching comparable levels, although with a marked delay. Following 
what we found in the case of resource extraction, the largest expansion in 
France happened in the 17th century, while for the Habsburg Empire the 
18th century saw the most change. The comparability with France also 
means that a comparison with the Qing reveals the same pattern of diver-
gence observed above. Based on a tenth of the population, the Habsburg 
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Empire mobilized an army around a third to half the size of the Qing army. 
This testifies to the immense degree of militarization of Europe during the 
17th and 18th centuries. 
The organization of the Habsburg army was characterized by a large de-
gree of decentralization. In each of the Habsburg territories, the Estates 
were responsible for the recruitment, supply and lodgings of troops.524 
The regiments themselves were semi-privatized, with the position of regi-
mental officer for specific regiments for sale, the buyer assuming private 
responsibility of maintaining his regiment.525  Even the supply of provi-
sions and transport for the army was often outsourced to private contrac-
tors, with predictably bad results for their quality.526 As mentioned, a re-
spectable part of the Habsburg army was made up of the Border Forces, 
controlled by the Inner Austrian Estates together with local powerholders. 
These were organized differently from the rest of the army, based on local 
family structures, and existed ostensibly for the defense against the Turk-
ish threat, but always with the parallel function of securing Hungary 
against rebellion.527 
Holding all this together was the central officer corps under the command 
of the Aulic War Council. Following the Thirty Years’ War, where the 
powerful commander Wallenstein was perceived to be threatening the re-
gime, the Habsburgs kept close control over the high command. The po-
sition of Commander-in-Chief was cast only upon trusted figures, or kept 
within the royal family - with dynastic considerations sometimes out-
weighing the question of experience.528 Moreover, high offices were peo-
pled by men from outside the Habsburg dynastic realms, in an effort to 
secure their lack of local attachment.529 
As happened with the rest of the state apparatus, from the 1740’s military 
administration was subjected to a series of reforms. Again, these were lim-
ited to the central lands of Austria and Bohemia, though with the addition 
of the strategically important southern Military Border. Here, the admin-
istration of army recruitment, supply and lodging were centralized, and 
conscription expanded in order to secure more recruits for the army. A 
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reorganization of officer recruitment and education also took place, with 
the effect of instituting a new elite group of ennobled, educated and mili-
tarized lower officers.530 The reforms succeeded in centralizing control of 
important parts of army maintenance, while other parts were left decen-
tralized. 
Summary 
Over the 16th and 17th centuries, the Habsburg Empire changed under 
pressure of war from being a disparate collection of territories and titles 
held together only by the person of the ruler, into resembling a more typ-
ical bureaucratic empire. Rule coagulated around a central court, with 
newly defined core territories increasingly subject to bureaucratic admin-
istration. A standing army was established under central control, and ex-
panded greatly through especially the 18th century. Resource extraction 
was simultaneously intensified to pay for it. Even though the central bu-
reaucracy was strengthened, and the scope of state power much expanded, 
rule remained based on local powerholders throughout the state, at the 
ground level through lords, or through regional Estates, with the upper 
bureaucracy consigned to a function of inspection and oversight. 
Conclusion 
What are we to make of this comparison between the central states of 
Qing China, France and the Habsburg Empire? The first conclusion to 
draw is that broad, generalized notions of Europe being ruled by modern 
states, as opposed to a traditional state in China, do not offer much insight 
on state formation in the 17th and 18th centuries. When we look at specific 
aspects of the state, such as tax structure or bureaucratic structure, no clear 
uniform divide between East and West is obvious. In some cases, the di-
vide is completely incongruent with traditional expectations – for example, 
in the recruitment of officials, China and the Habsburg Empire seem to 
have developed fairly meritocratic practices, whereas France practiced a 
venal system. Should we conclude that in this respect, the Chinese state 
was more modern than the French? This would, in my opinion, be absurd, 
and so should it seem when claims of modernity are liberally cast about 
regarding developments in the European states. Instead of applying broad 
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categories of modernity and tradition to states in this period, we must an-
alyze specific questions of converging and diverging developments, and 
relate them to concrete dynamics of pre-modern state formation.531 
Absolutism and the bureaucratic-imperial model 
The debates regarding the applicability of the concept of absolutism in 
Europe are the result of the unfortunate modernocentric implications of 
the term.  The notion of an all-powerful ruler capable of ruling alone with-
out recourse to local elites is a fiction in a pre-modern context, and rightly 
deserves to be criticized and ultimately abandoned. But the uncertainty as 
to how we can then characterize the states that developed in Europe in 
late pre-modernity has resulted in a number of typologies which seem not 
to be very fruitful. The ‘Dynastic State’ suggested by Rowlands seems not 
to capture the growing permanence of state institutions as distinct from 
the ruling family that developed precisely in this period, and the ‘Baroque 
State’ suggested by Campbell seems a bit too narrow and provincial.532  
What we see in this period, I suggest, is the appropriation or development 
of the bureaucratic-imperial model of rule in France and the Habsburg 
Empire, which therefore represents a degree of convergence between 
these and China. The bureaucratic-imperial model developed here incor-
porates most of what we understand of absolutism, but without its moder-
nocentric problems, and at the same time incorporates newer revisions to 
the picture. An outline of the model could be presented as follows: (1) the 
ruler is theoretically granted absolute power, but is simultaneously con-
fined by expectations of conformity with fundamental laws, not in the 
sense of a constitution, but by his role as part of the cosmic order. (2) Rule 
is structured in a series of concentric rings around the court as a perma-
nent center of power, with decreasing central control further from the 
center. (3) The core areas of the state are ruled by a somewhat abstract 
bureaucracy, while governance in more peripheral areas is delegated to 
semi-autonomous local elites. (4) Income derives from taxation of primar-
ily landed wealth. (5) Military power is projected by a standing army under 
bureaucratic control from the center. 
Seeing the states that developed in continental Europe in late pre-moder-
nity as instances of bureaucratic empires serves to conceptually unite Eur-
asian history of state formation. One could say that Europe’s position of 
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uniqueness is moved back in history to the middle ages, with its extreme 
diffusion of sovereignty among Church, Emperor, princes and lords. In 
late pre-modernity, this special position was gradually eroded by the es-
tablishment of bureaucratic-imperial states, and the locus of sovereignty 
was slowly unified in the rulers of these states.533 In this, they came to 
resemble other Eurasian bureaucratic empires, among them Qing China. 
The appropriateness of using the Chinese imperial system as a model for 
France and the Habsburg Empire is supported by the inspiration of Chi-
nese models of rule to contemporary state thinkers connected to the re-
gimes. This is not to argue that the direct influence of the Chinese example 
was crucial to this development. Far from it, idealizations of the Chinese 
state was used to provide input to essentially European discussions of state 
power, and their influence remained limited. But the mere fact that the 
Chinese model could be thought of as an inspiration for European rulers, 
and this by many influential thinkers, shows that the imperial model was 
eminently present in the European context. 
The fiscal-military state 
Concomitant with this convergence on the bureaucratic-imperial state 
form, we can observe a clear divergence between the European states and 
the Qing state is in the scope of military mobilization, and the related in-
tensification of resource extraction to fund it. After a drastic period of 
intensification in the 17th century in the case of France, and the 18th cen-
tury in the case of the Habsburg Empire, both these states attained a de-
gree of resource extraction nearing five times the amount of grain equiva-
lents per capita as that of the Qing state. This development was closely 
coupled with a spectacular growth in army sizes in France and the Habs-
burg Empire, where the number of soldiers similarly reached levels per 
capita roughly five times greater than in the Qing. 
These quite extreme levels of resource extraction and military mobilization 
attained by France and the Habsburg Empire has rightly been recognized 
as one of the most central developments of the European state in late pre-
modernity. In recent years, this has been discussed under the framework 
of the ‘fiscal-’ or ‘fiscal-military state’.534 Although the term ‘fiscal-military 
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state’ itself carries no implications of modernity, referring only to the abil-
ity of a state to tax its population and fight wars on a large scale, it has 
come to be “regarded by many as the key to comprehending the transition 
from old regime to modernity.”535 In this interpretation, the constant mil-
itary competition between European states forced them to continually im-
prove their capacities, which gradually led them to develop modern bu-
reaucracies. 
Our comparison reveals at least two problems with this view. Firstly, the 
bureaucracies developed in France and the Habsburg Empire to extract 
resources appear very far from being modern in any sense. They were 
enormously dependent on local powerholders, chaotically organized, 
semi-patrimonial, and differentiated across the states’ territories. In many 
cases, augmentation of resource extraction was coupled with devolution 
of central power rather than the opposite. And secondly, we do find some-
thing structurally resembling a long-standing fiscal-military state in China, 
even if operating at a markedly reduced level of intensity compared to 
Europe.536 
More broadly, the basic characteristics of the fiscal-military state, a state 
that taxes its population in order to feed its armies, seems to fit many states 
in history, especially imperial states. Again, the militarily feeble domain 
states of medieval Europe are the great outliers here. What is distinctive 
about late pre-modern European states is a question of quantity, not qual-
ity. Resource extraction and military mobilization were in 17th- and 18th-
century Europe driven to levels of intensity not seen before, but only 
through an intensification of essentially pre-modern practices. The theory 
of modernization by militarization has yet to answer at what point quanti-
tative change turns qualitative, and by which mechanisms. 
Stability and state dynamics 
Seeing the developments in France and the Habsburg Empire through the 
lens of the Qing state suggests a different perspective. First we must repeat 
that the central ‘goal’ of the pre-modern state is stability. Stability is gen-
erally what guarantees a regime’s survival, not modernization or change. 
Coming back to the analogy with evolution in the biological realm, evolu-
tionary success is governed by the general law of “survival of the stable”, 
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rather than “survival of the fittest”.537 The evolutionary analogy is apt, as 
pre-modern states are not as ‘designed’ as they seem – the pattern of sat-
isficing behavior that characterizes government means that it is primarily 
the local environment of a state that is important for its form.  
The stability of a state is threatened by internal forces – local powerholders 
seeking to undermine the state, split it up, or replace who holds power – 
as well as by external forces – other states who seek to conquer it. There 
exists a real tradeoff in the solution to these problems: internal security 
requires the diffusion of power away from any centers of control apart 
from the ruler, and necessitates as little an imposition of the state on local 
society as possible, in order to avoid popular and elite discontent. External 
security requires the opposite – the creation of effective armies which act 
as secondary centers of power as well as large impositions of the state in 
order to garner the resources needed to feed them. Moreover, a larger local 
presence of the state requires compromise with local powerholders, who 
thereby compromise central control. 
The Qing state, as the uncontested superpower of its region, is an example 
of a state strongly privileging internal security over external security, as no 
real external threats emerged before the 19th century. In contrast, France 
and the Habsburg Empire existed in a constant state of military competi-
tion. As both states built up their capacities to meet external threats, they 
at every turn encountered problems with internal stability, and were re-
peatedly forced to make concessions to secondary powerholders. The 
price the French and Habsburg rulers paid for increased military capacity 
was constant negotiation and an inherent instability of the regimes. 
Could this dynamic of militarization and increased state capacity continue 
indefinitely? Not without the technologies of modernity. The French state 
by the 18th century seems to have hit some kind of ceiling in its capacity 
for resource extraction and military mobilization. When the Habsburg 
Empire by the late 18th century finally attained the same level of militari-
zation as France, attempts at further reform quickly ended in failure. This 
could suggest that both states were near the far end of the spectrum of 
militarization possible with pre-industrial means. Any movement beyond 
this would have disastrous results for the stability of the system, as it in 
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fact did during the following revolutionary era, where the unification of 
Europe was nearly achieved. 
This insight has consequences for how we understand the European dy-
namic of state formation in late pre-modernity. As an inherently unstable 
dynamic, it could continue only up to a point without collapsing. Tilly has 
noted how interstate competition reduced the number of European poli-
ties from thousands to tens over the course of the centuries.538 If contin-
ued further, this number would be brought sufficiently low to make inter-
nal security a more pressing problem, which then would result in de-mili-
tarization and reduction of the scope of the state. This was in fact what 
happened in China at the end of the period of the Warring States (475-221 
BC), when the multistate system collapsed into an empire. 
The presence of such a dynamic of interstate competition in late pre-mod-
ern Europe was unusual, but it was not unique to world history. At various 
points in time we can observe similar dynamics of interstate competition 
leading to the buildup of fiscal-military states. Apart from in Warring 
States China, these dynamics have been observed in the period leading up 
to the establishment of the Roman Empire, and again in the late Roman 
Empire, in Southern Song China, and undoubtedly could be found in 
many other times and places.539 In all these cases, the dynamic eventually 
collapsed, and in none of them did it result in the formation of modern 
states. 
In reality, the multistate system in Europe did of course not collapse, alt-
hough it came close to during the Napoleonic Wars. In the 19th century, 
the flurry of technologies associated with modernity came into use, dras-
tically altering the dynamics of state power. What I would argue is that the 
temporal conjunction in Europe of the fiscal-military dynamic with the 
breakthrough of modernity does not necessarily imply a causal relation-
ship between the two. The fiscal-military dynamic did not in any direct 
manner bring forth the technological and scientific breakthroughs of the 
industrial revolution.540 It brought significant change, but not moderniza-
tion. It was, in short, a dynamic which can be contained within a pre-mod-
ern framework of state formation.  
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Traditional Elites 
Die vernünftigste und weiseste Staatsverfassung auf unsrer ganzen Kugel, wovor ich 
die Sinesische ohne Bedenken erkläre, weiß von keinen erblichen Adel. 
The most reasonable and wise constitution on our globe, which I unhesitatingly declare 
the Chinese to be, does not know a hereditary nobility. 
- Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi, Vergleichungen, 1762 
 
Through most of the recent century and a half, a fairly negative view of 
the traditional landed elites in 17th- and 18th-century Europe and China 
has prevailed. In the dominant modernocentric narratives, whether Whig 
or Marxist, the old elites were poised as obstacles to modernity, destined 
to give way to the modern bourgeoisie. Their association with tradition 
ensured that a number of negative characteristics were ascribed to them: 
conservative, unproductive rentiers, stuck in an unhelpful worldview 
oblivious to the changes of the world. 
In Europe, interpreted through a framework of gradual modernization, 
the nobility was seen as in decline, becoming increasingly irrelevant to a 
society dominated by the twin engines of modernization, the capitalist eco-
nomic system and the leviathan of the modern state.541 Particularly asso-
ciated with this view is Norbert Elias, who in The Court Society described 
the French nobility as trapped in the ‘gilded cage’ of Versailles, removed 
from the exercise of power.542 In China, conversely, the lack of moderni-
zation was often attributed to the continued dominance of the traditional 
elites, the gentry. This view was prevalent already from the time of Weber, 
who attributed China’s stagnation to its lack of a bourgeoisie and the con-
tinuous rule of an unchanged traditional elite.543 This picture conforms to 
the pattern we have observed in the previous chapters. Tradition is 
equated with stagnation and lack of change, and development is equated 
with modernization. 
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Fortunately, since the 1970’s the European nobility has been the object of 
renewed interest, which has resulted in a strong revisionist critique of their 
traditional image. It is now broadly accepted that the European nobility 
retained its influence and power throughout late pre-modernity and even 
well into the 19th century.544 As we have already noted in the previous 
chapter, it is now recognized that the absolutist states emerged through 
cooperation with the old elites, rather than supplanting them.545 Also in 
the economic sphere it is now noted that the nobility remained powerful, 
both by their continued dominance of landed wealth and by increasing 
economic relations with the state and the markets.546 
The persistence of traditional elites in Europe was thus at least partly the 
result of their changing with the times. This fact is unavoidably interpreted 
by some as evidence of the nobility as a modernizing force.547 Instead, I 
argue, this understanding can be used to explore the dynamics of elite for-
mation in late pre-modernity, independent of any modernizing framework. 
Seeing European elites through the prism of the late pre-modern Chinese 
elites, which were not as unchanging as earlier scholarship believed them 
to be, illuminates the common dynamics through which state building and 
commercialization in the late pre-modern world were central in shaping 
the dynamics of elite formation in both East and West. 
Qing elites – civil and military 
The process of elite formation in Qing China has been the subject of com-
paratively little research by Western scholars due to long-standing notions 
of the unity, permanence, and lack of dynamic potential of the dominant 
elites in China. Enough work, however, has been done to show that these 
notions fail to capture essential aspects of the functioning and develop-
ment of social elites of the Qing dynasty. 
The structure of Qing elites may be illuminated by the framework briefly 
outlined by Ernest Gellner in his 1983 book Nations and Nationalism (see 
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fig. 16).548 The vast majority of people in the pre-industrial world, includ-
ing the Qing Empire, lived as agricultural producers in communities for 
the most part isolated from each other. In China proper, these could be 
thought of as the ‘standard marketing communities’ of around 7-8,000 in-
dividuals mentioned in a previous chapter.549 Elite groups in society trans-
cended these isolated communities by participating in a literary high cul-
ture, which bound together and integrated elites across a large territory, 
while simultaneously excluding most of the population from participation 
due to the widespread illiteracy of pre-industrial society. In the terms of 
Michael Mann, participating in the organizational networks that cut across 
local communities enabled elites to “organizationally outflank” local net-
works of power, thereby maintaining their privileged status.550 
  
Fig. 16: Gellner’s Model of Social Structure in Agrarian Societies 
Source: Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 9 
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Three largely separate groups can be said to constitute the Qing elites.551 
The first is the imperial family, the Manchu clan known as the Aisin Gioro. 
The second is the chiefly military caste of Manchus and bannermen, de-
scended from the Qing conquest armies. The third is the Chinese Confu-
cian scholars known as the literati or the gentry. The ideology and struc-
ture of each of these differed markedly, and the imperial court related to 
each through simultaneous expressions of the Qing as a patrimonial family, 
a Manchu regime, and a Confucian dynasty.552 In the following, I will by-
pass the imperial family due to its relatively small size, and focus solely on 
the Gentry and Bannermen. 
The Gentry 
The social group most often referred to when speaking of late pre-modern 
Chinese elites is the gentry. This was the social class from which the im-
perial officials were drawn, and which constituted the core of local elites 
in most of the Qing Empire. There has been some disagreement in the 
literature over whether the basis of gentry power either derived from their 
role as state officials, or from their economic dominance, i.e. their role as 
landowners. Older important works such as those by Ho Ping-Ti and 
Chung-li Chang focused solely on degree-holders, and thus came to stress 
state-elite relations.553 Conversely, Marxist scholars have focused on the 
gentry as a landowning class.554 In reality, the two forms of dominance, 
political and economic, were closely intertwined – economic power was a 
prerequisite for political power, which conversely guaranteed the mainte-
nance of economic power. In any case, the formation and organization of 
the gentry was closely connected to developments in both state power and 
economy. Thus the developments sketched in the previous chapters – the 
increased commercialization of the economy and the increasingly lean 
state structure – bore with them changes in gentry society. While remem-
bering the interdependence of political and economic aspects, we will here 
first focus on the political role of the gentry, and secondly the economic 
basis for its dominance. 
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The defining role of the state 
One of the central practices of empire is the production of hierarchy.555 
To some degree, the state has the power to define social hierarchies and 
back them up with coercive power. This power is not absolute, as it is 
dependent on the societal acceptance of the defined hierarchy, which 
therefore cannot deviate too much from already established structures. 
Thus, the strong role of the Qing state in defining elites was the result of 
a long, gradual development, stretching back to the first millennium.556 
Before 750, China was mainly ruled by aristocratic, hereditary elites.557 
During the Song dynasty (960-1279) and after, these became increasingly 
replaced by the gentry, Confucian scholars recruited through a civil service 
examination system gradually constructed and maintained by the state. 
Over the period from the Song and stretching into the Qing dynasty, the 
meritocratic aspects of the examination system continued to be strength-
ened, and it became the only major route to official privilege and state 
office.558 
By the time of the Qing, the examination system was central to the ex-
tremely formalized hierarchy of Chinese society. Examinations were held 
at a number of different levels, from local through provincial and metro-
politan to palace examinations, with each level being associated with a for-
mal degree guaranteeing a certain level of social prestige. The most im-
portant of these degrees in defining social stratification, however, were the 
lowest and highest degrees. The lowest degree of ‘Licentiate’ (Shengyuan) 
was of tremendous importance as it brought with it the official designation 
of gentry.559 This designation secured a number of privileges, most im-
portantly partial exemption from taxation and the right to commute cor-
poral punishments.560 But of equal importance was the fact that it brought 
access to the network of Confucian elites spanning the country.561 The 
highest degree of ‘Advanced Scholar’ (Jinshi) was important insofar as it 
opened the door to appointment in the imperial bureaucracy, which 
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brought major power, prestige, and wealth. Within the bureaucracy, a fur-
ther well-defined hierarchy of 19 ranks established where on the ladder of 
prestige and authority anyone was located in relation to everyone else.562 
The Qing state was thus central to the definition of who belonged to the 
recognized elite, and what formal privileges that entailed. The meritocratic 
examination system was ideal for the state, as it made political power de-
pendent on the grace of the central state and thereby impeded the buildup 
of alternative centers of patrimonial political power. 
Examinations and elite culture 
Apart from functioning as a system of recruitment of officials and distri-
bution of privilege, the examination system was a central tool for shaping 
an empire-wide elite culture, which bound the realm together as a unified 
polity. This was, as in the Gellner model, a high culture which was hori-
zontally inclusive, but vertically exclusive – spanning the entire empire, 
but restricted to encompass only a narrow part of population.563 
The establishment of a curriculum necessary to master for all examination 
students resulted in a standardization of high culture to an impressive de-
gree by pre-modern standards.564 This was done by sustaining a classical 
canon of literature, the Confucian ‘classics’ as well as certain canonical 
commentaries on these. The stable nature of the canon created common 
reference points for all participants in the culture, enabling shared under-
standing. The examination system likewise sustained a common language, 
classical Chinese, which enabled people from all over the empire to com-
municate. Based on ancient Chinese writing, classical Chinese was a fixed, 
dead language far removed from any vernacular – as it belonged to no 
local group in particular, it belonged equally to everybody who mastered 
it. The horizontally inclusive aspects of Chinese elite culture are also evi-
dent in the system of quotas established for examination candidates. To 
ensure that no region or local groups should dominate, each province was 
given a quota of degrees to bestow on local candidates. Quotas were sim-
ilarly in place for ethnic groups, guaranteeing the three ruling groups of 
Manchu, Mongol and Chinese a degree of representation. Various non-
Chinese ‘minorities’ in the provinces were also given quotas in order to 
                                              
562 Watt, The District Magistrate, 20–1. 
563 For an exploration of these aspects of high culture in a comparative perspective, see 
Johanning, “Reading the Signs.” 
564 Elman, “The Social Roles of Literati,” 364–5. 
177 
 
facilitate their integration into the Chinese cultural sphere.565 In principle, 
Chinese elite culture was thus open to anybody, regardless of ethnic or 
geographical origins. 
As much as Confucian culture was horizontally inclusive, it acted as an 
exclusionary mechanism for producing and reinforcing vertical hierarchies. 
In a society without public schooling, and basic literacy hence scarce, any 
written culture excludes a large majority of the population. This was true 
for Qing China as well, even if literacy rates were relatively high by pre-
industrial standards.566 The requirement of classical Chinese proficiency 
exacerbated this fact. In practice, the examination system was only open 
to families who had the financial resources to pay for the education of 
their male children, as well as the cultural capital necessary to ensure suc-
cess.567 In the 18th century, degree holders numbered around 750,000-
1,000,000, only a fraction of a percent of the population. Even when in-
cluding their families, the numbers amount only to 1.3% of the popula-
tion.568 
On top of this, there existed a large group of educated people, who nev-
ertheless had failed the examinations. This was a substantial group, as in-
tense competition meant that only 1.5% of the candidates passed any given 
entry level examination.569 Numbers are hard to come by, but Elman esti-
mates a pool of around two million candidates existed by 1800.570 These 
would have been educated, and in that sense able to participate in elite 
networks and culture, but without attaining the privilege and prestige of 
an official designation as gentry. We will come back to these later. 
Including candidates and degree-holders, the examination system thus 
reached some two to three million people in total at any given time. This 
made it a powerful tool of ideological control on the part of the state. 
Confucian ideology was closely entwined with the legitimacy of the state, 
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and by sponsoring Confucianism the state ensured ideological stability and 
its own legitimacy.571  
Gentry as state agents 
The relationship between state and gentry was one of mutual assistance. 
While the gentry provided legitimacy and officials to the state, the state 
provided privilege and wealth to the gentry. Apart from the already men-
tioned tax reduction and freedom from physical punishment, the gentry 
gained power by participating in governance throughout the provinces. 
With the state being as thin on the ground as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, many tasks of local governance was thrust in the hands of the 
local gentry. The practice of gentry involvement in governance has been 
described by Susan Mann, following Weber, as “liturgical governance”.572 
For the most part, public projects were funded, and controlled, by local 
gentry. Whenever the magistrate needed some large project done, such as 
a construction project, he would ask local gentry to contribute financially, 
and ultimately direct the whole process. The gentry funded and ran a host 
of public institutions, such as local schools, disaster relief, public granaries, 
examination halls, public temples as well as local militia.573 While this nat-
urally cost the gentry substantial amounts of money, it also reinforced their 
power over local society. The gentry also provided consultation to the 
magistrates whenever they needed something done, as practically nothing 
could be accomplished without their help. 
Acting as intermediaries between the state and local society offered ample 
opportunity for enrichment. Though this was not officially sanctioned, 
gentry often acted as tax collectors for the local peasants, using their su-
perior status to pay lower tax rates while keeping the difference. Gentry 
also acted as sham holders of peasant-owned land, paying reduced tax 
rates and splitting the difference with the peasants in question.574 It is also 
not hard to see how control over public resources such as irrigation facil-
ities or public granaries could be used to further one’s own interest in local 
society. 
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Seen in a broader perspective, the relationship between state and elite was 
stable, because their interests were aligned. The state guaranteed a promi-
nent role for the gentry in local society and the bureaucracy in return for 
dynastic loyalty. Otherwise it generally left the local power relationships of 
the gentry alone. For the gentry, power was more easily attained through 
cooperation and involvement with the state than without it, so through 
most of the period, very little practical opposition existed to imperial 
rule.575 
Elite economics 
For many observers, the political role of the gentry has appeared so central 
to their existence that the economic basis of their dominance has been 
relatively overlooked. But as we have seen, entry into the examinations 
required considerable financial and cultural resources, and millions of peo-
ple apart from the gentry had the wherewithal to compete for degrees, 
though they ultimately failed. It is therefore important to look to this larger 
group of people from whom the gentry was drawn. 
The first thing to note when we look at the economic background of the 
gentry is the great diversity of local contexts from which the elites sprang. 
Some came from families of local strongmen, some came from military 
backgrounds, some had mercantile roots, and so on.576 This makes sense 
in a Gellnerian perspective – as soon as we look beneath the layer of Con-
fucian culture, diversity rules. Some general statements, though, can be 
drawn from the literature. First of all, we must affirm the central im-
portance of land ownership to the maintenance of elite status. This is not 
immediately obvious due to the prevalent practice in China of partible in-
heritance. Wealth amassed in a family had to be shared between all male 
offspring, thus strongly inhibiting the accumulation of large, patrimonial 
estates such as those seen in Europe. However, following the work of 
Hilary Beattie, the central role of land ownership to the maintenance of 
elite status has come to be more recognized.577 What Beattie and subse-
quent scholarship has found is that elite groups, broadly understood as 
locally leading lineages, followed a long-term strategy of acquiring land and 
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investing in education of their male children, often with considerable suc-
cess. By continually plowing profits back into land and education in the 
hopes of a family member attaining an examination degree, elite families 
could retain their dominant position in their local societies for centuries.578 
Landownership thus acted as a material basis for education, and the inter-
mittent production of degree-holders facilitated further economic gains. 
As landownership was to a considerable degree commercialized, land be-
ing frequently and freely traded on the market, local elites acted more like 
investors or commercial brokers than feudal landlords. The 17th and 18th 
centuries saw the advance of landlord absenteeism in commercialized ar-
eas, where landowning elites increasingly resided in cities, contributing to 
breaking down the distinction between merchant and gentry landowner-
ship.579 Already by the Ming dynasty, formal exclusion of Merchant fami-
lies from the examination system had ended, providing opportunities for 
those to enter the elite as well.580 Gentry culture, of course, did not remain 
unchanged by commercialization either. A number of studies have docu-
mented the emergence of a vibrant material culture during the late Ming 
and early Qing dynasties. As a response to the growing commercialization, 
opportunities for luxury consumption expanded and came to play a 
stronger role in elite interaction.581 It thus should come as no surprise that 
gentry also participated in other commercial ventures, such as trade or fi-
nance. Commercial wealth, in fact, seems to have played a large and grow-
ing role in attaining elite status.582 This fact contrasts clearly with the quite 
negative appraisals of merchant activity often found in Confucian circles. 
Merchants were often officially disparaged, and their profit-seeking atti-
tude disdained, in contrast to the official extolling of the virtues of agri-
cultural life. This attitude, carried on from ancient times, continued to be 
espoused all the while social and cultural distinctions between merchant 
and gentry groups were breaking down. Observing the fusion of these two 
classes, Esherick and Rankin describe the negative attitudes to merchants 
as becoming “more pro forma than real”.583 However, ‘pro forma’ disdain 
of merchants served a function of reinforcing social stratification, forcing 
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merchant groups to assimilate to gentry culture if they wished to advance 
socially. The pattern we observe is therefore one in which families often 
depended on mercantile activity to obtain wealth, but then converted their 
holdings to land and degrees once elite status was attained.584 
Military elites – Manchus and Bannermen 
The Qing dynasty has traditionally been classified as a ‘conquest dynasty’, 
as it originated in the conquest of China by the Manchu people in the mid-
17th century. This classification is both problematic and useful. It is prob-
lematic because it tends to obscure the fact that all Chinese dynasties were 
established by conquest by some elite group who subsequently came to 
rule over others. On the other hand, it is useful because in the Qing case, 
China was conquered by a non-Han group holding itself to be ethnically 
distinct from the Chinese, and who was using this ethnic distinction as a 
tool of elite formation and imperial control. 
Simplified views of clear-cut ethnic distinctions between Chinese and 
Manchus have long ago been abandoned. It is by now commonplace to 
see ethnic identities as socially constructed phenomena, and this holds for 
the Manchus as well. The term ‘Manchu’ as a common identity to embrace 
all (formerly) Jurchen tribal peoples was only used from 1635 as part of 
the state-making initiatives of successive Qing monarchs before their con-
quest of China.585 Manchu identity was thus from the beginning tightly 
connected to the ruling strategies of the Qing state, although with a basis 
in already existing identities. After the Qing conquest, Manchu identity 
was politically maintained and used as a tool of social differentiation, 
which facilitated Qing rule.586 
Machu identity was closely connected with the Banner system. The entire 
conquest population, which consisted of Manchus, Mongols, and ethnic 
Chinese, were organized into military-political units known as the Banners. 
These were multifaceted institutions of military origin, delimiting an ex-
clusive, hereditary caste of warriors tied to the Qing regime.587 Given that 
all Manchus were part of the Banner system, ‘Manchuness’ was in practice 
defined by membership in the banners, and over time, the distinctions be-
tween Manchu and Bannerman became somewhat muddy, leading large 
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numbers of Chinese and Mongol bannermen to be reclassified as Manchu 
or at least treated as such.588 
Organized as a military force, the Bannermen were confined to garrisons 
spread out over the empire, physically separated from the rest of society. 
In this way they could act as the military backbone of the imperial state, 
and were ideally kept from developing local ties, which would compromise 
their loyalty to the state. Maintaining their total separation from the sur-
rounding society was of course impossible, and successive emperors often 
worried about the loss of the supposedly “old traditions of the Man-
chus”.589 Given the perceived threats to the separate identity of the Man-
chus, the state gradually enforced a stricter observation of boundaries, by 
regulating a formalized “Manchu” cultural education and compiling gene-
alogies of Banner descent by the Banner households.590 
As an elite group, the Bannermen enjoyed a number of privileges. First of 
all, every Bannerman received a monthly rice and silver stipend. Secondly, 
Bannermen had preferential access to government positions through a 
system of deliberately biased quotas, with the banner presence being 
greater in the higher rungs of the imperial government.591 Thirdly, having 
a distinct legal status, Bannermen were immune to civil prosecution and 
often treated leniently in the military judicial system. Bannermen were thus 
judicially, economically and politically privileged by the state. 
In spite of their privileged status, Bannermen were far from universally 
well off. As the total number of Bannermen grew in step with the rest of 
the population, common resources had to be shared among more people, 
and individual stipends diminished. However, in spite of numerous indi-
vidual cases of poverty, the Bannermen remained a privileged group 
throughout the Qing, producing most of the high government officials 
and retaining their judicial and economic advantages. While the idealized 
picture of the Bannermen as a pure warrior caste untainted by Chinese 
society and living frugally was challenged by reality, the Banner system 
retained its importance. This was because the distinction between Banner-
men and Chinese was a political one, and thus not dependent on any ‘real’ 
difference between individuals of the two groups. Political stratification 
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was upheld as a tool of imperial Manchu control, and the distinctions mat-
tered even though they could not be backed up by cultural differences and 
economic superiority. 
Summary 
The Qing state maintained a tight hold on its social elites through the 17th 
and 18th centuries. The Chinese civil elites, the gentry, were established 
centuries earlier as a state-oriented and -created service elite. The gentry 
participated in an empire-wide elite culture patronized by the imperial 
court, which acted as a tool for both empire-wide integration and vertical 
hierarchization. The political and economic dominance of the gentry was 
mutually reinforcing, in a pattern where landownership provided the basis 
for political power, which in turn guaranteed continued wealth. Commer-
cial wealth often entered into the system, but was generally transferred 
into land and political office. The Qing Bannermen constituted a politi-
cally and ethnically defined military elite, privileged and provided for by 
the state. The interdependence of Bannermen and state was extremely 
close – Bannermen manned many of the top official posts, but were sim-
ultaneously utterly dependent on the state for their privileged existence, as 
they had no autonomous base of power to rely on. 
French nobility between the sword and the robe 
Assessments of the social and political elite of 17th and 18th-century France, 
the nobility, have inevitably been colored by their unhappy fate in the 
French Revolution. Traditional scholarship has treated the nobility as an 
outdated force, destined to crumble. Elias saw the fate of the nobility 
sealed by the growing power of the state, as they became entrapped in the 
‘gilded cage’ of the court at Versailles, while Tocqueville noted their loss 
of vitality and political authority and eventual assimilation into the bour-
geoisie.592 Marxist scholars have similarly interpreted the nobility as being 
outflanked by capitalism and the bourgeoisie.593 Since the 1970’s a wave 
of revisionist scholarship has successfully challenged the narrative of de-
cline, and placed the nobility at the forefront of modern developments – 
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in the words of Jay M. Smith, the nobles were “as modern and progressive 
as anyone.”594 
However, by using the Chinese case as a basis for comparison, we can get 
a different perspective from the traditional dichotomy of decline versus 
modernization, and interpret what we observe as an example of pre-mod-
ern change largely driven by similarly pre-modern processes of state for-
mation and commercialization.  
State-elite formation 
The meaning and significance of ‘nobility’ in France was a product of the 
changing times, and the growing presence of the state was a decisive factor 
for what it meant to be noble. The French state never had the degree of 
control over elite formation that the Qing did, both due to the earlier 
weakness of the state, which had left a group of autonomously established 
nobles in the provinces, and to the principle of heredity governing noble 
status. The hereditary aspect of nobility meant that even as the state took 
control over the conferment of noble status, as we will see, nobility re-
tained a feature of being in the patrimonial possession of families, which 
guaranteed a degree of independence from the state. Even so, during the 
17th and 18th centuries, the influence of the French state in elite matters 
increased greatly. 
Nobility before the formation of the bureaucratic-imperial state had been 
a somewhat loose concept about being of ‘good stock’, a title conferred 
to, or arrogated by, the leading members of society.595 Being noble meant 
having a certain lifestyle of leisure, and by ‘living nobly’ a family could 
without great trouble enter the ranks of nobility.596 From the 17th century, 
the growing state took over the function of defining and guarding the 
ranks of nobility, closing the door on the possibility of entering the nobil-
ity through mere noble living.597 
Under the bureaucratic-imperial state, nobility came to be defined more 
precisely by the state through a number of privileges given from above. 
Members of the nobility were partially or wholly exempted from a number 
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of taxes, had a number of judicial privileges, and had greater access to 
offices in government, many of which were exclusively reserved for no-
bles.598 Through state mediation, a more formalized hierarchy of noble ti-
tles was put in place, which prescribed ordered patterns of interaction be-
tween different groups.599 The state thus shaped the previously amor-
phous mass of nobles into a more well-defined corporative order spanning 
the realm, whose privileged position was guaranteed by monarchical 
power.600 
Entry into the nobility was now guarded by the state, but the state pro-
vided ample opportunity for ennoblement through state service. A num-
ber of government offices, which could be acquired through purchase, 
conferred nobility upon its holders, and this became the primary way to 
attain noble status. A large number of commoners were in this way enno-
bled, creating what came to be known as the ‘nobility of the robe’. This 
new nobility came to encompass around two-thirds of the nobility by the 
late 18th century, half of which had been ennobled only in the previous 
century.601 This naturally invited opposition from the older ‘nobility of the 
sword’, named so because they based their legitimacy on their traditional 
role as a military class. The nobility of the sword responded to the chal-
lenges of the newcomers by closing their own ranks, and developing a 
racially legitimizing ideology, on which more below. 
By thus creating an elite of officeholders, and by fashioning these into a 
formal order sustained by state power, the interests of the elite became 
more closely aligned with that of the state. The nobility became a service 
nobility, working with and through the state to maintain their positions to 
to the interest of all involved parties.602 This was what Elias and others 
interpreted as the ‘domestication of the nobility’ by the court, and this 
view has substantial merit. But it is also important to remember that the 
system was greatly beneficial to the nobles themselves. The ‘gilded cage’ 
of Versailles, in which the powerful nobles were supposedly kept to curtail 
their independence, was of course the most powerful institution of the 
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realm, and by residing there the nobility kept their hands close to the levers 
of state power. 603 In this sense, serving the state also meant serving one-
self. 
Elite economics 
Even though noble status was in itself not dependent on economic wealth, 
and a substantial proportion of the nobility led meager lives, wealth and 
status were closely intertwined.604 The relationship between wealth and 
status went both ways – status begot wealth, and wealth begot status. The 
French nobility was therefore greatly influenced by the commercialization 
of the economy, as well as by the increased participation of the state in the 
economic sphere. 
The principal source of income for the nobility was landownership, as had 
always been so. Around a quarter of the land was owned by the nobility, 
despite them constituting only about 1% of the population.605 Land was 
traditionally important to the nobility of the sword, but newly ennobled 
robes also tended to acquire landholdings, both as a source of stable prof-
its and because of the respectability they conferred upon their owners.606 
Income from land was supplemented by income from various seigneurial 
rights which came with large landholdings. Apart from receiving seigneu-
rial dues from the peasantry, various privileges connected with the sei-
gneuries, such as forestry rights etc., could be used to squeeze resources 
out of the subject population.607 Especially in highly commercialized areas 
seigneurial power was often employed to distort markets and reap sub-
stantial gains.608 Over the 17th and 18th centuries, nobles found ways to 
expand such seigneurial rights by depending on state power to back them 
up, usually by rulings of provincial courts manned by their peers.609  
Office holding represented another great source of income for the nobility. 
Having secured an office, an official received yearly payments regardless 
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of whether the office included any actual work. What could be worth more 
were the opportunities for exploiting the positions of power conferred by 
the offices.610 A third type of income came from financial activity, usually 
in the form of loans to the state.611  
In certain veins of revisionism, spearheaded by Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, 
a growing trend of commercial and industrial investment by the nobility 
has been identified and propped up as evidence that the nobles “join[ed] 
the ranks of modern capitalism, [and threw] off the weight of tradition”.612 
This is somewhat surprising in a society where nobles were by law prohib-
ited from engaging in commerce, and noble ideology looked upon mer-
chants with contempt.613 But indeed, the barrier between nobility and 
commerce was far from watertight. A number of nobles engaged in com-
mercial ventures, often using straw men to hide their tracks.614 Especially 
in the southern parts of the kingdom did nobles thus proceed, even some-
times receiving exemptions from the rule that barred them from com-
merce.615 In the end, even though numbers are hard to get at due to the 
secrecy surrounding noble commercial activity, it still appears that com-
merce remained a fringe activity among the nobility, with only a tiny mi-
nority actively engaging in it.616 
The main way we can see commercial life intruding on the nobility was 
another – the recruitment of commercial families into the noble ranks. As 
ennobling offices were up for sale, large amounts of commercial money 
was plowed into these, as families with commercial backgrounds sought 
to enter the political elite. This form of social advancement was normally 
coupled with investments in land, as land remained the ideologically 
‘proper’ economic basis for the nobility.617 In this way we see the same 
movement of money and people into the elite as we observed for the Qing 
– commercial wealth is turned into landed wealth as commercial agents 
become part of the political elite. This resulted in a replenishment of the 
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elite from other sectors of society, even as it upheld the formal distinctions 
between orders. 
The flow of commercial wealth and people into the nobility, along with 
state service becoming a primary entry route, also had effects on noble 
culture. An increasing prevalence of absentee landownership, with nobles 
preferring their town residences to their landed estates, meant that urban 
(‘bourgeois’) culture and values increasingly seeped into the nobility.618 As 
state service in the civil administration became a larger part of what it 
meant to be noble, educational ideals moved away from purely military 
ones to encompass classical, humanist learning, which would enable par-
ticipation in the culture of public power.619 And as the work of Elias has 
shown, court life resulted in the increased valuation of state service and 
strict self-control, at the expense of earlier warrior values.620 We thus see 
a mix of what has in Marxist writing been described as the “embourgeoise-
ment” of the nobility and the “féodalisation” of the commercial class.621 
Certain elements of urban culture entered the nobility as it changed in the 
face of state formation and commercialization, but the nobility retained, 
or even strengthened, its role as a privileged elite group rooted in their 
dominance of the land. 
Reshaping a military caste 
The warrior ethos of the old nobility of the sword did not entirely disap-
pear in the face of the previously noted changes, but came to be redefined 
and retooled for the changing times. Challenged by the growing power of 
the nobility of the robe, an ideological reaction developed among the no-
bility of the sword. This reaction was manifested as a stronger focus on 
genealogy and descent as legitimization of noble status. The nobility of the 
sword was reenvisioned as a true birth nobility, presented as the descend-
ants of the Frankish conquerors of old, while the rest of the population 
was supposedly descended from the indigenous Gallic population. The 
Sword nobility thus presented themselves as racially distinct from the rest 
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of the population, robes included.622 This racial ideology has been de-
scribed as “the last bastion of the lineage nobles, who had lost the mastery 
of their social reproduction in face of the affirmation of the authority of 
the state”.623 
However, this slightly derogative view misses the point that it fitted well 
with institutional developments in the 18th century French army. A num-
ber of army reforms, most notably the Ségur Reform touched upon in the 
previous chapter, worked to limit the recruitment of military officers to 
old noble families and those with a military history. In institutional practice, 
the old nobility of the sword was thereby reshaped into something resem-
bling a military caste.624 From the point of view of the state, this had the 
effect of diminishing the influence of money in military organization, in-
stead favoring professionalism.625 The military ethos of this caste was re-
shaped as to conform to the ‘authority of the state’. The ideology of noble 
martial honor was preserved, but coupled with more ‘robe’ ideals of a no-
bility of service.626 
So, while a degree of social assimilation between sword and robe nobility 
did happen, institutional arrangements reinforced certain distinctions in 
order to preserve the ideal of a military caste untainted by the surrounding 
commercialization of society.627 As in the example of the Qing Banner-
men, formalized stratification was introduced in order to reinforce hierar-
chies under threat by commercialization and cultural assimilation. 
Summary 
Over the course of the late pre-modern period, French elites were changed 
profoundly by the rise of the bureaucratic-imperial state and the commer-
cialization of the economy. From an amorphous mass of great families, 
the nobility was turned into an elite order, defined and upheld by state 
power, which conversely drew its strength from that order. The nobility 
was thus shaped into a Gellnerian elite, which could depend on a horizon-
tally organized political and cultural framework to further its interests vis-
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à-vis local society. The growing commercialization of society simultane-
ously influenced elite culture, which developed in a more ‘bourgeois’ di-
rection. Landownership nevertheless remained the main source of income 
for the elites, though even that was also commercialized to a degree. The 
traditional military vocation of the old nobility was also refashioned into a 
more clearly defined military caste serving the state. 
The Habsburg Empire – creation of an imperial elite 
In contrast to the French nobility, the elites of the Habsburg Empire have 
always been recognized to have retained their power and independence 
throughout late pre-modernity and well into the 19th century, even in the 
face of growing state power. Their persistent domination of the agrarian 
economy through the system of seigneurial demesnes, together with con-
tinued political representation through provincial Estates guaranteed the 
dominant social role of the nobility.628 
This picture to a large degree remains valid. However, also in the Habs-
burg lands, the growing power of the state was intrinsically linked with a 
transformation in elite society and organization. This process both had 
similarities and differences with what we have observed for China and 
France, and can thus further qualify our picture of elite formation in late 
pre-modernity. 
State-elite formation 
The nobility of the Habsburg lands was a disparate group, and before the 
17th century it is doubtful whether one could really classify them as any-
thing resembling a ‘Habsburg elite’. Even as we restrict our scope to deal 
only with the nobilities of the core Habsburg territories of Austria, Bohe-
mia, and Hungary, nobilities were separately organized on territorial lines. 
This territorial division is mirrored in the scholarly literature, which simi-
larly tends to treat separately the nobilities of the various territories making 
up the Habsburg Empire. On a political level, this division persisted 
throughout our period, with the nobility of each territory oriented toward 
separate provincial Estates providing the primary link between state and 
elite. The Estates retained a strong role in the mediation of the bestowal 
(or removal) of rights, privileges and titles, and continued to act as the 
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main source of government on the ground.629 The court did therefore not 
primarily rely on a state-created ‘robe’ nobility to consolidate its power.630 
Instead, the Habsburg court based its state-making on the consolidation 
of a magnate class of wealthy and powerful landowners across its territo-
ries.  
Ever since this was first argued by Robert Evans in The Making of the Habs-
burg Monarchy, it has been recognized that the main strategy for fusing to-
gether the Empire into a single political unit was through the creation of 
an elite culture centered on the Habsburg dynasty.631 This elite or high 
culture was based on the fusion of counter-reformation Catholicism with 
dynastic loyalty to the Habsburgs as defenders of the traditional order.632 
One aspect of the importance accorded to Catholicism in the Habsburg 
high culture was the exclusion of the significant number of Protestants in 
the realm from state service, as well as the general repression of Protes-
tantism.633 When opportunity arose in Bohemia after the defeat of the Es-
tates in 1620, vast amounts of land were confiscated from Protestants and 
given to Catholic noblemen loyal to the state, providing the basis for a 
small group of Catholic magnates to dominate there.634 In Hungary, the 
state granted hereditary titles of high nobility to hitherto untitled Catholic 
magnates in an effort to bring them into the state-wide aristocracy.635   
A central aspect of the construction of a Habsburg elite culture was the 
development of a more splendid court society in Vienna around which the 
magnate class could orient themselves. Though never quite as imposing as 
the French court at Versailles, the Habsburg court provided plenty of re-
sources of both an honorific and more concrete nature to make the aris-
tocrats see value in spending increasing amounts of their time there.636 
From the late 17th century, Vienna thus became the center of aristocratic 
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life, reflected in the spree of palace-building by the magnates.637 The gath-
ering into Vienna of aristocrats from the diverse territories of the empire 
was crucial in the development of a trans-territorial ‘Habsburg’ elite cul-
ture, lessening the aristocracy’s dependence on both local-territorial and 
broader European cultural forms and identities.638 
The Habsburg court’s cultural and political patronage of the magnate class 
was coupled with the consolidation of magnate power within the state bu-
reaucracy. A relatively small group of elite families tended to monopolize 
all important positions of power in the state and all of its constituent parts, 
including provincial Estates.639 The same group also largely gained control 
over important positions in the ecclesiastical institutions, which in all im-
portant aspects acted as just another set of feudal lords.640 
In a sense, the aristocrats moving into state office constituted a partial 
development of this group into a ‘service nobility’, as office-holding within 
the state became increasingly important for them, both in terms of eco-
nomic gain and in terms of identity.641 This was furthered by the fact that 
it was often the non-inheriting younger sons of the aristocracy that held 
positions of real power, while leading aristocrats mainly confined them-
selves to more ceremonial offices.642 From the middle of the 18th century, 
the traditional nobles were increasingly joined by newly ennobled officials, 
the “nobility of letters”, created by the administrative state of Maria The-
resia and her son Joseph II.643 From the 1780’s, this included a growing 
number of people of commercial or financial families. These can be seen 
as constituting the beginnings of a Habsburg ‘nobility of the robe’. How-
ever, even though a substantial number of commoners were ennobled as 
part of government service, they generally obtained only lesser titles, and 
                                              
637 Kann, “Aristocracy in the Eighteenth Century Habsburg Empire,” 5; Krueger, Czech, 
German, and Noble: Status and National Identity in Habsburg Bohemia, 36; Melton, “The No-
bility in the Bohemian and Austrian Lands,” 196. 
638 Krueger, Czech, German, and Noble: Status and National Identity in Habsburg Bohemia, 46; 
Melton, “The Nobility in the Bohemian and Austrian Lands,” 196. 
639 Winkelbauer, “Krise Der Aristokratie?,” 329; Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, 51; 
Godsey, The Sinews of Habsburg Power, 39. 
640 Krueger, Czech, German, and Noble: Status and National Identity in Habsburg Bohemia, 50; 
Schimert, “The Early Modern Hungarian Nobility,” 219. 
641 Scott, “The Evolution of Service Nobilities,” 10–11. 
642 Kann, “Aristocracy in the Eighteenth Century Habsburg Empire,” 6–8. 
643 Melton, “The Nobility in the Bohemian and Austrian Lands,” 194–5; Evans, “The 
Nobility of Hungary in the Eighteenth Century.” 
193 
 
were never in a position to threaten the established aristocrats as power-
holders as they did in France.644 
The late pre-modern Habsburg state thus consolidated its power through 
the creation of an imperial high culture, which could transcend its internal 
territorial boundaries. Contrary to earlier nationalist interpretations of this 
phenomenon as a form of German cultural domination, or “germaniza-
tion”, the elite culture of the Habsburg Empire was far from ‘ethnic’ in 
any sense of the word, and was on the contrary theoretically open to the 
participation of all.645 The hierarchization established was precisely not 
one between ethnic cultures, but a vertical one between the high nobility 
and the rest of the population. Thus Austrians, Bohemians, Hungarians 
and others with the wealth and social positions necessary to participate in 
Habsburg elite society all did so, at the expense of localism.646 
Elite economics 
To an even larger degree than in the Chinese and French cases, the eco-
nomic dominance of the Habsburg nobility was based on landholding. In 
the core Habsburg territories, landholding patterns were characterized by 
a manorial system, where seigneurial landlords held large demesnes farmed 
by a semi-unfree peasantry who were legally obliged to work a number of 
days per week for the landlord.647 Although this system was gradually re-
formed in the context of commercialization, as we saw in chapter 3, the 
manorial structure remained the dominant form of agricultural organiza-
tion in the Habsburg lands throughout late pre-modernity. 
The political stratification between the magnate class and the lesser nobil-
ity described above was mirrored in the economic realm. Over time, land-
ownership tended to get more concentrated in the hands of relatively few 
magnate families across the Monarchy, at the expense of the lesser nobil-
ity.648 An important aspect of the aristocratic consolidation was the in-
creased establishment of entails, a legal device insuring the inalienability 
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of land from family holdings as well as instituting the practice of primo-
geniture.649 The establishment of these entails required monarchical ap-
proval, and was legally confined to the nobility, so here the state played a 
role in reinforcing the economic dominance of the politically connected 
magnate class.650 Another way in which the state furthered the economic 
interests of the magnate class was through partial tax exemptions on noble 
land, even though this exemption was not as far-reaching as in either 
France or China. Finally, positions in the top layer of officialdom could 
bring with them special privileges, such as the role of contractor for the 
imperial armies, with substantial economic benefit apart from the more 
unofficial ways of making government service remunerative.651 
A fuirther aspect in which economic relations mirrored political develop-
ments was the increasing trans-territoriality of magnate landholding, as 
aristocratic families obtained estates across the boundaries of Habsburg 
lands. This enabled the magnate class to have the right of political repre-
sentation in multiple Estates, and helped fuse the upper nobility into a 
more unified Habsburg elite.652 
Until the late 18th century, the growing commercialization of the Habsburg 
lands was generally contained within the setting of the manorial economy, 
and did therefore not obstruct the dominance of the landed elite. Rather, 
landholders profitably participated in the commercialized economy by es-
tablishing small-scale manufacture on their demesnes and using their sei-
gneurial rights to shape markets to their gain.653 This did not so much re-
flect a commercial mindset of the nobility as much as it was done with a 
more traditional, paternalistic approach.654 In the Habsburg lands, com-
mercialization did thus not to a significant degree impact traditional social 
structure, perhaps due to its lesser advance than in France and China. 
The vast estate complexes of the magnate class acted as a material base, 
which enabled the aristocracy to preserve a great deal of independence 
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from the state.655 With often thousands of families under their jurisdiction, 
estates could be small political, social, and economic worlds in their own 
right, with quasi-governmental structure, bureaucracy, courts and all.656  
The nearly autonomous nature of these estates has been described by 
Thomas Winkelbauer as “seigneurial absolutism”.657 In the late 18th cen-
tury, the reforms of Maria Theresia and Joseph II slowly began to erode 
the manorial system, but did not substantially challenge the power of the 
magnates.658 
Military elites 
The evolution of a military elite in the Habsburg Empire took a distinct 
path from what we have seen in the Chinese and French cases. The main 
reason for this was the Habsburgs’ general lack of an indigenous group 
with strong roots in a military tradition. The Habsburg nobility, especially 
the higher aristocrats, took very little interest in martial values and prac-
tices, preferring careers in the civil bureaucracy or as managers of their 
own estates. In the 17th and early 18th centuries, indigenous nobles did 
possess military offices, but mostly as possessions of prestige or as objects 
of investment, and not out of interest in or proficiency with military mat-
ters.659 Proficient military command of the Habsburg armies was instead 
procured from a large number of men from outside the core territories of 
the Empire, particularly from Italy and the German principalities.660 
By the 18th century, this lack of an indigenous military elite began to be 
seen as increasingly problematic, and by mid-century efforts were under-
taken to create such an elite almost from scratch. Since the established 
nobility could not be depended on, reforms were enacted to ensure the 
ennoblement of officers with commoner background.661 Simultaneously, 
centers of military education were instituted, which acted both as centers 
of professional learning and social disciplining of this newly created 
elite.662 
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By the end of the 18th century, a distinct military nobility had emerged, 
largely separate from the magnate class that constituted most of the civil 
and economic elite. In contrast to both China and France, this military 
elite remained necessarily open, as the Habsburgs needed newcomers to 
form its base.663 Even so, substantial and mostly successful effort was 
made to enroll the sons of officers to military academies, creating the basis 
for the emergence of regular military dynasties.664 
Summary 
The emergence of the Habsburg state coincided with the formation of a 
trans-territorial elite of immensely wealthy landowners unified and bound 
to the state by a common elite culture. This group of magnates remained 
the essential powerholders at all levels of society throughout late pre-mo-
dernity. From the mid-18th century, the formation of the Habsburg Em-
pire as a bureaucratic-imperial state resulted in the first steps of the crea-
tion of a ‘robe’ service nobility, but this remained in its infancy throughout 
the 18th century. Similarly, only in the late 18th century did commercial 
culture begin to seriously intrude in elite spheres, and then only slowly. 
Lastly, at the same time a distinct military elite began to take form. 
Conclusion 
Looking at elite formation in China, France, and the Habsburg Empire, 
we get a broad view into how late pre-modern developments in state for-
mation and commercialization, as described in previous chapters, im-
pacted and coincided with change in social stratification. Although the so-
cial, political, and economic context of elite formation differed substan-
tially between the three cases, a number of common strategies and dynam-
ics are clearly visible. 
Elites and the bureaucratic-imperial state 
The first point to note is the important role of the state in shaping elites, 
even as the elites themselves shaped the state. In all our cases, the state is 
present in defining hierarchies, guaranteeing privileges, and shaping elite 
culture. However, the degree to which the state had and enacted these 
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powers differed in relation to the degree of development of the bureau-
cratic-imperial state. 
The bureaucratic-imperial state in China was ancient and well-consoli-
dated, and this was reflected in its large degree of control over social elites. 
The civil elites in China were constituted as a service elite defined in terms 
of its relation to the state. A formalized hierarchy was in place, with every 
elite member placed in a graded system of authority, both inside the state 
bureaucracy and outside it in terms of ranked examination degrees. The 
precise nature of elite status was made concrete in terms of formal privi-
leges given by the state, as well as by the defined elite role in local govern-
ance. Consequently, Chinese elites were dependent on the state for their 
authority, privilege, and power, which made state and elite interests largely 
aligned.  
In contrast to China, France and the Habsburg Empire were still in the 
process of developing into bureaucratic-imperial states in our period. Here, 
the states had to deal with hereditary landed elites like those which had 
been removed from power in China a millennium earlier. The principle of 
heredity of elite status was never broken, but nevertheless we can observe 
movement toward the Chinese model. The time-lag of about a century we 
observed in chapter 4 between the development of the imperial-bureau-
cratic state in France and the Habsburg Empire, is also evident in the elite 
sphere – in every aspect the creation of a service elite was far more pro-
gressed in the former than in the latter, but nevertheless the two states 
moved in similar directions. The state increasingly took over the task of 
defining elite status in terms of formalized hierarchies and privileges. In 
France, a new elite group of officials ennobled by the state, the nobility of 
the robe, became increasingly prominent, both numerically and in terms 
of influence. In the Habsburg Empire, this process only took off from the 
mid-18th century onwards, and remained in its infancy throughout our pe-
riod. 
This is not to say that the French, and to a lesser degree Habsburg, elites 
became trapped in a ‘gilded cage’ by the state. Generally, elites gained im-
mensely by being connected with a newly powerful state, which reinforced 
their local power and wealth, though at the expense of a reduced auton-
omy. The state simply acted as a machine through which elites increasingly 
had to exercise their power in a more well-defined system. In that sense, 
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we can speak of the bureaucratic-imperial state as “a redeployed and re-
charged apparatus of feudal domination”, as envisioned by Perry Ander-
son.665 
Gellnerian elite culture 
Another thing to note is the role of the state in fostering a state-wide high 
culture through which it is able to counteract elite localism. Distinct elite 
cultures are of course a near-universal phenomenon, but in the context of 
the bureaucratic-imperial state and its court as the locus of elite interaction, 
the extent of the high culture tends to increasingly coincide with territorial 
boundaries of the state and be organized around the person of the Mon-
arch. To do so, it needs to be both horizontally inclusive, in order to let 
elite members from disparate territories form a unified cultural group, and 
vertically exclusive, in order to make entry into this culture attractive. 
China again provides the purest example of this, with its Confucian culture 
spread throughout the empire by way of the imperially sponsored exami-
nation system. Confucian culture was universal, in the sense that it was 
theoretically accessible to everyone, while at the same time it stressed and 
reinforced traditional social hierarchies revolving around the imperial 
throne. In this way it served to integrate elites coming from widely differ-
ent backgrounds into a single social order. 
The fostering of a distinct culture among elites was also central to state 
formation in both France and the Habsburg Empire. The evolution of 
‘court societies’ in both Paris and Vienna brought elites from all over their 
respective realms together in a single social circle centered on the mon-
archs.666 Elites thus became uprooted from their local identities and part 
of a more free-floating elite ‘aristocracy’. A part of this transition was the 
growing focus on elite education evidenced in both cases, which served to 
inculcate noble children in the culture and languages of power. In the 
Habsburg case, the other side of the coin consisted of increasingly reori-
enting elites from a more broadly European elite culture toward one more 
contained within the territory of the state. One might venture that the im-
portance placed by the French and Habsburg states in ensuring religious 
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unity was connected with the central role of Catholicism in this elite cul-
ture.667 
One could easily read into this development the beginnings of a national-
ization of culture, but this is to miss the mark. The crucial aspect to re-
member here is the vertically exclusivist nature of the established elite cul-
tures. As much as they served to integrate elites into state-wide cultural 
spheres, they served to exclude the majority of the population from par-
ticipation. Court cultures were decidedly hierarchical, and required mas-
sive economic, social, and cultural capital to master. Only in the 19th cen-
tury, with the advent of mass communication and industrialization, did 
elite culture seep into the masses, and not in a straightforward manner, as 
is clear from the later fate of the Habsburg Empire. 
Commercialization and traditional elites 
Over the 17th and 18th centuries, the growing commercialization of the 
economy impacted elites in a variety of manners. This is clearly visible in 
the French and Chinese cases, and less so in the Habsburg case, where 
commercialization had never advanced to the level of the former two so-
cieties. 
Commercialization changed landholding patterns away from a manorial, 
paternalistic structure toward land being treated as an object of commer-
cial investment. Elites were part of this change, as they moved to the cities 
and bought and sold land on the market as commercial investors. Increas-
ingly, elites diversified their investments by engaging in finance or even to 
a lesser degree put their money in commercial ventures, often through 
straw men or less privileged family members in order to avoid social 
stigma. 
At the same time, the state provided openings for commercial elites to 
enter the political elite. In China, formal exclusion from the examination 
system of men with commercial backgrounds had ended by the Ming dyn-
asty, so throughout the Qing commercial families attained elite status in 
large numbers. In France, men of commercial wealth could obtain nobility 
by purchase. The Habsburg Empire followed slowly by ennobling a few 
men with commercial backgrounds from the late 18th century. Social and 
political limitations on the commercial activity of elites generally remained 
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in place, so a family’s entry into the elite was normally preceded by divest-
ments of commercial capital as well as the covering of their commercial 
tracks. In this way, formal social stratification between landholding elites 
and commercial groups were kept in place, while also providing opportu-
nities for individual social mobility between groups. 
The influx of commercial wealth, elite urbanization, and the expanded role 
of the elites as state servitors provided the conditions for a cultural change 
among the elites in the direction of more urban or ‘bourgeois’ values. This 
is evident in the growing focus on education and literary abilities as the 
way to enter public life we see present in especially France, while Chinese 
elites had long been looking in that direction. 
Despite all this, commercialization did not change the basic fact that land-
holding still constituted the primary economic base of elite dominance. 
This is of course what we should expect given that all three societies re-
mained primarily agricultural economies. The forms of landownership 
changed, but landholding still acted as a secure investment which could 
provide a stable source of wealth. Elite society similarly remained ideolog-
ically connected to agriculture despite the disparate origins of individual 
families. Landed dominance in fact often provided the basis for the com-
mercial activities of elites, as the local positions of power afforded by their 
dominant role in agricultural society provided opportunities for shaping 
markets in their own interest. Landed and commercial wealth was there-
fore often closely intertwined with each other as well as with political 
power.668 
Caste as a tool for military professionalism 
Certain common dynamics between our three cases are also visible in the 
realm of military elites. Even though operating out of very different con-
texts, and in neither case taken to its extreme, we can observe a pattern of 
separation of civil and military elites, and the formation of a group of mil-
itary elites on caste-like lines. In China, the conquering Bannermen were 
organized as an exclusive, hereditary social group providing the military 
backbone of the Qing state. In France, as the nobility of the robe increas-
ingly dominated the civil administration, the old nobility of the sword was 
sharpened into a state-serving military caste, with the exclusion of newly 
ennobled and commoners from the officer class. In the Habsburg Empire, 
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as the old nobility dominated civil administration, a new social group of 
military elites were instituted, though this group remained substantially 
more inclusive than in either China or France. 
The overarching intention behind the emergence of all three patterns of 
military-elite formation was to ensure a professional military administra-
tion, untainted by the perceived corruptions connected with civil and com-
mercial life, and solely dedicated to military matters. In France and China, 
by the late 18th century, caste was thus seen as a perfectly acceptable solu-
tion to the problem of ensuring professionalism. If this was not so in the 
Habsburg Empire, it was only because there existed no military elite group 
that could be closed. 
Traditional elites in flux 
All in all, this comparative study of elite formation in China, France, and 
the Habsburg Empire shows a clear pattern of convergence. Differences 
of course persisted, but the general pattern is one of 1) an increasing role 
of the state in shaping elites, 2) an increasing role of the state and the court 
as a locus of elite orientation, 3) an increasing formalization and hierarchi-
zation of political elites, 4) an increasing commercialization of elite eco-
nomic activity, and 5) an increasing separation of military and civil elites 
into distinct groups. 
In all these developments, China seems to have been substantially ‘ahead’, 
though of course that term can be somewhat misleading. This points to 
an important conclusion – that we should not interpret or connect these 
phenomena with any notion of modernization. Some may have been help-
ful in, or even necessary for, subsequent modernization, but this does not 
mean that they carried any modernizing essence in themselves. 
Neither should we interpret these similar developments as global phenom-
ena of ‘early modernity’.669 Between our three cases, the timing and ad-
vance of the observed developments were substantially disjunct, some as-
pects by nearly a millennium. Mostly they grew out of internal develop-
ments, and were in any case not clearly dependent on any ‘early modern 
global connectivity’. What we observe here is rather a continuation of pre-
modern dynamics of elite formation in the context of similarly pre-mod-
ern state building and commercialization. Traditional elites were far from 
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stagnant, and acted as both the products and the agents of change through 
pre-modernity.  
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Conclusion 
En vous instruisant en philosophe de ce qui concerne ce globe, vous portez d’abord 
votre vue sur l’Orient. 
When you consider this globe as a philosopher, you first direct your attention to the 
East. 
- Voltaire, Essai sur les Mœurs, 1754 
 
In the 19th century, the world was remade. By the combined powers of 
science and industry, European societies were transformed beyond recog-
nition. And by their ensuing subjugation of the rest of civilization, either 
by military force or by the “heavy artillery” of “cheap commodity prices”, 
as Marx and Engels put it, Europeans in turn transformed the world.  
In the revolutionary fires of modernization erupting everywhere, the 
world of pre-modernity was destroyed. The economic, political, and ideo-
logical systems that had governed human civilization for millennia melted 
into air. In this process, also the Europeans’ image of their own history 
was transformed. From across this historical divide, it seemed natural to 
assume that all that had gone before was simply a prelude to the advent of 
modernity. History itself, in other words, was thus remade in the image of 
modernity. 
In this thesis, I have attempted to dig beneath the layers of modernocen-
tric history shrouding the world of pre-modernity. Through a comparative 
analysis of developments in the economic, political and social spheres in 
17th- and 18th-century China, France, and the Habsburg Empire, I have 
argued how these can be understood as the workings of essentially pre-
modern dynamics of change and stability. And I have attempted to show 
how these dynamics have been obscured by teleological assumptions aris-
ing from the modernocentric grand narrative still structuring Global- and 
World History. 
To do this, as Voltaire instructed in the above quotation, I have directed 
my attention to the East. China has, indeed, long acted as a mirror for 
European history. In the modernocentric historiography, China was often 
presented as a case of failure, a society which had had its way to modernity 
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obstructed by some detrimental social configuration or another. However, 
it was precisely the social configurations that made China appear as a fail-
ure to modern scholars that made it such a successful formation in the 
pre-modern world it inhabited. In China, we can find an instructive exam-
ple of an advanced, pre-modern society independent of any process of 
modernization. Historical scholarship of the recent decades has only be-
gun to explore the crucial implications to World History that arises from 
engaging comparatively with the history of such non-European societies. 
This thesis represents my contribution to the study of these implications. 
Modernocentrism 
To make sense of the teleological problems connected with the framing 
of world history as the origin story of modernity, I have introduced the 
concept of modernocentrism. Modernocentrism, in essence, denotes the 
tendency to measure every historical change by its relation to modernity. 
It is the sense one gets from much scholarship of ‘looking back’ from the 
precipice of modernity to determine the relevance and ultimately the 
‘meaning’ of historical phenomena, rather than looking forward from the 
events themselves. It is what makes of every economic history a history of 
capitalism, market society or the industrial revolution; of every history of 
state formation a history of the nation-state; and of every history of elites 
a history of the bourgeoisie. 
In the previous chapters, we have seen how modernocentrism has influ-
enced scholarship on all our three cases. In the economic sphere, it has 
led to an unhelpful conceptual dichotomy of development and stagnation, 
with no place offered to notions of pre-modern change. In the political 
sphere, it has led to unreasonable expectations of the power of central 
bureaucracies. And in the realm of elite studies, it has led to a negligence 
of the power of traditional, landed elites. 
Of course, history must always be, in a sense, our history. And as men and 
women living in the modern world, the historical problem of how that 
world came into being remains essential to us. But a part of the historical 
sciences ‘growing up’ in the modern world, so to speak, is the realization 
that most of history is simply not about us. Modernocentrism is to liken 
with the ‘childhood disease’ of evolutionary biology that presented hu-
mankind as the pinnacle of evolution, and saw all of evolutionary history 
leading inexorably toward our eventual emergence. The emergence of mo-
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dernity, like the evolutionary history of modern humans, naturally consti-
tutes an important problem in its own right. But it should not form the 
basis from which we engage the totality of pre-modern history. The his-
tory of pre-modernity is relevant, not only as a genealogy of our modern 
condition, but as a repository of the immensely diverse wealth of social 
formations that have existed through the ages. 
Continuity and discontinuity 
The ever more popular periodization of the centuries preceding the indus-
trial revolution as an ‘early modernity’ is a prime example of modernocen-
trism, and consequently needs to be abandoned. Although the problems 
concerning its use as a period in world history have been noted by many 
scholars670, even as a strictly European periodization it is burdened by too 
much teleological expectation to be useful. Instead, I have opted to use 
the term ‘late pre-modernity’ to cover the same period. This periodization 
flips the pattern of continuity and discontinuity implicit in the notion of 
an early modernity, and affirms the period’s broad continuity with the past, 
rather than its connection with the future. 
The 17th and 18th centuries were characterized by a great continuity with 
earlier centuries. Change in both the economic, political, and social realms 
largely followed already established patterns across all three cases. How-
ever, as I have argued, it is a profound mistake to interpret this continuity 
as evidence for a long history of modernization, as is so often done in the 
literature. Rather, it should be taken as a reaffirmation of the 19th century 
as the great historical divide between the pre-modern and the modern. 
Continuity over the late pre-modern period implies a greater discontinuity 
with period that followed it. The stronger the discontinuity, however, the 
harder it becomes to explain. This calls for some clarification. 
Modernity, of course, did in some way emerge from pre-modernity. But it 
did so not as a natural outcome of the processes described here, or as the 
next ‘stage’ in a generalized pattern of social evolution. In truth, modernity, 
like the evolution of modern humans, was the result of an aberrant devel-
opment. Whether the emergence of modernity should be understood as a 
specifically British phenomenon, and thus geographically external to our 
cases, or as a general European one, and only analytically external, is a ques-
tion that cannot be answered here. What can be said is that it was at least 
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an external phenomenon to the dynamics of economic development and 
state- and elite formation at work in all our three cases. The roots of mo-
dernity, in short, are not to be found here. They may very well be found 
elsewhere, say in the evolving intellectual tradition connected to the scien-
tific revolution. If modernity was in this way or another somehow bub-
bling up from underneath European society, its influence remained pe-
ripheral to economic, political, and social developments through the 17th 
and 18th centuries. 
Population and economic development 
The pattern of pre-modern continuity is clearest in the economic history 
of our three cases, which also presents us with the greatest similarities be-
tween them. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, we have observed a 
Boserupian dynamic of demographic expansion resulting in both agricul-
tural intensification and a growing commercialization of the economy. The 
power of the Boserupian framework, as developed here, lies in its integra-
tion of the commercial and manufactural spheres with the agrarian econ-
omy, which in the pre-modern world at all times formed the basis of the 
economic system. In this way, we become able to make sense of the seem-
ingly contradictory evaluations of the economic performance of all three 
cases. The increasing misery of the peasant population was directly linked 
to the expansion of manufacture and the growing commercialization of 
the period, which makes any generalized notion of ‘progress’ meaningless. 
This perspective can be generalized to the entire agrarian age between the 
Neolithic and the industrial revolution. The most notable pattern of cu-
mulative development throughout this age is the slow expansion of the 
agrarian population, both into new territories and by filling up already cul-
tivated lands. Over time, cultivation practices intensified everywhere, so 
increasingly the biblical curse upon Adam that he would eat his food (of 
declining quality) “by the sweat of your brow” became true of the human 
condition. Simultaneously, denser populations enabled the world to be-
come increasingly bound together by commercial networks, though these 
remained fairly limited in strength due to the fundamental constraints on 
mobility inherent in the pre-modern world.  
The 17th and 18th centuries represent the climax of this continuous devel-
opment, not because it was ‘completed’ or fully developed in any sense, 
but because its further development was cut short by the intrusion of mo-
dernity in the 19th century. It is thus no surprise that the late pre-modern 
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world saw population, commercialization, and manufacture reach new 
heights of intensity, as these were continually increasing. No notion of a 
demographic, commercial, or industrious revolution is needed to explain 
this, and it tells us very little about the emergence of modernity. 
Dynamics of state formation 
The patterns of state formation in 17th- and 18th-century China, France, 
and the Habsburg Empire present a somewhat more complex picture. On 
one level, France and the Habsburg Empire in this period can be thought 
of as converging on the bureaucratic-imperial model of rule exemplified 
by China. This model involved rule through somewhat abstract bureau-
cracies, the taxation of agricultural land as the central source of revenue, 
the maintenance of a standing army, and a system of differentiated rule 
structured  in concentric circles surrounding the imperial center. On an-
other level, a clear divergence appeared in the capacities for resource ex-
traction and military mobilization between France and the Habsburg Em-
pire on the one hand, and China on the other. 
What are we to make of this convergent-cum-divergent development? The 
emergence of the bureaucratic-imperial state in both China and Europe 
can be seen as an example of convergent evolution. Faced with similar 
problems of internal control, the bureaucratic-imperial model offered an 
effective approach to securing internal stability in a complex society. The 
peculiar state forms of medieval Europe, with their non-monopolization 
of the sources of social power, in the terminology of Michael Mann, over 
the late pre-modern era slowly gave way to the more stable “recurrent Le-
viathan” of the bureaucratic-imperial state.671 
This development of the French and Habsburg states occurred in the con-
text of an intense interstate competition, which also explains the diver-
gence in fiscal-military capacities. The constant military threat to these two 
states necessitated an immense expansion in army sizes, the cost of which 
required them to push resource extraction to its limits. This militarization, 
however, was undertaken by purely pre-modern means, and it came at a 
cost to the internal stability of the regimes. The dynamic of interstate com-
petition was inherently unstable on the macro-level, firstly because it led 
to this internal instability, and secondly because competition ultimately 
                                              
671 Eich, Schmidt-Hofner, and Wieland, Der Wiederkehrende Leviathan. 
208 
 
tends to produce winners and losers. In a global perspective, similar dy-
namics therefore always resulted in the collapse of the system, usually lead-
ing to the establishment of an empire, as it had done in China two millen-
nia before. The natural end-point of this dynamic was thus not the modern 
nation-state, but ultimately its own collapse. 
Traditional elites 
The formation of societal elites in all our cases is heavily bound up on the 
twin processes of the emergence (or continuation) of the bureaucratic-
imperial state and the increasing commercialization of the economy. The 
bureaucratic-imperial state functioned by orienting social elites toward the 
state through a variety of means. Physically this was done by establishing 
a lavish court that acted as a center of elite attention and acted as a ‘foun-
tain of privilege’. More broadly, through the formalization of elite status, 
the institution of similarly formalized elite hierarchies, and the careful de-
limitation of the privileges connected with elite status, the state acted as 
the ultimate source and guarantor of elite privilege in society. The power 
of local elites was thus enacted more through the state than in opposition 
to it. Additionally, the bureaucratic-imperial state acted as a sponsor of a 
high culture, which could provide a cultural unification of the various local 
elites spread across its territories. China, with its bureaucratic-imperial 
state reaching back centuries if not millennia, had gone farthest in this 
direction, but developments in 17th- and 18th-century France and the 
Habsburg Empire trended toward similar patterns. Also here we see a 
gradual monopolization of the sources of social power over time, and thus 
a gradual convergence on the Chinese pattern. 
Simultaneously with these developments, we can observe the effects of 
commercialization on the elites in all three cases. Patterns of elite land-
holding changed toward land being treated more like an object of invest-
ment on the part of the elites. Commercial and financial activities were 
also increasingly undertaken by elites, though as a rule it remained socially 
disparaged. And families of commercial wealth were offered openings into 
the elite, replenishing their numbers. Following the differentiated impact 
of commercialization across the three societies, the commercialization of 
the elites had proceeded further in China than in France, and least far in 
the Habsburg Empire. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the primary 
economic basis of elites in all three societies remained landholding 
throughout this period. As the economies remained fundamentally agrar-
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ian, landholding was far from being displaced as the main economic activ-
ity of the elites. Furthermore, the commercial activities of the elites were 
generally dependent on their domination of either the land or the levers 
of political power, as it often resulted from their ability to distort local 
markets for their own gain.  
Also in the elite sphere, then, were the developments of the 17th and 18th 
centuries broadly continuous with earlier trends, the product of essentially 
pre-modern developments in the political and economic spheres. We have 
no need of the framework of modernization in order to understand these 
transformations, which can be easily accommodated within pre-modernity. 
Late pre-modernity in World History 
What can we learn from these conclusions about the place of the late pre-
modern period in the greater structure of world history? In order to get a 
broad perspective, let us first zoom out to the farthest possible view. Hu-
man history can be separated into four great epochs. The first epoch is the 
exceedingly long stretch of time before the Neolithic revolution some-
where around 10,000 BCE, though subject to local variation in timing. The 
second epoch stretches from the Neolithic to the Urban revolution of c. 
3000 BCE, where cities and states first emerged. The third epoch is the 
agrarian age of civilization stretching from that time until the Industrial 
revolution of c. 1800 CE. And the fourth, and current, epoch is the age of 
modernity. Each of these four epochs was governed by distinct evolution-
ary dynamics, and the transitions between them represent the greatest dis-
continuities of historical time. 
The 17th and 18th centuries studied here thus represent the final moments 
of the great agrarian epoch. Late pre-modernity can thus be thought of as 
the climax of the agrarian epoch, if only because of its subsequent transi-
tion into modernity, and not because it represented an inherent end-point 
in itself. In late pre-modernity, new patterns of response to old dynamics 
appeared, as they continually did, growing new ‘branches’ of the evolu-
tionary tree of agrarian history. States spread out to cover new territories 
on every continent except Antarctica, and commercial links between every 
part of the world strengthened. But these developments did not represent 
a prelude to modernity. The dynamics governing late pre-modernity were 
substantially the same, pre-modern dynamics that had been governing his-
torical change through millennia. Their resultant trajectories of change led 
210 
 
not toward modernity, but toward the continuation, extension, and further 
development of the pre-modern, agrarian world.  
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Abstract 
In World History, the 17th and 18th centuries represent an ambivalent pe-
riod, conceptually caught between the realms of tradition and modernity. 
Conventionally, European scholarship has interpreted major develop-
ments of this period through a framework of modernization, with the con-
ceptualization of the period as an ‘early modernity’ gaining ground. In re-
cent decades the notion of an early modernity has been extended to serve 
as a framework for global history as well. 
This thesis challenges these frameworks of modernization and early mo-
dernity on the grounds of their inherent teleological problems. Instead, it 
argues that the major developments of the 17th and 18th centuries can be 
largely accounted for in terms of the continuous workings of pre-modern 
dynamics of change and stability. The argument of the thesis is structured 
around a comparative analysis of processes of economic development, 
state formation, and the formation of social elites in China, France, and 
the Austrian Habsburg Empire, c. 1650-1800. By departing from the usual 
pattern of East-West comparison and using China as the model case for 
the analysis, the thesis provides a new perspective on the major develop-
ments in the period, stressing their deep continuities with pre-modernity. 
In the economic sphere, it is argued that developments in China, France, 
and the Habsburg Empire were mainly driven by a shared agrarian dy-
namic, in which population growth resulted in agricultural intensification, 
the growth of manufacture, and an increasing commercialization of soci-
ety, including social elites. Similar dynamics of state formation resulted in 
a convergence of state forms across the three cases on the model of the 
‘bureaucratic-imperial state’. This also resulted in a similar convergence of 
state-elite relations. Conversely, the period saw a divergence in state ca-
pacities for military mobilization and resource extraction, with China im-
posing far less on local society than both France and the Habsburg Empire. 
It is, however, argued that this divergence can ultimately be contained 
within a pre-modern framework of historical change. 
Finally, these conclusions are drawn together to argue for a reconceptual-
ization of the period as ‘late pre-modernity’, a period characterized by the 
continuation and extension of the pre-modern, agrarian social formations. 
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Resume  
Det 17. og 18. århundrede udgør en ambivalent periode i historien, fanget 
mellem tradition og modernitet. I europæisk historieskrivning er tidens 
store forandringer almindeligvis blevet tolket som modernisering, og i sti-
gende grad bliver der talt om perioden som ”tidlig modernitet”. I nyere 
globalhistorie er den tidlige modernitet endog blevet fortolket som et glo-
balt fænomen. 
Denne afhandling udgør en kritik af disse forståelsesrammer, der må op-
fattes som udtryk for en teleologisk tilgang til verdenshistorien. De større 
udviklingstendenser, der gjorde sig gældende i det 17. og 18. århundrede, 
bliver her i stedet forklaret som udslag af førmoderne udviklingsdynamik-
ker. Afhandlingens kerne udgøres af en komparativ analyse af økonomisk 
udvikling, statsdannelse og dannelsen af samfundseliter i Kina, Frankrig 
og det østrigske Habsburgerrige i perioden ca. 1650-1800. Modsat tidligere 
traditioner for komparation, hvor Europa tages som udgangspunkt, tager 
afhandlingens analyse udgangspunkt i Kinas udvikling. Dette bidrager 
med et nyt perspektiv på tidens udviklinger, der lægger vægt på deres 
grundlæggende kontinuitet med det førmoderne. 
Økonomisk udvikling i både Kina, Frankrig og Habsburgerriget var i 
denne periode grundlæggende styret af en fælles udviklingsdynamik, hvor 
befolkningsvækst førte til intensivering af landbruget, vækst i manufaktur-
virksomhed samt øget kommercialisering af samfundet, herunder sam-
fundseliterne. Sammenlignelige statsdannelsesprocesser førte til en kon-
vergerende udvikling i de tre samfund imod dannelsen af bureaukratisk-
imperiale statsformer. Dette indebar desuden en lignende konvergens in-
den for relationerne mellem stat og eliter. Omvendt var perioden dog også 
karakteriseret af en fortløbende divergens i staternes evner til at mobilisere 
både ressourcer og militære midler. Hvor staten i Frankrig og Habsbur-
gerriget kontinuerligt øgede sine ressourcemæssige og militære kapaciteter, 
var den kinesiske stat langt mindre indtrængende i lokalsamfundet. I sidste 
ende kan denne divergens dog også forklares inden for en førmoderne 
tolkningsramme. 
Afslutningsvis sættes disse konklusioner i perspektiv, og der argumenteres 
for en omdefinering af tidsperioden som ”sen førmodernitet”, en periode 
præget af en kontinuerlig udvikling og udvidelse af førmoderne, agrare 
samfundsformer. 
